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Editor: KEITH HOWARD

Editorial Assistants: BETH MCKILLOP
JUDITH NORDBY

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KOREA AND THE GULF CRISIS

BRIAN BRIDGES

On 26 January 1991, two South Korean Air Force C-130 Hercules transport planes landed at Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia carrying Colonel Ch'oe Myŏnggu and a military medical team. These were to join the multinational forces fighting in the Gulf. The despatch of the 154-member team was the first occasion for the South Korean military to serve in an overseas war zone since April 1973, when the last "Tiger Division" had been withdrawn from Vietnam. The medical corps' activities were limited by the speed of the collapse of the Iraqi forces after the land offensive against them began in the last week of February. Brief though the activities may have been, the symbolism of South Korean involvement was nonetheless important. The 7 month Gulf crisis, dating from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, also had a broader significance for Korea. This paper argues it has proved to be a dilemma, a diversion and a catalyst for the southern government.

Serious South Korean contact with the Middle East has been both recent and predominantly economic in character. As South Korea began to industrialize in the 1960s and 1970s, its burgeoning energy demand led to an increased dependence on imported oil. Indeed, the dependence ratio rose from 10% in 1964 to 75% by 1983. Also, there was an increased dependence on a few Middle

Eastern countries, to the extent that in 1978, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran supplied 96% of South Korea's oil imports. The southern economy weathered the first oil shock relatively well, not least because of the post-shock Middle Eastern construction boom, but it was hit harder by the second shock; growth even went negative in 1980. During the first half of the 1980s, the government therefore put greater emphasis firstly on conservation and secondly on diversification of oil suppliers and other energy sources. Nevertheless, the Middle Eastern energy import and construction activities remained integral elements in Korean economic development. Indeed, in the second half of the 1980s, the dependence on Middle Eastern oil started once more to creep up.

Politically, South Koreans had kept a low profile in the region. They were wary of radical Arab nationalism, broadly prepared to follow the Arab line on the Israeli-Palestinian issue after the 1973-74 switch of policy, and they tried to continue to conduct business with both sides during the lengthy Iran-Iraq war. As in Third World areas, diplomatic competition with North Korea was a continuing feature. The North had made notable diplomatic advances in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s, and its support for Palestinians and radical Arabs became implicitly linked with its challenge to American imperialism. In the 1970s, however, growing fragmentation amongst the Arab states and South Korean companies' active participation in construction led to increased South Korean political contacts, even with the more militant and previously pro-North governments. By the late 1980s this had resulted in large-scale construction projects with countries such as Libya.

Yet, overall, the Koreans have had very few historical or cultural connections with the Middle East. They feel very

little affinity either with Islam—which was formally introduced into South Korea by Turkish troops during the Korean War and which now has only about 20,000 adherents—or with the Arabs in general.

Economically, the most immediate concerns for the South Korean government after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 were the safety of Korean workers in the region and the effects of the invasion on the supply and price of oil. The four largest Korean construction companies were involved in a total of 17 projects, valued collectively at $2,510 million. Around 1,300 Koreans were working in the two countries. Iraq and Kuwait supplied around 12% of the South's imports of crude oil (figures for the first half of 1990 give 4.2% from Iraq and 7.6% from Kuwait). Kuwait additionally supplied around one-fifth of imports of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), a key cooking fuel in Korea's smaller cities and rural areas.

As a result, government officials, while sympathizing with Kuwait as a victim of aggression, were extremely cautious in commenting publicly. This position continued even after the U.N. Security Council resolution proposed economic sanctions. Only on 9 August, after strong requests from U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar and a visit from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, did the government announce a series of economic sanctions. These included an import embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude oil and a total trade embargo, apart from some medicines. This marked a victory for the Foreign Ministry over the Economic Planning Board (EPB). The latter had opposed economic sanctions on the grounds that, even if the domestic oil price was not raised immediately, there would be an inflationary psychological impact of the embargo.

The Gulf crisis, ironically, acted almost as a kiss of life for the Energy and Resources Ministry, which not so long before had appeared close to abolition because of bureaucratic rivalries. Minister Yi Hŭi-il voluntarily forfeited his summer holiday and set up a crisis management team; his Ministry took the lead in formulating a two-pronged response. Firstly, to alleviate supply shortages and to stabilize the domestic oil price, the Ministry decided to revive the national energy conservation campaigns which had flagged in recent years. They drew on stockpiles of crude and petroleum products (39.8 million barrels, or the equivalent of 43 days' supply if all imports ceased) and used the Petroleum Business Fund (then standing at 1. 6 trillion *wŏn*) to cushion spot-price oil purchasing. Secondly, for the medium-term, the Ministry decided to speed up work on nuclear power plants already under construction to reduce the relative dependence on oil, and to review and intensify extant plans for oil exploration on the continental shelf. In early March 1991, they thus unveiled a revised long-term plan for an additional 16 electricity power plants to be built by 2001, none of them oil-fired.

Other ministries were concerned about the falling away in exports to the region (losses were estimated to be in the order of $500 million for the August-December 1990 period) and uncollected payments for construction jobs undertaken in Iraq and Kuwait (about $1 billion outstanding). The government tried to encourage exports to other regions and to arrange loan facilities for companies which found themselves in financial difficulties. Consideration was also given to the repatriation of Korean nationals; some were evacuated, mostly from Kuwait to neighbouring countries, but about 100 construction workers—including 23 from the Hyundai company working on the presidential palace in Baghdad—continued working in Iraq up until the eve of the January fighting.

The government was successful in the short-term in finding alternative sources of oil supply, mainly through signing new contracts. Saudi Arabia agreed to supply more than double the amount that Iraq and Kuwait had previously exported; their share of Korean oil imports therefore rose in 1990 to 12%, and in 1991 was likely to reach around 25%. However, when oil prices jumped to $40 a barrel in Autumn 1990, it proved difficult to continue the policy of freezing all domestic oil prices; on 24 November the Energy Minister announced a 28% price increase in both kerosene and petrol. Although oil prices eased back towards the end of the year and actually dropped to around $16 a barrel after "Operation Desert Storm" began on 16 January 1991, the government instituted further emergency measures in mid-January. Neon signs and electronic advertisements were banned, street lighting was cut by half, TV broadcasting hours were cut by two hours, and private passenger cars were forced to stay off the roads every 10th day. The effects were noticeable. In February, private petrol consumption decreased by 12% compared with pre-war (1990) levels and electricity consumption dropped 3%. With the war over so quickly, these energy conservation gains may only be temporary and the government faces a test as to whether it is able, in the medium-term, to both sustain this conservation mood and consolidate the renewed enthusiasm for diversification of energy sources.

The rapid end of the war not only made more stable oil prices likely, but also raised prospects for Korean companies, particularly construction companies, of a new business surge as Kuwait is reconstructed. One Ministry of Trade official speculated that South Korean companies could expect to win 10% of the rehabilitation project contracts. However, since American companies seem to be getting the lion's share of new work, Korean companies may well need to go into joint ventures and sub-contracting.

The new more optimistic mood, like the bouts of panic over the autumnal oil price increases, may actually act as a diversion from the consideration and remedying of more serious underlying problems within the South Korean economy. The oil price rises were not the main cause of economic woes, nor are construction orders likely to be the solution. Although economic growth recorded a 9% figure in 1990, the trade and current account balances went into the red to the tune of around $2 billion. This was the first such result for five years. In 1991, the growth rate was expected to be down around 7% and deficits were expected to increase. Indecision and confusion has characterized recent economic policy-making, with ministers involved in reshuffles, convoluted domestic political manoeuvering, and dramatic diplomatic offensives. All of these have distracted Roh Tae Woo [No T'ae-u]. Protectionism has been rising in major markets, where South Korea no longer benefits from benign neglect, and the spluttering negotiations in the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) seriously impacted on Korean trading practices. At home, rising demands for social equity and a better quality of life have exposed socio-economic tensions.

Most serious, however, was the loss of international competitiveness as continued high wage rises and exchange rate changes coupled with the emergence of new—often Southeast Asian—competitors in traditional products hampered Korean export growth. South Korea, therefore, has an economy in transition: its relatively new emphasis on automation and skill training, overseas investment and, above all, funding for research and development will need to be sustained if it is to return to earlier successes.

The inter-ministerial wrangling which delayed the South's initial response to the Iraqi invasion in August led to some political fall-out. Although at that time not a member

of the U.N, it did accede to the call for economic sanctions. Calls from George Bush at the end of August 1990 for greater commitment by those nations not yet actively participating in the multinational forces then placed the government in a dilemma. U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady visited Seoul in early September to specifically ask for a $350 million contribution. After considerable deliberation, the government on 24 September announced a package of $220 million aid—$120 million to the multinational forces and $100 to help the front-line states of Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt—and the dispatch of a small medical team. Within the government, concerns for the roughly 200 Koreans still left in Iraq and Kuwait and for Korean companies' interests were balanced against the desire to see oil price stability ensured by an early resolution of the crisis and the need to keep good relations with the United States. The financial package was finally approved in January 1991, by which time the number of states to receive aid widened but the dollar total remained the same. The package seems to have been pitched at the level at which countries such as Taiwan were expected to contribute and caused little domestic controversy. The same could not be said about the plan to send a medical team.

The main consideration behind the plan for a medical team seems to have been to pre-empt calls from the American Congress for greater contributions or for actual military participation. Discussion about the team's composition became protracted, perhaps deliberately so, for the government hoped negotiations might settle the crisis. Public opinion was certainly ambivalent; an opinion poll by the *Chungang Ilbo* newspaper in January 1991 (the day after the failure of the Baker-Aziz talks) showed 55% of the respondents not expecting the outbreak of war, only 30% in favour of using force to expel Iraq and 50% supporting the deployment of a medical team. But the U.N. deadline to Iraq

concentrated the government and when legislation was finally drafted for the National Assembly in January it became clear that a 154-man military medical team would be sent. Compromise ruled: although in uniform, they would be sent for humanitarian purposes.

Memories, but contradictory ones, of both the Korean and the Vietnam wars were evoked by this decision. As Defence Ministry officials argued, the dispatch of the team could be seen as a way of repaying U.N. forces for having shed blood for the South during the Korean War; it would also help in gaining broader international support should the South again find itself subject to invasion from the North in the future. On the other hand, as Kim Dae-jung [Kim Taejung] and his opposition Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), pointed out, South Korean involvement in the Vietnam War began with the dispatch of medical personnel in 1964 and escalated until over 4,000 combat troops had died before withdrawal in 1973. Roh Tae Woo [No T'ae-u] had himself commanded a South Korean battalion in Vietnam. The fear of escalating involvement and the concomitant of a new heightened role for the military was deep-seated. Even some members of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), especially the faction led by Kim Young-sam [Kim Yŏngsam], were strongly opposed to anything more than a medical team being sent. When Defence Minister Lee Jong-koo [Yi Chonggu] suggested on 11 January that South Korea would give careful consideration to any strong U.S. requests for combat troops, the adverse reactions within the DLP and amongst other ministries forced him to withdraw his remarks.

The outbreak of fighting in mid-January posed further problems for a southern government aware of implicit U.S. hints that further help was needed. The National Assembly quickly and overwhelmingly approved the dispatch of the

medical team, as the PPD dropped its opposition provided that no combat troops were to be sent. Only the small Democratic Party voted against. On 30 January, the government decided to provide an additional $280 million to the multinational forces and to send 5 C-130 transport planes to help ferry materials and personnel to Saudi Arabia. After National Assembly approval, the transport unit left Seoul on 18 February for the United Arab Emirates, where it was to be based.

The second dispatch was justified in terms of South Korea's interests both in its relations with the United States and in the anticipated post-war Middle Eastern order. Certainly, South Korean-U.S. relations had been strained over the past year by a number of trade and market-opening disputes (compounded by differences over GATT negotiations) and by disagreements over financial and operational burden-sharing in the defence area of Korea itself. Some Americans had also noted the paucity of the first Korean commitment in comparison to the $3 billion aid package agreed by the Soviet Union. The predilection to equate the multinational forces with the United States, a tendency found in other countries as well, was a key factor behind the South's commitments, and helped to explain the measured response to a request made in mid-February by a visiting senior British Foreign Office official for finance. Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ock [Yi Sangok] described strengthening relations with the United States as one of the primary diplomatic goals of 1991; the second Gulf commitment was clearly envisaged as a further part of this process.

The government, however, also felt that South Korea could not expect to have a voice, and a real commercial presence, in the post-war reconstruction of Kuwait, Iraq and the surrounding region unless it was prepared to stand

up and be counted. This was an argument accepted by the opposition PPD as well. Some officials argued, on the contrary, that South Korea might suffer adverse Arab nationalist sentiment because of its participation, but the majority Arab support for the allied cause and the restraint of the Israelis lessened these concerns.

The Gulf crisis also heightened South Korean concerns in a number of other areas. The North Korean reaction was followed carefully. P'yŏngyang found itself in a difficult situation. It had openly supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and, despite subsequent attempts to repair relations with Iraq, it did pass critical comment on the invasion of Kuwait. Yet North Korea also criticised the US involvement and, later, announced that the opening of hostilities were typical of American imperialism's aggression. North Korea, consequently, was scathing about the South's efforts to contribute to the multinational forces and warned of the dangers of tension on the peninsula increasing as a result of the growth of warlike feelings in the South. Roh Tae Woo was described as "running amok like a cow on fire". The southern government was worried that the North might take the opportunity of U.S. distractions to cause trouble. As a result, the South's armed forces were put on full alert, just as the North's troops went on alert. Nevertheless, the South decided to continue with the joint South Korean-U.S. "Team Spirit" exercises in March, though much reduced in scale. The interruptions in the North-South dialogue, however, had little to do with the events in the distant Gulf. The North must have been disturbed by the relative ease with which the high-technology U.S.-led forces defeated the Soviet-armed Iraqis. Their own forces are far better entrenched in underground bunkers than were the Iraqis, and the potential psychological impact of their Scud missiles on Seoul will have been noted (unlike Israel, the South does not possess Patriot missiles and, even if it did,

they probably could not be used to intercept a northern Scud given the short flying time from the DMZ to Seoul). North Korea's need to modernise its equipment was nonetheless made clear; whether its allies would be willing to provide such new hardware and whether the North Korean economy could afford it was less clear.

South Korea was also worried about the course of the Japanese debate, much more intense and public than the Korean one, about how to contribute to the crisis. The Japanese plans, abortive though they ultimately were, to send self-defence forces (SDF) to the Gulf under the U.N. Peace Co-operation Bill and, subsequently, to send SDF aircraft to transport refugees, evoked memories of past Japanese military activities overseas and led to fears that they would be "the starting point of the remilitarisation of Japan" (according to the South Korean Foreign Minister, Ch'oe Hojung). Moreover, if Japan did send the SDF then American pressure on South Korea to send troops would have increased. In the end, the southern government was able to draw comfort from the fact that they were one of only two countries in East Asia that were considered as serious potential contributors to such a multinational endeavour and that they themselves had contributed men as well as money, unlike the Japanese who have continued to be criticised in the United States and elsewhere.

Has the Gulf crisis shown South Korea to be a global player? Despite the economic and political difficulties participation caused, the crisis may act as a kind of catalyst towards what Korean ministers have described as the fulfilment of responsibilities commensurate with the nation's status in the international community. South Korea was not at this time a member of the United Nations, but responded as if it was and, indeed, later in 1991 joined. In the 1982 Lebanon crisis South Korea had been asked to

join the international peace-keeping force but did not feel able to. In 1988, the South felt unable to respond either with naval forces or direct financial help to U.S. requests for assistance in the earlier Gulf crisis. In the 1990-91 crisis, however, the South cautiously moved into action. Undoubtedly, South Korea is now a much more mature economic and political entity. Concern about the US relationship remains important, but an aspiration for a more independent approach is also clear. One Foreign Ministry official said that the Gulf crisis had made the government "realise the limitations" of its diplomacy. 1991 marked the time to diversify diplomatic activities and to develop independent capabilities.

NOTES

This paper draws predominantly on contemporary Korean, European and Japanese newspapers and journals, the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts, and the FBIS Daily Report. These sources are supplemented with interview material.

For additional background refer to:

1. Chung-in Moon, "Between ideology and interest: North Korea in the Middle East," in Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chol Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak (eds), *The Foreign Relations of North Korea* (Seoul: Kyungnam [Kyŏngnam] University Press, Seoul, 1987).

2. Dalchoong Kim and Euisoon Shin (eds), *Energy Policies in Korea and Japan* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986).

EXPLAINING KOREAN DEVELOPMENT:

Some issues of ideology and method

AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER

Introduction

Few, if any, topics in the social sciences have been the subject of such a variety of competing explanations as has the economic development of South Korea. In an earlier essay (1987a: 252-253), I listed over 20 factors—many mutually contradictory, and covering the full span of economic, political, and cultural variables—which different authorities have pin-pointed as significant in this context.

The present brief paper pursues a similar goal, but more broadly. Rather than individual factors, my focus here is on four main approaches or schools which have become prominent in the literature: market forces, dependency, étatiste, and Confucianism. Although none is (in my view) wholly devoid of merit, all suffer in varying degrees from at least two kinds of defects, namely, ideological bias and methodological problems. My modest hope is that identifying these may encourage both reflection and better communication among scholars working in this area in future.

A note on ideology

While the notion of methodological problems is uncontentious, the word "ideology" may raise eyebrows or even hackles. All I am suggesting is that scholars writing on Korea, as on anything or anywhere else, tend to have wider political, moral, cultural, or just disciplinary commitments. These may be explicit or implicit, but in either case are fairly evident. Just as Korea itself 40 years ago was a battleground for rival global systems and ideologies, so has the interpretation of modern South Korea become a talisman for broader controversies—whether within the social sciences, or in respect to political commitments.

Two further clarifications. First, without getting into a deep theoretical debate, I would just clarify that to expose ideology is not to expunge it. Unlike Max Weber, I do not believe that social science can attain *Wertfreiheit* (value freedom). But importantly, this does not mean a free-for-all. Rather, the task is to make ideological elements explicit, and then compare the adequacy of rival explanations. Second, it of course follows that this exercise itself can never be wholly "scientific". Here, I try to practise what I preach and make my own ideological commitments (past and present) as transparent as possible.

Market forces

As is well known, one major interpretation of South Korea's economic success attributes it to textbook economics. Authors and writings associated with the World Bank (Balassa, Krueger, Little) and others (Galenson, Hicks

and so on) see Seoul's success as vindicating the general tenets of neo-classical theory and laissez-faire practice—often summarized in the slogan "getting the prices right". As such South Korea, as well as the three other East Asian NIEs which are similarly characterised but which are not my concern, has been touted as a model of an "open" economy which other would-be developing countries should emulate.

Despite its wide currency and respectable credentials, this approach suffers from a fairly major methodological defect: it is largely untrue. As overwhelmingly demonstrated by Amsden (1989) and the IDS-Sussex "Gatsby" project authors—Wade (1982), Wade and White (eds) (1984), White and Wade (eds) (1985), Luedde-Neurath (1986), White (ed.) (1987)—the South Korean state has been highly interventionist and even *dirigiste* in almost every field of economic policy: export promotion, credit control, import restrictions, agriculture, industrialization, technology transfer, etc. etc. In Amsden's memorable phrase, "getting relative prices *wrong*" in order to create comparative advantage, dynamically, would be a more appropriate characterization than "getting the prices *right*".

A brief summary like this runs the risk of caricature (which, indeed, has not been absent in some of the mutual sniping, rather than direct debate, which has characterized the field thus far). But it does seem clear that the impetus to portray the South Korean case as a free-market flagship forms part of a more general move, which Toye (1987) has dubbed a "counter-revolution" in development studies. The authors cited above (especially Little) are generally critical of earlier paradigms in development economics, especially the penchant for import-substituting industrialization (ISI) once associated with the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL).

That South Korea and the other NIEs represent a break with ISI is plausible. Even this is not uncontentious, since in South Korea ISI both preceded (in the 1950s) and arguably continued alongside the more obvious and celebrated export-orientated industrialization (EOI). And today the home market is far from negligible.

Nonetheless, the kernel of truth in the market forces school lies in South Korea's export-orientation, and more especially in the rare subtlety and effectiveness of the policy instruments deployed (such as access to foreign exchange and import licences, the timing of devaluations, and so on). Yet that conceded, two criticisms must stand. First, even these interventions—for interventions they undoubtedly were—surely go beyond "getting the prices right". Using White's (1984) terminology, state intervention in South Korea was "pervasive" and not merely "parametric". And second, acute sensitivity and responsiveness to world market conditions by no means entailed either an "open" economy (as regards imports or foreign investment) or a laissez-faire approach at home.

Finally, the fact that over the past decade (largely since Chun Doo Hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan] came to power) the South Korean economy has *become* less étatiste should not lead to erroneous assumptions that it has been that way all along. In particular, to view the earlier Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi] regime as one dominated by market forces is surely unsustainable.

Dependency

With dependency theory we enter very different territory. For one thing, alone among the four schools I consider here, dependency theory sees itself as seeking to explain failure rather than success. Less extreme versions might qualify this, but would still insist that South Korea's development is fragile, circumscribed by, or otherwise dependent on, an unpredictable global economy.

For anyone without an ideological axe to grind, the idea of South Korea as an economic failure seems bizarre. (What, then, would one point to as *success* in this mortal life?) Indeed, it is tempting to suggest that the dependency approach shares all the empirical implausibility of its free market polar opposite, while enjoying none of the latter's respectability. Yet this school remains influential in South Korea itself, if not outside.

In an earlier work (1987a) published as part of a collection devoted to this topic, I undertook an exhaustive examination and critique of dependency propositions concerning South Korea. Like most foreign observers, and including those sympathetic to the general dependency approach, the conclusion I drew from the evidence was that Seoul stands out precisely as having *avoided* the pitfalls and traps which an outward-oriented strategy risks. More precisely: although in the past South Korea did present the picture of an export-dependent, low-wage, high-debt, labour-intensive dictatorship, in retrospect all these appear only as stages *en route* to something altogether healthier. In Luedde-Neurath's happy phrase, even if South Korea over time has in a sense grown more dependent *on* the world economy, it has simultaneously become more independent within it.

The few outside Korea who continue to deny this (eg, Sunoo 1988) produce work whose ideological prejudice is as obvious as their arguments are unconvincing. Many who once held similar views have either gone over to the étatistes (like myself) or made some other retreat. One luminary of dependency theory, Samir Amin, seems to have collapsed into culturalism: if South Korea (and Taiwan) have escaped from dependency, then thank Confucianism (1987: 54)!

Still another tack (in a work from which I have thus far only seen extracts) is to shift in a sense from red to green. Bello and Rosenfield's *Dragons in Distress* emphasises the environmental as well as dependency risks in South Korea's development pattern. While undoubtedly there are real issues here, the suspicion persists that the main aim is a debunking exercise (to puncture the "miracle") rather than dispassionate scholarship.

One dependency proposition which does raise real questions arises on the kindred terrain of world-system theory (WST), and has been posed in a recent article by Bruce Cumings (1989). In general, WST allows for limited upward mobility by a few "semi-peripheral" countries within the hierarchical world-system, at certain times and under conditions dictated by the "core". In particular, Cumings argues that the regional economy which emerged in North East Asia over the past quarter-century found its niche in manufacturing for U.S. markets—but the very fact that it did so meant that Latin America could not, since there was not room for both.

Although such propositions are inherently difficult to prove or disprove, to me the notion of some systematic or relational constraints or effects (put quite simply, how some countries' development alters the prospects for others) is in principle more convincing that the naive "methodological

country-ism" of the free marketeers, for whom it seemingly suffices for any and all countries, anywhere and anytime, to open up and let rip (see Crook 1989). On the other hand, overstating systemic constraints can lead to a "zero-sum" pessimism which risks being refuted by successive waves of NIEs, NNIEs (next NIEs), NNNIES (nearly next NIEs)...

Excepting this one WST argument, then, dependency analyses of South Korea are in the 1990s largely unconvincing. They are nonetheless of great ideological interest, particularly within South Korea. Not only are quite extreme versions of the dependency approach, which elsewhere in the world has been in decline for well over a decade, still influential among the student movement. But in a more diffuse sense these also resonate with a wider Korean scepticism. Why is this?

The answer can be found in Gavin Kitching's (1989) concept of populism. From the beginning, he argues, the horrors of industrialism tend everywhere to produce a typical ideological reaction: a mix of moralism, ruralism, and nationalism. *Minjung*-philosophy fits this bill exactly. This is the ideological response of people who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have been victims rather than makers of their own history. Hence the strange paradox, that where foreign observers and empirical evidence show a strong Korean state and Korean corporations (*chaebŏl*), "radical" students claim to see rather the hidden hands of America and Japan. Stranger still is their notion that North Korea's economy, while palpably ailing and inferior in every department to that of the South, somehow represents a more authentic type of development.

If this analysis is correct, one would predict that dependency analyses in Korea will eventually lose their appeal, as the national psyche comes to terms with the fact

of success. Reunification, following North Korea's imminent collapse, will also give a boost. But for now, to rework a Korean proverb, this is a dolphin which thinks it is still a shrimp.

Étatisme

The third school goes under various names: étatiste, statist, mercantilist (Haggard and Moon 1983), or neo-Listian (Foster-Carter 1985). Its key feature, as already mentioned, is insistence on the role of active state intervention in promoting or even causing economic development.

This approach (which is where I would place myself) has perhaps been subject to too little critical—or self-critical—scrutiny. Two points need making at the outset. First, we are a very heterogeneous and quite odd ideological collection. And second, our core proposition on the developmental state, while empirically true, is as it stands barely more than descriptive: a starting point and not a conclusion for scholarly investigation.

Ideologically, the bias for state intervention in this camp is at least as clear and as strong as was the free marketeers' prejudice against it. But the étatistes represent a coalition of at least three possible broader worldviews: Keynesian (eg, Michell, Wade), socialist-Marxist (Amsden, White), and right-wing corporatist (nobody known to me in the current literature on Korea, but the links back to List via Manoilescu are intriguing and evident). Amsden is particularly interesting here. Having earlier written similarly on Taiwan for a volume entitled *Bringing the State Back In* (Evans *et al* [eds] 1985), her work on Korea seems theoretically and practically segmented for audiences as diverse as management schools (where she has worked) and the *New Left Review* (eg, 1990).

This ideological heterogeneity is arguably a strength, in that these authors are on to something. The question is what, and how to explain it. For Marxists, the relative (if not absolute) autonomy of the South Korean state, which seems to have been more the creator than the creature of a ruling class, poses difficult problems (see, for example, Hamilton 1986; Cotton 1991 gives an excellent general discussion). For Keynesians, the success of intervention in the Korean case raises the question of what made the difference, as compared with the often dismal record of planning elsewhere in the developing world.

At least two other general problems are already evident in the étatiste camp. One is the danger of reifying "The State", just as neo-classicism arguably reifies "The Market". The risk lies in assuming either that the South Korean state was or is unitary and homogeneous, and/or that its interventions were always efficacious and successful. Amsden may be vulnerable here. It is certainly thought-provoking to contrast her "black box" account with Michell's (whose work she does not cite) picture of a buzzing hive, full of inter-ministerial rivalries and subordinates who talk back (1984). The other issue is how to treat culture. At least some of those who are happy—indeed insistent—to "bring the State back in" in order to avoid economic reductionism (be it Marxist or laissez-faire) are distinctly less happy to extend the same privilege to the cultural domain. Yet to treat the South Korean state simply as a highly effective policy machine risks abstracting it from its very particular institutional and cultural context. Here again Michell's work is a valuable exception: for example, his suggestive

comments show how business-state relations are often mediated by classmate ties (1984).

Confucianism

If some étatistes eschew culture, conversely there are others for whom it makes up virtually the whole picture. The idea of a "Confucian ethic" as explaining East Asia's economic "edge" (Hofheinz and Calder 1982) has had wide currency in the last decade or so. Here too, as with dependency, I shall just draw out some points from an earlier paper (Foster-Carter, 1987b). While this idea is superficially attractive, it has a glaring methodological flaw. Quite unlike Weber's "Protestant ethic" argument, which at least attributed one novelty (the birth of capitalism) to another contemporaneous trend (Protestantism), the idea of a "Confucian ethic" purports to explain something very new (development) in terms of something much older. If this were so, why didn't Korea's take-off start in 1392, with the strongly neo-Confucian Chosŏn dynasty? Clearly, this cannot constitute a complete explanation; one would have to ask what enabled Confucianism to take effect in recent decades, and what stopped it in previous centuries.

On another tack, even the suggestive propinquity of Japan and the "four dragons" might reflect not culture so much as very material political and economic ties, forged by the region's modern history (Cumings 1984). Or again, emphasis on a work ethic may seem very positive, but is this any less of a stereotype than yesteryear's racist Japanese clichés about Koreans' alleged fecklessness and irresponsibility?

I suspect that at least two ideological elements are at work in the notion of a "Confucian ethic". One is a Western effort to construct a common-sense conservative role-model, particularly in terms of learning from Japan. (A mirror-image variant inverts the role model as a cultural or economic threat: these are their unnatural practices...) The other is some East Asians' own wish to construct a regional or national "uniqueness". Notwithstanding Said's (1978) strictures against western "Orientalism", my impression in Korea is that ideological enthusiasm for separating "east" from "west" is by no means confined to westerners.

Most of this, it seems to me, is data for social science rather than itself constituting social science. But of course culture matters, if only (although not only) because people think it matters and act accordingly. A more radical view would be that people of necessity think *within* and through different cultures: it is the air we breathe. Unfortunately, sociology's conceptual armoury does not yet seem well equipped to tackle this area with much subtlety. Yet it appears at least plausible, and worthy of investigation, that the varied (by no means identical) "group-isms"—family, firm, state—of different East Asian societies might have an input into economic development. At all events, attempts to study either "state" or "market", without full awareness of how these work—or indeed what they *mean*—in a given cultural and historical context (itself many-layered and dynamic: talk of "tradition" will not get us far), will surely be inadequate.

Conclusion

None of the above approaches alone can serve as an adequate explanation of South Korean economic development. Although there has been little constructive communication between the theorists of each, a more rounded account would have to take elements from all four.

South Korea has become a successful and skilled operator in a capitalist world economy, but this has not meant unbridled *laissez-faire*. Such an external orientation carried risks, but they have largely been surmounted. The role of the state has been crucial, but this has to be disaggregated and explained. Part of that disaggregation will involve cultural variables, but these on their own explain little.

More direct debate and fruitful interaction among scholars in this field would in itself be a step forward. One might also predict a likely divergence between the specific task—historical, or becoming so—of explaining South Korea's success, and the more hazardous enterprise of trying to extract a "model" or even lessons for others. In either case, a greater degree of methodological sophistication than we have sometimes seen hitherto is needed.

A full explanation for the South Korean case will have to examine economic, political and cultural dimensions. Each of these categories in turn may subdivide into both endogenous factors, and ones external to Korea. Nor should one exclude sheer contingency (as in Korea's partition). Finally, all the above "objective" and/or structural factors can be in principle, and have been in practice, transformed dialectically by people as acting subjects—whether it be

Park's South Korea clawing its way up the global hierarchy, or the democratic movement in 1987 which toppled the dictatorship which in a sense had produced it. (I expand on these rather crude methodological principles elsewhere; 1987a: 254-257.)

To end on a personal note. My own original motivations for getting interested in Korea, more than 20 years ago, were frankly ideological and nomothetic. I hoped to use Korea to prove a general point about the superiority of self-reliant socialism in P'yŏngyang over dependent capitalism in Seoul, with consequent lessons for the Third World. As that dream died (in Korea, and in my head), and also as I got to know Korea better, I have found *any* kind of nomological (generalizing) statements increasingly difficult to make. Instead, it is Korea's specificity and particularity—the "idiographic", in the terms of the German *methodenstreit* debates—which now seems crucial. If that is so, then while the task of explaining South Korea remains, the possibility of generalizing its lessons may prove chimerical.

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CHANGES OF POLICY ORIENTATION AND THE DETERMINANTS:

The Unification Policy of South Korea

JONG SOO LEE

Introduction

i. Conventional wisdom and a recent change

If there is one factor that determines today's Korean society it is, more than anything else, the partition of the country. The impacts of this range widely from people's daily lives to foreign relations both in South and North Korea. Whether named re-unification or new unification, reunion is not only the greatest hope of the Korean people but also a contested academic debate.

The partition of the Korean peninsula has, for a long time, been ascribed to an international conflict between the superpowers by the Korean people themselves. Many analysts have also been trapped in environmental determinism, a fashionable theory following the end of World War II which partly resulted from what has elsewhere been called "super power phobia" in unification studies. Lack of information, particularly about the P'yŏngyang regime in the North, made studies on internal factors like a crossword

puzzle and accordingly dampened the impact of domestic concerns on inter-Korean relations. Accordingly, the question of domestic variables has often been hidden beneath discussions which ascribe to superpowers a single and general position in South-North Korean relations.

Recently some attempts have been made to restore a more proper balance between external forces and domestic politics. This interactive perspective[1] stresses that the researcher must be careful not to jump to any final conclusions on the determinants of Korean unification.[2] If domestic factors are as unimportant as environmental determinism suggests, interactionists hold that an enormous question mark should be placed against the actual possibility of unification. There is, from the environmental determinist view, little hope for Korea itself to find a way to escape the web woven by the international power balance. The now historical example of German unification also raises a comparable question: are there greater international barriers against Korean unification than there were for German unification?

In this paper I start with the assumption that future studies on Korean unification must pay more attention to domestic factors. While not ignoring the fact that the international current may have been influential on the unification problem, I argue that unification policies in reality have been framed largely by domestic variables. My focus is only South Korea. Two empirical examples are presented about ongoing changes taking place in both government and society. Firstly, a content analysis carried out on presidential new year's addresses from 1970 to 1991 to follow up changes in governmental policy orientation. The addresses, fundamental to governmental yearly policy, systematically mark the government's attitude. Secondly, the results of five nation-wide surveys carried out in 1977, 1987, 1988 and 1990 respectively are compared. These show underlying trends in public consciousness on unification issues in terms of ideology, the method of unification and the post-unification political system. My paper begins by outlining the different dimensions of unification policies in Korea.

ii. Setting the framework

An overview of the unification policies put forward by South and North Korea indicates that there are three dimensions in which the problem is discussed: co-operation, co-existence and conflict. These three are the simplified elements often employed to explain inter-governmental relationships. Any governmental stance can be marked on a general continuum running between the three.

In the case of the unification policies of South Korea, a different dimension has been emphasized at different times and in different places. This is because a specific dimension is highlighted by the government for differing reasons under given circumstances. It is nonetheless mainly from a humanitarian and nationalistic dimension that a cooperative posture is emphasised. On the other hand, the state-political dimension often leads to a conflict-oriented stance. Figure 1 summarises these correlations; arrows mark the directions of influence and dotted lines indicate relatively weak correlations.

Figure 1

Dimensions of The Unification Problem



1) Roh Tae Woo [No T'ae-u], in his special announcement "Proposals For Grand Inter-Korean Exchanges of People" July 20, 1990.

2) Kim Il Sung [Kim Ilsŏng], in his New Year's Address, January 1, 1991; *Rodong Shinmun*, October 2, 1986.

3) Chun Doo Hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan], in his T.V. address on October 20, 1983 to warn North Korea after Rangoon bomb blast.

4) Kim Il Sung, in his New Year's Address, *The People's Korea*, January 14, 1984; *Minju Chosun*, January 29, 1978.

Changes of Policy Orientation: the South Korean Government's Stances

As I pointed out earlier, content analyses of the Presidential New Year's Addresses between 1970 and 1991 estimates the South's stances. Content analysis is a method for making replicable and valid inferences from data in their context[3] which helps to mark inferences by objectively and systematically identifying the characteristics of messages.[4] Its development can be traced back to theological studies in the late 1600s when the church was worried about the spread of secularism in the press. During world war II, content analysts had successfully predicted several major military and political campaigns, including the date of deployment of German V-bombs. Here a basic content analysis is used to mark policy orientations towards the North. Each sentence in the addresses is quantified in terms of frequency, intensity, and favourable/unfavourable attributes (for convenience, variables are not calculated). [5] Table I outlines my criteria for the analysis of addresses. A glance at this is sufficient to identify the distribution of scales between clusters for quantitative scoring. Basically, thirteen types of message can be elicited from the addresses. These can be further categorised into seven exclusive clusters, within each of which sentences have similarities.

Figure 1. Changes in the Government's Atitude



TABLE I

SCALE POINTS FOR ASSESSMENT

Co-operative Region	*Scale Point*	+3	* Acceptance of the other side's proposal
		+2	* Praising the other side
		+1	* Proposing unification policies
Neutral Region		0	* Stressing the importance of unification * Mere retrospect of the past * Statements on other countries
Conflicting Region		-1	* Stressing defensive capability * denial of the other side's proposal * Hypothetical assumption about other side's conflicting action
		-2	* Weak or indirect criticism
		-3	* Strong and direct criticism * warning * Stressing the danger of war

In order to quantify each sentence, I developed a 6-point scale divided into two regions: a *co-operative* region and a *conflicting* region. +3 is the value given to the most co-operative governmental posture, the most favourable stance towards the North.[6] -3 indicates the most conflicting governmental stance, for example in sentences implying hostile antagonism. Point 0 on the scale signifies a neutral region, neither co-operative nor conflicting. Based on this, each sentence can be marked; the sum of the marks becomes a given year's score. (Policy Orientation = $\sum F*I$; where "F" is frequency and "I" is intensity).

i. 1970 - 1979 (regime of Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi])

The first feature noted in this period is that the Seoul government's policy remained at the bottom of the conflict region. The three consecutive years from 1975 to 1977 recorded the highest points in the conflict region, indicating the time of greatest hostility. This was due to the violent murder of Park's wife on 15 August 1974. Park himself narrowly escaped assassination and suspected that his would-be assassin was an agent of P'yŏngyang. A further serious blow was the discovery of a series of tunnels dug by North Korean troops under the Demilitarised Zone in November 1974 and February 1975. The two incidents became the prelude for self-injuring rivalry between Seoul and P'yŏngyang in a prolonged cold war, even after the orchestrators of them had entered into an international detente.

Second, the government's attitudes before and after the historic year of 1972 deserve special mention. 1972 is often seen as a milestone in the South-North talks about unification since the historic Joint Communiqué was agreed on 4 July 1972. More specifically, on 12 August 1971 the southern Red Cross proposed a meeting with the northern Red Cross to discuss the problem of families divided since the post-war partition of Korea. Their proposal was immediately accepted and, after preliminary meetings, a total of seven full-sessions of talks were held between 30 August 1972 and 13 July 1973.[7] The Joint Communiqué came after a series of secret negotiations about exchange visits between Seoul and P'yŏngyang.

Surprisingly, however, the Park government's attitude remained highly negative on the eve of this historic Communiqué. Conflict points decreased by 20 points in 1973, but co-operative points remained constant. Again, the increase of co-operative points in 1974 was not accompanied by a decrease of conflict points. Rather there was a sharp increase of conflict points, suggesting that although the Joint Communiqué reflected the strong aspirations of the people, it was pronounced in a hostile climate. The Park government seems to have been unwilling to seek the further steps towards unification suggested by the Communiqué.

South-North dialogue proceeded no further. Even the Joint Communiqué was interpreted differently by both sides. For one thing, democratic procedure was taken by Seoul as an excuse for denying any sweeping policy proposal from P'yŏngyang and autonomy was thought of by P'yŏngyang as an agreement to drive out the American ground troops stationed in the South. Facing P'yŏngyang's argument for the removal of American troops, Park took a step backwards and announced a new policy: he opened up the possibility of contact with communist countries in his 23 June 1973 "Declaration on the Diplomacy of Peaceful Unification". Park stated that both Seoul and P'yŏngyang should be admitted to the United Nations, while Seoul would open its doors to communist states and non-aligned groups[8]. This idea developed to a cross contact concept later, but at this stage the first priority was given to non-aggression in inter-Korean relations. Seoul vehemently opposed any P'yŏngyang contacts with the United States or Japan. P'yŏngyang for its part criticized the cross contact concept as perpetuating the partition of the Korean peninsula.

Lastly, it is interesting that there was a steep decrease of conflict points in proportion to domestic affairs

difficulties[9]. A notable move was made towards unification though this was the most difficult domestic time for Park's government, since it followed the passing of the *Yushin* (Vitalising Reforms) Constitution on 17 October 1972. Perhaps the endemic popular fear of the communist North became less effective in calming domestic discontent, while at the same time, public sympathy for Park's tragic loss of his wife petered out.

The Park government found itself facing growing discontent in 1978. On 12 December, legislative elections were held resulting in the massive defeat of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The ruling DRP won only 32% of the vote as against the 34% gained by the die-hard opposition New Democratic Party (NDP). Opposition forces became more diverse, ranging from the NDP to student radicals and religious organisations. The immediate inference is that Park's government tried to play a co-operation card to cool domestic discontent. This is supported by the fact that co-operative points did not increase at all in 1979 despite the sharp diminishing of conflict points. The conflict-oriented drive, used until then to extend the duration of Park's presidency, became of little use. Facing demands for constitutional revision and the president's resignation, the unification stance was changed. But no sooner did success seem to be within reach than the government fell with Park's murder in October 1979.

ii. 1981 - 1987 (regime of Chun Doo Hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan])

Figure 2 indicates that Chun's government made more attempts to step up the South-North dialogue than had his predecessor. In a sense, this co-operative drive was an inevitable consequence of the fact that the general public became so enlightened that the government could no longer use a conflict-oriented card. Conflict-oriented drives were no longer attractive to the people. Chun's debt to the people who elected him, founded on the 1980 Kwangju incident, also accelerated changes in unification policy.

Seoul's co-operative posture was dealt a decisive blow by the Rangoon bombing incident on 9 October 1983. As Figure 2 shows, conflict points suddenly increased by 33, from 17 to 50, in 1984. Chun warned P'yŏngyang, speaking on nation-wide television on 20 October: "The Rangoon incident is an act of terror against the head of this state, and it is to be treated as a declaration of war". He went on to continue, later in January 1984:[10] "I am warning that I will retaliate unreservedly if North Korea continues its violent provocation which threatens our existence".

However, the government quickly started to turn back to a co-operative stance from mid-1984. Figure 2 illustrates that 3 points were added to the co-operative region with a 48 point decrease in the conflict region despite the incident. In addition, mid-1984 saw the agreement to hold meetings to discuss economic co-operation, parliamentary exchanges and sporting links. In September, following disastrous flooding in Seoul, the North offered aid in the form of rice, cement and medicine. This was accepted by the South. The South sent electronic home appliances to the North. Economic talks followed on 15 November 1984.

Chun's government sought to revive co-operative relations with P'yŏngyang although there were no notable demands for such action from society at large. In doing so, the politics behind Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics cannot be over-emphasised. Politics rendered Chun's government malleable not only to the vanguard of the popular movement for constitutional reform,[11] but also to improving South-North relations. Seoul's fear of losing the Games prevented the government from deploying forceful policies against the North. It served Chun to restrain from the use of force against the Summer 1987 mass protests for constitutional reform and to argue for peaceful coexistence, if not co-operation, with the North. Meanwhile, after Seoul was chosen to host the Games, from 30 July 1985 North Korea repeatedly argued that it should be the co-host. As a result, in October 1985 and January 1986, the North and South Korean Olympic committees held two rounds of (inconclusive) talks. The Seoul government was extremely careful to soothe P'yŏngyang, especially until the Games were held in 1988.

To conclude, Chun started to reject four decades of unwavering policy against international communism. In doing so, the extension of the diplomatic horizon was a major policy aim. However, diplomatic expansion was not paralleled in South-North relations. Chun's unilateral posture was not matched by the North and, by and large, remained rooted in cold war consciousness. His diplomatic policies were framed to check the possible southern policy from the North, a policy directed particularly towards influencing the United States and Japan.

iii. 1988 to the present (regime of Roh Tae Woo [No T'ae-u])

Figure 2 indicates that President Roh's government has maintained the most co-operative stance since his inauguration in 1988. As can be seen, the conflict points recorded are at the lowest end of the scale and, at the same time, the co-operative points are, throughout the whole period, higher than before. Historic two-day talks between the prime ministers of the two Koreas took place on 6 September 1990. A second round of talks between the premiers, Kang Young Hoon [Kang Yŏnghun] and Yon Hyong Muk [Yon Hyongmŏk] followed in P'yŏngyang on 16-17 October 1990.

In a sense, the talks can be seen as one consequence of mounting pressure on Roh since 1988 to address the question of unification. The vanguard process of liberalisation in 1988 and 1989 meant the old-style security card became almost incapable of use. Government policy was demystified, and policy-makers were forced to change from crisis politics to interest politics. Roh himself understood this trend and from his inauguration onwards asserted that he would seek a co-ordinating role between differentiated southern and northern interests rather than act as an agent for change.

Roh's approach developed into a new style of policy, new both in content and in context. Strictly speaking, altered environmental contexts in domestic politics apparently contributed to the creation of a new unification policy coupled to a new attitude in foreign affairs. The specific policy which was formulated has been termed the Northern Policy[12] and is often linked to the late 1960s Kiesinger[13] and Brandt[14] *Östpolitik* in West Germany. Park Chul Un [Pak Chŏrun], formerly State Minister for

Political Affairs, was at the core of planning and executing Seoul's new policy.

The northern policy resulted in some notable successes, particularly in respect to Seoul's relations with former Eastern bloc states. Diplomatic relations were opened with Hungary in February 1989, and soon afterwards with Poland and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania followed in 1990. Seoul's efforts to improve such relations reached a peak with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 30 September 1990. When President Roh met Gorbachev in San Francisco on 4 June 1990 they agreed to normalise diplomatic relations after 86 years of rare contact.

From the domestic viewpoint, Roh's northern policy seems to be a product of the consideration of three factors. First of all, sweetened relations with former adversaries were judged to offer new foreign markets for Korean manufactures. Korean products, after all, now face a renewed protectionism in American and European markets. The threat of sanctions over Korean protectionism also loomed large, and South Korea faced particular difficulties when put on the United States' list of unfair trading nations.[15] Former eastern bloc states looked to Korea for help to stem economic stagnation, and particularly to overcome problems associated with supply difficulties for consumer goods.

Warning bells had begun to sound in 1988. Then, Korea's labour force, arguably the hardest working in the world, took to the streets as the social consensus on economic development broke down. Korea's labour-intensive industries were forced to turn their attention overseas, where the applied industrial technologies of South Korea were welcomed. Table II gives a typical illustration of

the economic relations between Seoul and one former adversary.

TABLE II

TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND THE USSR IN 1989

(unit: $1,000)

	Exports		Imports	
1.	Machinery	55,545	Pig Iron	75,024
2.	Textile	53,396	Agri. and Food	70,245
3.	Shipbuilding	40,317	Coal	54,611
4.	Electronics	24,584	Nickel Ingot	33,183
5.	Soap	9,511	Row Cotton	17,416
6.	Toothpaste	3,661	Timber & Pulp	15,490

Source: *Korea Newsreview*, 16 June 1990: 13.

Secondly, the new policy was designed to induce changes in North Korea through international pressure. When Roh met Gorbachev in San Francisco, Roh asked for help to persuade North Korea to leave its self-imposed isolation. Initially, however, Seoul was worried by the rival policy of the North.[16] The posture of policy makers did not move far from the zero option, in which one side's gain was seen as the other side's loss. But, as time went on, Seoul gained in confidence, for instance, allowing pictures of Kim Il Sung to be displayed on university campuses. The government feared the consequences if P'yŏngyang was excluded from the international community by the new policy and by the reverse domino effect of changes in the eastern bloc. So, Seoul's orientation became slowly more favourable towards the North. It repeatedly stressed that the policy aimed not to isolate North Korea from its old allies, but to pave the road for mutual prosperity. Roh told

Gorbachev: "We don't want North Korea to remain isolated, and we hope relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea will develop further".[17]

Last, but not least, the domestic drive to use diplomatic success as political capital in internal politics was a third reason for the new policy. Here, the race for the domestication of international affairs can be seen as a by-product of the political limits faced by Roh and his rivals, the two Kims, under the so-called *yŏso yadae*[18] phenomenon. In 1989, both public feeling of political inefficacy and diminishing popularity of political leaders led to the race between Roh and his rivals for invitations to visit former eastern bloc states, with the greatest efforts being exerted to gain invitations from the Soviet Union and China. Kim Young Sam [Kim Yŏngsam] visited Moscow first. His visit occupied the mass media for several days, leading to the likelihood that he could rebuild his popularity both ideologically and as a potential foreign policy manager. However, the conservative alliance of 22 January 1990, in which Kim joined Roh, fuelled conflicts between Kim and Park Chul Un, both of whom had ambitions to become president, particularly after Kim's second Moscow visit in March 1990. Facing the gradual spread of democratic ideas, which limited available political resources, parliamentarians increased their options through foreign relations. The foreign card proved effective in cooling the people's discontent, albeit for a brief period.

In respect to this last point, some critics are worried that Roh is following a costly policy which has no guarantee of future profits, at least in economic terms. For one thing, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Poland on 1 November 1989 accompanied official agreement on bilateral economic cooperation. Under this, Korea's state-run Exim bank is to provide Korean companies setting up plants in

Poland with $400 million in loans over a five year period, with another $50 million given as a loan to Warsaw. Again, in the case of Russian contacts, Seoul agreed to give a $3 billion aid package. This is certainly large-scale support. Earlier, it is claimed some businessmen went to Eastern bloc states for investment purposes without any pre-calculation, merely believing that the government would cover any losses for political reasons.

Public Opinion as a Policy Environment

So far, the main emphasis of my paper has been on the part played by the government in the domestic arena. Of course it is undeniable that the Seoul government's multifarious initiation has been the most powerful factor in explaining public policy. For example, during the period of rapid economic development, the government was the agent of change, the guardian of political stability, the major investor and a dominating force influencing private business investment decisions.

Recent developments indicate some emerging areas of politics working from the bottom up. In these, policy can be interpreted as government responses to public opinion. Society is becoming more diversified and more complicated, and this imposes crucial limits on the entrepreneurial role which the government is able to take. Differentiated social interests can no longer be satisfied by policy measures worked out on the basis of a monolithic pragmatism. Differing voices have to be heard, and this demands that the government should act as a co-ordinator, minimising its intervention. The people's antipathy towards authoritarian rule also undermines their compliance with the planning and implementation of policy.[19] The people do not believe

that the government is a neutral guardian of public interests. They do not regard public bureaucrats as superior in terms of competence and motivation to private elites.

Unification policy, unavoidably, is subject to the same changing perspectives. More than ever before, it is now influenced by public opinion. This has been particularly so since 1988, when its unification policies were fiercely challenged.[20] Then, those who believed that the partition of Korea was the fundamental source of socio-political problems began to focus their attention on unification.

To demonstrate my assertion, I will compare five nationwide opinion surveys. These span 14 years from 1977 to 1990 and cover the general public, university students and opinion leaders in their respondents. The questions asked ranged the gamut of all unification issues.

TABLE III

THE DESIRABILITY OF UNIFICATION (1988)

(unit: %)

Answer scale:	1	2	3	4	5
Public	63.5	20.8	7.4	6.5	1.5
Opinion Leaders	81.9	14.9	1.6	1.4	0.4

Explanations:

1 "should be done"
2 "will be better"
3 "trouble making"
4 "unnecessary"
5 "it is not my business"

Source: Pyung Gil Chay [Ch'oe P'yŏnggil], *A Survey on Socio-Political Consciousness* (Seoul: the Department of Public Administration, Yonsei University, 1988).

The first feature of Table III is the desirability of Korean unification. Respondents were asked how much they thought unification desirable. Answering on a simple five point scale, respondents almost uniformly placed emphasis on the importance of unification. 84.3% of the general public and 96.5% of opinion leaders believe unification desirable. The proportion considering unification "not necessary" roughly equals those responding "not my business".

To explore the background of popular support for unification, another question was given. 49% thought unification desirable for "national prosperity and development" and 25% chose for "recovering national identity". 18.4% believed unification desirable simply for the accomplishment of a united nation. As the cross-tabulation (0.0002 chi^2) of this attitude against respondent age shows, the younger the respondent the more emphasis given to politico-historical aspects over than humanitarian/ geographical concerns (the reverse also holds).

Experience of life before 1945 in undivided Korea seem to lead the older generation to stress the reunion and of up to 10 million people within now separated families. This generation accounts for nearly 20% of today's population and tends to be relatively conservative in political terms. This stems not only from vivid memories of wartime life, but also from the fact that many of them (between 700,000 and 1 million) fled from the North as refugees. Although by voting with their feet[21] they contributed to the political legitimacy of the South, they added a more conservative colour to the political spectrum.

TABLE IV

OBJECTIVES OF UNIFICATION AMONG OPINION LEADERS (1988)

(units: numbers, %)

Answer:		1	2	3	4	5	6
Ages:	10-19	0	7	8	1	3	19
		0	36.8	42.1	5.3	15.8	0.8
	20-29	7	209	308	19	93	637
		1.1	32.8	48.4	3.0	14.8	28.2
	30-39	10	168	356	37	115	686
		1.5	24.5	51.9	5.4	16.8	30.4
	40-49	5	93	289	41	73	501
		1	18.6	57.7	8.2	14.6	22.2
	50-59	9	77	127	35	112	360
		2.5	21.4	35.3	9.7	31.1	16.0
	60-69	3	10	16	3	20	52
		5.8	19.2	30.8	5.8	38.5	2.3
	Total	34	564	1104	136	416	2255
		1.5	25.0	49.0	6.0	18.4	100.0

Explanations:

1. Meeting of separated families
2. Recovering national identity
3. National prosperity and development
4. Liberation from the fear of war
5. Accomplishment of a unified nation

On the other hand, the post-war generation has much more practical and realistic values in respect of unification, and does not take the divided country as a given necessity. They focus on the political and economic burden caused by division and tend to be less concerned about national

security. In South Korea today, fully 50% of the adult population are aged between 20 and 35.

A much greater surprise is the notions of what a post-unification political system should be. Table V summarises the sweeping changes deemed desirable. The different wording between 4 and 5 in the answers is due to the fact that questionnaires were designed to allow respondents to locate themselves in relation to major currents of the time.[22]

TABLE V

THE POST-UNIFICATION POLITICAL SYSTEM

(unit: %)

Answers:		1	2	3	4	5
Years:	Surveyed:					
1982	Public	76.3	0.5	12.5	8.6	
1986	University	47.8	2.68	38.28	8.59	
1987	Public	46.0	0.9	14.5		37.2
1988	Public	43.4	0.7	19.8		35.5
1990	Public	25.8	0.3	28.9		45.0

Explanations:

1. Capitalism
2. Communism
3. Mixed system
4. Any system except communism
5. New ideological system

The majority of respondents in 1990, 45%, would prefer a new ideological and political system. There has been a constant and rapid increase in the respondents who give this answer since 1987. On the contrary, those in favour of the capitalist system have decreased considerably from 76.3% in 1982 to 25.8%. Answer 1 is in inverse relation to

answer 5. This seems to indicate that those who alienate themselves from capitalism have gained a new political outlook over the decade. Considering that there is little change in the unpopularity of communism, it follows that many people have been disappointed by South Korean domestic politics.

TABLE VI

CORRELATION OF POST-UNIFICATION SYSTEM WITH AGE (1990—public respondents)

(units: numbers/%)

Answers: Age:	1	2	3	4	Row total
20-29	57	0	136	209	402
	14.2	0	33.8	52	37.4
30-39	74	1	66	129	270
	27.4	0.3	24.4	47.8	25.1
40-49	65	0	56	84	205
	31.7	0	27.3	41	19.1
50-59	51	2	39	51	143
	35.7	1.4	27.3	35.7	13.3
60-69	30	0	14	11	55
	54.5	0	25.5	20	5.1
Total no.	277	3	311	484	1075
Total %	25.8	0.3	28.9	45	100.0

Explanations:

1 South Korean style capitalism
2 North Korean style communism
3 mixed system
4 new system

Source: Pyung Gil Chay, unpublished survey data (1990)

Cross-tabulation (0.002 chi²) of this with age reveals an explicit pattern of dissimilarities between age groups. Estrangement from the existing capitalist system is most

notable amongst those in their 20s and 30s: 85.8% and 72.2% respectively favour a mixed or new system. They are prepared to accept either, and this sytem can be thought of as somewhere between the current southern and northern styles. There is almost unanimous opposition against communism, despite the fact that the younger the respondent the more a new system is preferred. This opposition seems to have been strengthened with the fall of the eastern bloc in 1989.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the changing trends of Korean unification policies and explored domestic factors which have framed the changes. Two empirical examples were presented, annual presidential addresses which mark government attitudes, and five nationwide surveys which show underlying trends in public consciousness.

It is not surprising that the unification issue has been an oasis in the political desert for politicians in both the South and North. The issue itself was often interpreted as an issue of security issue when the southern government drove domestic policies hard and railed against international detente. Political stability and national security was then the concern. More recently, though, the unification issue in the South has been used very much to enforce a co-operation posture. The change was mainly due to the discrediting of the old conflict-oriented stance through vigorous democratisation in the South. 1989 saw the most sweeping change from conflict to co-operation. As a result, the game in which one nominal policy proposal by one side is answered by a counter-proposal from the other,

have become more realistic. This has led to a decrease in the self-injuring rivalry between South and North.

The domestication of policy marked one feature of recent times. Fierce competition between political leaders, witnessed in competing unification policy initiatives, is a paradoxical indication of this. The South Korean people also more and more ascribe the partition of the peninsula to domestic factors rather than international interference. The surveys consequently show a 10.1% decrease in respondents who consider international factors a constraint upon unification between 1987 and 1990. However, the Koreanization of unification has fuelled conflicts between political leaders, suggesting that there is a danger that unification policy, or related foreign polices, can have too great a cost to be justified in terms of domestic ends. The public, nonetheless, shows undiminished support for unification. This has functioned as a source of political discontent wherever there is a gap between popular aspirations and government policies.

Comparison of opinion surveys over the last decade indicates that the reasons for public support for unification are changing. Where in the past unification was considered desirable mostly for humanitarian reasons, now it is thought necessary for national prosperity. This marks changing generations. The young generation, particularly those aged between 20 and 30, is not only more practical and realistic but also plays a leading role in making unification policy more democratic. They deny the old security card argument presented by the government and discard the mysticism which has usually surrounded unification policies. As a consequence, recent unification policy can be taken as the government's response to public opinion.

Finally, public opinion has recently tended to polarise, and many people are dissatisfied with the southern political practices. Although more and more focus on the domestic factors, this shift of interest is not matched by positive developments in the domestic arena. Table V thus illustrates that many Koreans now feel alienated by capitalism and want to promote a new ideology. Special attention ought to be paid to these dissatisfactions to prevent them developing into centrifugal political force. Thus, one of the most urgent things to do is to construct an economic welfare floor below which no one sinks in industrialised Korean society.

APPENDIX: Sources for presidential new year's addresses

Sôul shinmun, 9 January 1970, 11 January 1971, 11 January 1972, 12 January 1973, 15 January 1976, 12 January 1977, 18 January 1978, 19 January 1979, 13 January 1981, 23 January 1982, 18 January 1984, 17 January 1986, 18 January 1989.
Korea Times, 19 January 1974.
Korea Herald, 15 January 1975, 19 January 1983, 10 January 1985.
Chosŏn ilbo, 11 January 1988, 11 January 1990.
Kyŏnghyang shinmun, 12 January 1987.

NOTES

1. Michael G. Fry and Arthur N. Gilbert (1982), "A Historian and Linkage Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 26/3.

2. The influences of various factors in foreign policy making were well illustrated by G.T. Allison's *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) for the United States and in Britain by W. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977).

3. Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (London: Sage, 1980).

4. O.R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969).

5. V.O. Key Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1964).

6. Azar developed a 15-point scale and weighted values by asking 18 experts on international relations. For the list of COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank), see Edward E. Azar, *Codebook and User's Package for the COPDAB* (Chapel Hill: Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1978).

7. D.S. Lewis (ed.), *Korea: Enduring Division?* (London: St. James Press, 1988).

8. *The Korea Herald*, 15 January 1975.

9. *Far Eastern Economic Review* 5 October 1979 and 26 October 1979.

10. *The Seoul Shinmun*, 18 January 1984.

11. Lewis, *ibid:* 99.

12. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 August 1990.

13. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Ludwig Erhard's successor, was inextricably connected with the rise and fall of the Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU/CSU. He was said to be the ideal chancellor candidate since he had the fewest outright opponents in either party when the Erhard government collapsed. Donald P. Kommers, "Chancellor, Cabinet and President", in C.C. Schweitzer *et al* (eds), *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Leamington: Berg Publishers, 1984): 50 - 79; Martin McCauley, *The German Democratic Republic since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

14. Willy Brandt was brought to the national scene by the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966. As foreign minister he started to normalise the relationships with Eastern Europe.

15. South Korea, whose trade structure most closely resembles that of Japan in terms of export composition and destination, also suffered most from the depreciation of the yen (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 5 July 1990).

16. The series of developments in 1989 so elated the Seoul Government that Roh told his ruling group on 6 July 1990 that he expected to see north and south Korea re-unified within 5 years (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 19 July 1990).

17. *Korea Newsreview*, 9 June 1990: 4.

18. *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, 26 April 1988.

19. For a discussion of policy compliance, see Oran R. Young, *Compliance and Public Authority* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979).

20. Young Whan Kihl, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea* (London: Westview Press, 1984).

21. This concept is based on Tiebout's explanation of the movement of population in search of preferred political systems. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure", reprinted in M. Edel and J. Rothenberg (eds), *Readings in Urban Economics* (New York: Macmillan, 1972): 513 - 23. See also L.J. Sharpe and K. Newton, *Does Politics Matter?* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

22. Otherwise the number of respondents who gave no reply increases. See H. Schuman and S. Presser, "The Assessment of 'No Opinion' in Attitude Surveys", in K. Schuessler (ed.), *Sociological Methodology* (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1979).

SOUTH KOREAN TELEVISION POLICY AND PROGRAMMES:

A Question of Localism

DONG-HOON MA

Introduction

The thirty year history of South Korean television reveals that it has been characterised by centralism, authoritarianism and commercial populism. These concepts, combined with a question of localism, are key components for our understanding. The idea of political centralism, which informs the authoritarianism of broadcasting, and which must eventually result in the alienation of localism, stems from a political culture carried over from the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910). The commodification trends of television products on the basis of commercial populism also militate against local interest. Here, I begin by talking about the main traits of television policy, and then move to a case study of localism in a popular nationwide television drama. This latter represents an important pattern of localism in South Korean television.

Television in South Korea

Since the first transmission by the state-owned KBS (Korea Broadcasting System) in 1961, television broadcasting in the South has experienced frequent institutional changes. The establishment of a commercial channel by TBC (Tongyang [Oriental] Broadcasting Company) in 1964 created a competitive state-owned versus commercial television system and replaced the original state monopoly. The government's willingness to launch a second commercial channel called MBC (Munhwa [Cultural] Broadcasting Company) in 1969 signalled the golden age of commercial television. The political shake-up of 1980 opened a new era, which might be called the age of public broadcasting. Following large-scale reforms throughout the entire mass media network, a new system of public television, comprising two broadcasting institutions (KBS and MBC) and four channels (KBS1, KBS2, KBS3 and MBC) was established. This system has continued for ten years. The history of television in South Korea, embracing these major institutional changes and policy reforms, can be outlined as follows.

(1) 1961-1964: State-owned KBS monopoly

(2) 1964-1969: KBS and TBC competition

(3) 1969-1980: KBS, TBC and MBC competition

(4) 1980- on: Public television monopoly

The first period (1961-1964) comprised a single channel monopoly system with one state-owned institution. KBS television was, like KBS radio, established and operated by a government body, under the Ministry of Culture and Information (MOCI). In 1962, the government

issued a Code for Financing Television which provided legal foundations for state-run television broadcasting. According to this code, KBS would be financially supported by licence fees for its major funding, and also by commercial advertising as a supplementary source.

The second period (1964-1969) was initiated by the launch of the commercial channel TBC, affiliated and owned by Chungang Mass Communications, part of the Samsung Group. The KBS and TBC duopoly showed an extremely adverse and competitive relationship between the two channels. The new TBC promptly encroached into commercial advertising markets which had previously been fully appropriated by KBS. South Korean television next moved to a new phase characterised by even more severe competition following the establishment in 1969 of a second commercial channel, MBC, owned by the 5.16 Foundation. Government guidelines of the time stopped KBS broadcasting advertisements, and the station was re-scheduled to supply mainly news, educational and informational programmes.

In 1980, South Korean television experienced its biggest shake-up. The highlight was the blitz ordered by a Code for the Integration of Mass Media (CIMM), accompanied by a series of measures for political and social reformation that began the 5th Republic and legally buttressed by a Basic Press Law. This law forced many fundamental reforms. First, TBC was completely merged with KBS. Second, substantial ownership of MBC was given to KBS. Third, KBS was given three public television channels, KBS2 from TBC, and KBS3 to serve as a new educational VHF channel. Finally, the authoritative function of supervising public television was given to the Korea Broadcasting Commission (KBC) and a new Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO). The

resulting public monopoly system, which has now existed for a decade, has recently become the subject of public discussion because of its overt and covert failings during the 5th Republic. Consequently, a Broadcasting Policy Research Commission was established in April 1990 to submit a report on the feasibility of running a mixed public and commercial system.

Television and Localism: What are the issues?

It goes without saying that modern South Korean society has undergone a tremendous socio-cultural transformation since it began to move rapidly towards a highly industrialised nation in the 1960s. In that period, almost all valuable national resources have been concentrated in the geopolitical centre, Seoul. This has eventually alienated rural society. Images of rural life are distorted and presented as peripheral, inferior and relatively coarse by urban broadcasters. In fact, local culture is often considered peripheral by Koreans. Local broadcasting is consequently thought of as only a subordinate sub-system below central organisation. Notwithstanding, hardly any South Korean will deny the rapid growth of local broadcasting which followed the development of national stations. By the mid 1980s, the number of local television stations reached 23, 12 run by KBS and 11 by MBC. A further 12 KBS and 8 MBC transmission stations cover isolated areas. With the successive distribution of transmission technologies during the 1980s, local stations were able to cover nearly all the country: KBS1 96.6% and KBS2, KBS3 and MBC approximately 90%.

Issues which concern localism and television broadcasting suggest that three basic questions must be addressed. First, who makes the programmes? Is the main programme production national or local? Second, who are the programmes made for? This question concerns the target audience, and whether it is national or local. Third, what is actually represented in programme content? Local programmes, for example, can include news, drama and other entertainment produced by a central station for a nationwide audience, but focusing on local interests.

Recent short-term data concerning local broadcasting in the Taejŏn area pin-points some problems concerning the localism of South Korean television.[1] In the case of Taejŏn, the first question relates to the way that production and distribution is centrally concentrated. Less than 10% of the programmes were produced by the local KBS or MBC stations. Second, more than 90% of programmes remain targeted to a national audience, rather than the specific communities of Taejŏn. This relates to the definition of audience in local media policies and practices. Third, approximately 20% of programmes focus on local interests.

Political Centralism and Localism: Who makes programmes?

Structural imbalance of the programme production system in terms of localism reflects an authoritative and Seoul-centred policy. Local stations in South Korea are not independent; they function only as regional networks or relay systems for central stations. This seems to stem from the tradition of political centralism, which itself has deep cultural and dynastic roots. The major philosophical

foundation can be attributed to Confucianism.[2] Confucianism taught a doctrine of inequality, claiming that the distinction between superior and inferior were natural for the good of society. Everyone and everything, therefore, should be under the control of someone. Responsibility and benevolence always emanate from above, from heaven to the king, from the king to the subjects, and from central to local governments. Obedience, loyalty and respect come from below. Seoul, therefore, was respected because the king and central government lived there. The carry over can be seen in the absence until very recently of local government in South Korea. City, town and provincial legislative bodies were established in the southern part of the peninsula in 1952, expanding to Seoul in 1956. Local government functioned fully between 1956 and 1961. Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi], with his coup in 1961, abolished local administrations. The contemporaneous launch of television broadcasting is quite suggestive for explaining the innately subordinate position of local stations.

The traits of centralism and authoritarianism in Korean television are reflected by the management of financing, man-power and by access to mechanical technologies. The first idiosyncrasy to note is the subordinate financial structure of local stations. The Basic Press Law of 1980 prescribed that 51% of the capital stock of local stations should be owned by paternalistic national stations, that is KBS and MBC in Seoul. In addition, over 80% of expenditure for production, distribution and management has since been spent in Seoul. The bias in man-power is also considerable. 60.9% of KBS and 71.2% of MBC staff work in Seoul. On the contrary the average percentages of man-power in each local station is 1.2% for KBS and 1.5% for MBC. Further, large quantities of technological equipment are concentrated in Seoul.[3] This is particularly salient for filming, editing and projection

activities. The concentration means that, according to KBS data, 49% of filming, 58.4% of editing, 65.9% of projection but only 22.9% of transmission equipment is held in Seoul. The averages for other local stations are, respectively, 2.0% for filming, 1.5% for editing, 1.2% for projection and 3.0% for transmission.[4] Such structural barriers restrict the functions of local stations to the distribution of programmes produced by KBS and MBC in Seoul. Only 7% of local television programmes were directly produced and distributed by the local stations in one recent year.

Commercial Populism and Localism: for whom are the programmes made?

The second question concerns the broadcaster's undoubted preference for a network audience. This is echoed in common expressions such as "Yŏŭido Culture" and "Yŏŭido Kingdom". No matter what the subject, most programmes are manufactured on the island of Yôûido, southern Seoul, where KBS and MBC have their main stations. The programmes tend to express things which represent Seoul. Three findings emerge from recent research. First, the political and economic content of news broadcasts overwhelmingly stress central concerns. Second, most "interest" stories focus on Seoul or are based on assumptions held basically by Seoul's urban population. Third, variety shows express a popular culture prevalent basically in Seoul. All three findings relate to commercial populism or commodification.

Commercialism, as we find it in South Korean television, has its origins in 1960s American practice. Commercialism intensified with the indiscriminate

competition between KBS, MBC and TBC during the 1970s. Though the degree of commercialism in television contents appears to have lessened since the radical reforms of the 1980s, the commercial advertising market has continued to expand. Commercialism, combined with the notion of political populism in the early 1980s, has stimulated the production of mass-targeted and standardised broadcasts. The increasing intrusion of advertising means that programmes during this period emphasized popular and national interests, rather than the particular interests of minority or local groups. This led to a side effect in the homogenisation of programming and contents. Altogether, this was quite irreconcilable with the proposed media strategy of audience segmentation in terms of localization.

Localism in Programme Contents: What is represented in programme contents?

The third question more specifically addresses one aspect of localism. It is difficult to analyse systematically the contents of the 20% of programmes which concern local interests, so here I introduce an exemplary case. This is a local drama, centrally produced though targeted at a nationwide audience, called *Chunwŏn ilgi* ("Diary of country life"). This is an extremely successful television drama series broadcast by MBC whose nationwide popularity has continued for a decade. It is a fictional drama, the Korean equivalent to The Archers in Britain, and tells a different story every week in the life of a farmer.

The farmer, Kim, has a family typical of small countryside villages. He lives a few miles from the city of Suwŏn. At the start of the series, eight members of his family lived in a traditional rural cottage: Kim (played by Ch'oe Pŏram), his wife (Kim Hyeja), two sons and their wives, a grand-daughter, and Kim's mother. The drama revolves around the Kims and their neighbours. Kim runs his own small farm, but is also in charge of the village farmers' union. He is considered generous and patient. We hear frequently of ordinary family affairs such as marriage, trouble with relatives or neighbours, conflict between the mother and her children, education and work concerns. Sometimes we hear about more current rural issues, like local feelings towards national policies for economic development and modernisation.[5] The Kims usually tell the story, and their decisions and positions tend to reflect the conservatism typical of Korean farmers and the elder generation generally. The two main characters are, however, occasionally sympathetic to liberal ideas about the family and social affairs. They may be thrown into the whirlpool of neighbour and family troubles. The rural family, neighbours, and the central position of husband and wife are principal symbols. Although made by MBC in Seoul, and then distributed through the MBC national network, to the majority of South Koreans *Chunwŏn* is a typical local drama. It has, through its popularity, articulated local voices nationwide.

A structuralist analysis starts with the drama's icon, genre and formulae.[6] To begin with, the icon of *Chunwŏn* raises the question why Kim and his family represent such sympathetic and familiar images of farmers. As a result of the Korean urban-centred economic development and the subsequent exodus of young people from the countryside, rural areas have large numbers of elderly households. They are thought of as undeveloped, with uneducated families sharing a low standard of living. Many programmes ranging from news to shows created the stereotype, marking absentee youth but also functioning as symbols of

economic and social inadequacy. The Kims' image—patient, loving, caring and quite rational, despite a low income and little education, responsible parents of three, and credible village opinion leaders—is the antithesis of the stereotype. Mr Kim shows unwavering understanding and is always perceptive in his advice to children and neighbours. His gloomy moments reflect as icon of the ordinary, typical farmer, yet appear to be simply transferred from images of typical ordinary and friendly Koreans common to other films and television dramas. The relationship to other dramas in the genre assured success, for in South Korea, drama has traditionally been one of the most popular genres of television. The genre allows *Chunwŏn* to gain ready access to Korean living rooms. The humanity in the series is again typical, based on Korean humour and grudging, positive fatalism and warm heartedness. This too evokes sympathy from the average Korean audience. Humanity is here rooted in problem solving by way of mutual understanding, the extension of compassionate help, and great patience. Hence, the drama can have no dramatic or revolutionary conclusion.

Let me look closer at the formulae used. Does the drama rely upon the practices of social conventions or does it invent behaviour? It stresses i) strong family units, ii) the value of country life, and iii) the value of money, education and jobs. This is distant from the text of the modern nuclear family. The parents have a strong union and are family centred; they frequently reminisce about their marriage and their family history. Their children are quite normal rural youths who play their own roles socially and at home satisfactorily. Everything is predictable. Whatever the exceptions, the role-playing is quite believable to the nationwide audience.

Although the emphasis is on country life, the drama includes a variety of representations of local towns and of the capital, Seoul. The family's eldest son works for the government office in Suwŏn, and a married daughter in Seoul sometimes visits. The Kims never intend to leave their country cottage, and the combination of rural and urban life in the drama always suggests an ideally harmonic, rather than fundamentally troublesome, juxtaposition of two different societies. For ten years, Kim has held his position as president of the village farmers' union. He has a deep pride in this unpaid job. He is deeply self-content as a farmer, though he occasionally feels some psychological inferiority to city folk. He covertly teaches his children his philosophy, but paradoxically hankers after the gaiety of the city. Money may not be everything to Kim, but he teaches his children the virtues of diligence and frugality. Similarly, personal achievement may not be so important, but he wants to push his children to the city for education and work. The paradoxes can become main themes.

My brief descriptions pose a further question: what is the ideological function of this sort of local drama? The codes reflect localism, but does the drama suppress or resolve the social contradictions it presents? The drama recodes the realities of local life around a traditional view of family life, the balance of old and new lifestyles, and humanity in family and neighbourly dealings. The combination of these codes emphasizes traditionalism, localism, and an evolutionary developmentism. There are some contradictions, however, between the old and the new, rural and urban life, evolutionary and revolutionary approaches to problem solving, though resolutions seem consistent. Does the drama mask and obscure problems through ideological manipulation, like Barthes' mythology's foremost function? Or does it, closer to Levi-Strauss' ideas,

initiate and reinforce a needed catharsis for resolution? The opposition is false, for *Chunwŏn* does both to some extent.

Tony Bennett suggests a Gramscian notion of hegemony which helps assess the interests of a dominant central Seoul over subordinate local issues.[7] On one side, rigid structuralism would argue popular culture is an ideological machine dictating people's thoughts. On the other side, populist culturalism romantically considers popular culture the authentic voice of subordinate groups. Bennett views popular culture neither as the site of a people's cultural demise nor as their cultural self-affirmation. Rather, it is a force in human relations shaped precisely by cultural contradictions. In *Chunwŏn*, then, we see resolutions to the problems of localism, forced by national authoritative politico-economic policies. But at the same time, suppression of localism exists, because the choice of programme material may be regarded as a reflection of political pressure on South Korean broadcasting.

Conclusion

Localism is a serious problem in South Korean broadcasting in three respects. First, there is a structural imbalance that stems from the political culture. Second, there is difficulty defining local audiences in a media concerned primarily with commercial interests. Third, the programme contents themselves may either suppress or resolve local interests. Current and anticipated reforms are meant to resolve the first two, but the third has not yet been considered. The third is more intangible, reflecting individual interests and the production team which works

on a given programme. But if it is intangible, it is also driven by the norms and conditions of culture and society both inside and outside the mass media. In the case of South Korea, then, the primary stress on the gospel of westernization, modernization and efficiency plays an important role in creating the dominant atmosphere within which the mass media operates.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Radio broadcasting in Korea started with the Japanese-controlled *Kyŏngsŏng* station in 1927. The first southern TV station was the state-run KORCAD, which operated from 1956 to 1959. KBS initially broadcast as Seoul TV in 1961.

Ma Dong-Hoon's paper was presented at the conference of the British Association for Korean Studies in March 1990. Since then, substantial changes have taken place in South Korean broadcasting, culminating on 9 December 1991 with Seoul Broadcasting System going on the air as a second quasi-private network. The bias towards Seoul is evident in the new name, just as it was in the initial name of the 1961 station; Ma's argument clearly remains valid.

NOTES

1. The following table gives programme percentages in the case of Taejŏn broadcasting channels:

Station	Subject	Target	Content
National	90.5%	91.4%	80.1%
Local	9.5%	8.6%	19.9%

Data is based on my analysis of 339 programmes broadcast by KBS and MBC between 12-18 January 1989. Only simple frequencies were counted.

2. Among the Confucian principles the hierarchical relationship between sovereign and subject was emphasized. For a discussion of the virtues and principles, based on a political analysis, see S. K. Pae, *Testing Democratic Theories in Korea* (1986), pp.19-21.

3. Staff numbers:

Stations	KBS		MBC	
Seoul	2924	(60.9%)	2574	(71.2%)
Local	1878	(39.1%)	1000	(28.2%)
Each local station (average)		(1.6%)		(1.5%)
Total	4802	(100%)	3574	(100%)

Source: *Yearbook of KBS* (1986).

4. Technological equipment at KBS (%):

Stations	Filming	Editing	Projection	Transmission
Seoul	49.6	58.4	65.4	22.9
Pusan	5.6	5.4	6.4	8.3
Taegu	4.8	4.6	3.8	7.1
Kwangju	4.1	4.3	3.8	6.9
18 Others	35.9	27.3	20.6	54.8
(average)	(2.0)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(3.0)

Source: *Yearbook of KBS* (1984).

5. Contents of *Chunwŏn ilgi* (analysis of 21 programmes broadcast from August 1988 to January 1989, counting simple frequencies), based on my observations:

Contents	Frequency
Conflicts with neighbours	7
Rural issues	5
Conflicts within the family	4
Conflicts with relatives	3
Rural rituals	2

6. In media structural analysis, "icons" mean the external expressions of internal convictions tied to a dominant cultural form, "genres" mean the codes framed by setting, characters, dress, plot, and so on and "formulae" describe the way that cultural patterns are expressed in the narrative form. See Michael R. Real, *Super Media: A Cultural Studies Approach* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), pp.109-114.

7. Tony Bennett, "Gramscian ideology and popular culture," in Tony Bennett, Coline Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds), *Popular Culture and Social Relations* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp.11-12.

RECENT CHANGES IN SOUTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

DUK-JE PARK

Introduction

South Korean society has, through rapid industrialization, changed drastically in the last 30 years. In 1960, South Korea was a poor agricultural country with a per capita income of around $80. By 1988, she had become a newly industrialised country with a per capita income of $4,040.

In the process of industrialisation, the South Korean employment structure has changed. Table I, which gives labour statistics collected systematically by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) since 1963, shows this. In this paper I discuss the implications which the remarkable recent industrial and employment developments have for industrial relations in Korea.

Industrialisation and the change of employment structure in South Korea

A number of factors need to be considered. First, the modern industrialisation of Korea began only in the 1960s; hence, Table I demonstrated that until this time Korea was an agricultural society. The history of industrialisation is therefore still very short. Even in 1970, the percentage of the population employed in the agricultural sector remained more than half of the total labour pool. In comparison, the proportion of the British population employed in agriculture was 33.0% in 1811, and had declined to 28.4% by 1821 (Hunt 1981: 26). In the case of Japan, the comparable figures were 54.0% in 1920 and 49.7% in 1930. Industrialisation in Korea began late, more than 150 years later than in Britain, and more than 50 years later than in Japan.

TABLE I

CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT BY MAJOR INDUSTRIES

(Unit: %)

Years:	1963	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989
Agriculture	63.1	50.5	45.9	34.0	24.9	19.5
Manufacturing and mining	8.7	14.3	19.1	22.6	24.5	28.2
Services and others	28.2	35.2	35.0	43.4	50.6	52.3
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total (1,000s)	7,662	9,745	11,830	13,706	14,935	17,510

Source: Economic Planning Board, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population.*

Second, as the history of industrialisation is so short most current South Korean employers are founders of their companies. Hence, as with many founding entrepreneurs, they are often strong and charismatic characters. This is one major reason why many employers exert strong authority through an imposed hierarchical order. It also explains why they tend to demand loyalty and discipline from their employees.

The characteristics imposed by employers can be summed up by the term *sahun*. *Sahun* in Korean companies corresponds to certain basic values in American firms, such as the 'customer service' of IBM. According to one survey of the 87 largest South Korean companies, the most preferred *sahun* values are 'harmony and unity' (46.4%) and 'sincerity and diligence' (44.2%) . The values are realised by a unique personnel management system: executives and top managers are closely related to the primary owner by blood; senior and junior managers are connected to top managers on the basis of school alumni; shop floor workers share a strong regional identity with the primary owner. Here, a pre-industrial hierarchical relationship retains strong influence (Hak Chong Lee 1989 [in Chung and Lee 1989]; Yoo and Lee 1987).

Third, because of employment patterns, wages paid by large employers have been kept at a comparatively low level. During the first stage of South Korean industrialisation, workers needed by industry were supplied from the rural sector. As there was a large under-employed rural population eager to move to the industrial sector in order to seek better economic opportunities, industry could expand without suffering any serious labour shortage until the mid 1970s (Bai 1982). In this period the South Korean economy expanded through the growth of labour-intensive low-technology industries such as the manufacture of textiles,

garments, wigs, and so on. The expansion was rapid, so from 1962 to 1983, 12.5 million people migrated from the farm to urban centres. The yearly average was around half a million, an annual 4.1% of the average farm population over the same period. The income of rural Korean farms was low, running at a level of 60-70% of urban household income in the 1960s and 80-90% in the 1970s. In such a situation, wage levels in the industrial sector were inevitably kept at a low level. As one example, over the 25 years from 1960 real wages rose by an annual 6.7%, but labour productivity increased 10.7% annually.

Fourth, a sharp discrepancy of opinion among employees appeared in the mid 1980s. Those workers who had migrated to urban centres during the first stage of industrialisation had experienced severe poverty in their previous rural life. They remained grateful that they had a job in the urban sector, and they were accustomed to the authoritarian order which they had experienced in rural society. Therefore they were comparatively compliant and neither expressed strong opinions nor complained about their meagre employment conditions and the authoritarian controls imposed by their employers. But by the mid 1980s, the South Korean economy had progressed from low-technology industries to medium-technology plants producing automobiles, electronics, ships and other engineering manufactures. This had led to the appearance of new groups of workers who behaved differently to early migrants. These groups were more educated than their older compatriots, as Table II shows. They were younger and had been born or educated in cities. They had never experienced severe poverty. As they had learnt social and democratic principles in their schools, they did not hesitate to criticise authoritarian rule in the workplace. Their opposition to the traditional order of industrial relations led to conflict not only with employers and managers, but in

some cases also with their elder fellow employees who had for many years maintained a moderate stance.

TABLE II

EMPLOYMENT BY EDUCATION

(unit: %)

Years:	1960	1970	1980	1989
primary school	84.2	67.4	49.1	30.3
junior high school	7.3	20.1	26.4	43.1
high school	6.2	-	-	36.5
college	2.4	6.1	7.8	13.1

Source: Economic Planning Board, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population.*

Note: In South Korea, to graduate from primary school, junior high school, high school and college, students have to attend for 6, 9, 12 and 14 years respectively.

Recent Developments in the Trade Union Movement

As industrialisation in South Korea progresses and the number of wage labourers increases, so the potential for industrial disruption also increases. However, until 1986 industrial relations were relatively peaceful and trade union activities remained moderate. The number of strikes had been kept below 200 per year throughout the 1970s. The main reasons for such a halcyon situation may have been the relative weakness of trade unions as a result of an over-supply of labour, and government-imposed restrictions on union activities.

In the 1980s, although the over-supply of labour sharply declined, the government under Chun Doo Hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan] retained its restrictions. The number of strikes was consequently kept below 300 per year until 1986. In 1980 however, the transitional year between governments, the number of strikes reached 407. This temporary increase was due to loss of government control. In 1987, the country again entered a transition period. Chun was due to step down in favour of Roh Tae Woo [No T'aeu]. As the country prepared for the change, the political situation suddenly altered in a way which was to increase democracy and individual liberty. A momentous shift in industrial relations occurred.

TABLE III

UNIONS: THEIR INCREASE AND MEMBERSHIP

Date	numbers of unions	membership (1,000s)	(%)
June 1987	2,725	1,050	11.9
June 1988	5,062	1,510	15.9
June 1989	7,380	1,825	18.0
Dec 1989	7,883	1,932	18.7

Source: Korean Labour Institute, *Quarterly Labour Review* 3/1 (1990).

The most striking features of this recent shift is the rapid expansion of trade union organisations and the increase in their activities. This is demonstrated in Table III. The number of union members remained relatively constant at about 1,000,000 for over a decade until June 1987. In December 1989, the number of union members and the union density (workers affiliated expressed as a portion ofthe total working population) reached around 2,000,000 and 18.7% respectively.

Although the ratio of organised workers to all employees remains below 20%, the union organisation establishment rate, which can often be an important indicator of trade union influence, is very high. This is especially true in large establishments, as Table IV shows; in January 1989, the establishment rate for companies with over 300 employees reached 72.9% In contrast, the union organisation establishment rate in companies with under 100 employees is very low in South Korea. The rapid expansion of unions is partly due to a 1987 revision of the Trade Union Law. This relaxed previous regulations on union organisation. A more important factor, however, is a change in the Korean socio-political environment, so that workers now feel less fearful about the consequences of involvement in union activities.

TABLE IV

UNION ORGANISATION ESTABLISHMENT RATE IN KOREAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Company Size (employees)	Nov 1986	Jan 1989
10-29	1.4	2.0
30-99	2.5	7.7
100-299	11.0	30.6
300-499	25.9	59.4
500-999	45.9	77.0
over 1,000	51.6	79.2
All companies	4.9	20.3
Medium and small size	3.3	9.6
Large size (over 300)	38.9	72.9

Source: Ministry of Labour, *Survey Report on Manufacturing Industry Wage Conditions*, quoted from Moo (1990).

Note: Organization rate = (no. of companies with unions/total companies) x 100

Many company managers are unaccustomed to collective bargaining, just as they are used to maintaining an authoritarian dictatorship over their employees. Moreover, leaders of newly organised unions have no experience of institutionalised industrial relations and—sometimes—have an insufficient understanding of the business administration within the company of their concern. Confrontation has been inevitable, since both sides are novices in collective bargaining, and this offers one reason why the number of industrial disputes has recently increased.

Together with the change in the political environment, an acute labour shortage since 1986 has influenced the extent of union activities and the propensity of workers to take strike action. The annual rate of South Korean GNP increase exceeded 12% between 1986 and 1988. Coupled with this, the unemployment rate was below 4% (see Table V). This itself led to a shift in bargaining power, unions gaining an advantage.

TABLE V

MAJOR TRENDS IN THE KOREAN LABOUR MARKET

(unit: %)

	nom. wage (rates of increase)	real wage (rates of increase)	GNP growth rate	unemployed rate
1985	9.2	6.6	5.4	4.0
1986	8.2	5.3	12.9	3.8
1987	10.1	6.9	13.0	3.1
1988	15.5	7.8	12.4	2.5
1989	21.1	14.5	6.7	2.6

Sources: Economic Planning Board, *Major Statistics of Korean Economy*; Ministry of Labour, *Monthly Survey Report on Labour*.

As I have mentioned, one outcome of these developments was the increase in strikes. From an annual 200 up to 1986, the number jumped sharply to 3,749 in 1987, and more than 1,600 in 1988 and 1989 respectively (Table VI). Though the number decreased from a 1987 peak, the loss of working days continued to increase because the average duration of strikes lengthened and the number of workers joining strikes grew through to 1989.

TABLE VI

STRIKES AND DAYS LOST DUE TO STRIKES

Years	Strikes	Days Lost (unit: 1,000)
1970-79	79 (annual average)	-
1980-85	193 (annual average)	-
1986	276	-
1987	3,749	6,792
1988	1,873	11,269
1989	1,616	13,275

Source: Ministry of Labour, *Monthly Survey Report on Labour*

After 1987, strikes were no longer confined to the manufacturing industries: many companies in transportation, medical and health, and the construction industry have also been affected. The most influential strikes have however been those at big manufacturing companies such as Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Heavy Industrial Company. In 1987, workers were called to strike with the idea to "strike first, negotiate second". As a result, many companies experienced strikes even though they had no trade union. Union leaders, for their part, demanded higher wages, better working conditions and improved work rules regardless of whether any existing

agreement was in place. Then, after 1988, most strikes proceeded legally, according to the process prescribed in the labour law.

Finally within this account, I should briefly mention the underground activities of some intellectuals and connected radical organisations. Since the 1970s, some student activists within universities have sought to join in the trade union movement. To do so, they have taken jobs as manual workers and, in due course, become agitators in the midst of ordinary workers. In some workplaces these intellectuals have exerted a strong influence over young workers. They were critical of authoritarian managers and senior workers obedient to managers. The intellectuals and workers influenced by them confronted the comparatively moderate union leaders, criticizing them as "co-opted leaders". During the labour upheavals after 1987, some incumbent union leaders were forced to resign because of this agitation and criticism.

In this way, some unions came under the influence of intellectuals. Such unions call themselves "democratic" to distinguish themselves from others. In January 1990, a new federation, the National Federation of Trade Unions (NFTU) was organised by these "democratic" unions. According to the Ministry of Labour, the NFTU had 337 affiliated unions and 140,000 members in July 1990.

There are some merits in the competition which has grown between the two rival union camps. In particular, the NFTU has questioned—and potentially could change—the stagnant and submissive characteristics of the traditional Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU) group. But, at the same time, we cannot neglect the negative aspects of splits and rivalries within the union movement. So long as trade unions have two different voices, their influence in changing

government policy is likely to be weak, and their chance of improving the welfare of workers is likely to be poor.

Future prospects

As I have shown, since 1987 South Korean industrial relations have moved in a direction which contrasts with similar relations in most advanced countries. Elsewhere, trade union membership and union activities are diminishing (Beaumont 1987).

What are the future prospects of South Korean industrial relations? Many people still have a long-term optimism. There is some reason for this when we consider South Korea's economic growth, a growth characterised by remarkable adaptability on the sides of both managers and workers. This performance has, however, been achieved under two conditions: an abundant supply of labour and strict controls on trade union activities by the authoritarian government regime. Now that both conditions have changed to the advantage of workers, a new system and working practices must be put in place which reflect this new situation.

During 1990, the number of trade unions and their members continuously increased, but the incidence of strikes decreased. However, this decrease seems to be caused not by the development of co-operative relationships between employers and unions. Rather it is a result both of the slowdown in economic growth and of a strict application of legislative machinery to control union activities by the government. In this regard, establishing an industrial relations system and working practices which will lead to

more commitment and satisfaction amongst workers but less conflict between employers and unions, remains an urgent task which must be solved.

NOTE

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THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN KOREA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS

WON CHONG-KEUN

Introduction

Although the history of Korea's labour relations goes back to the early 20th century, the nation's real labour movement, a movement directed by workers for workers, only began to appear after 29 June 1987. This was the date of a package of democratic political reforms, dramatically announced under the pressure of severe civil unrest against Chun Doo Hwan's [Chŏn Tuhwan's] oppressive regime. Prior to 1987, labour relations had been deliberately restricted, ostensibly to achieve the goal of economic development through the maintenance of artificially low labour costs and enforced workplace peace.

The pronouncement of liberalisation on 29 June marked a real and sensible milestone in the labour movement. Since then, every aspect of labour relations has begun to change. Unprecedented disputes and strikes have taken place in virtually all workplaces, reflecting the fact that the pronouncement gave labour movements tremendous momentum in their organisation and collective

bargaining roles. Real wages soared as new union movements formed outside the established government-controlled structure. Many major international investors were concerned by this rapid, explosive and radical change, but inside South Korea, liberalisation threw open many active debates about industrial democracy.

The purpose of my paper is to describe the recent developments and to consider the causes of labour unrest. First I will discuss the characteristics of South Korea's labour relations before 1987. The final section of the paper addresses future tasks and draws some implications applicable for international investors.

Labour relations prior to 29 June 1987

South Korea's labour relations before 1987 were oppressive and authoritarian. Under the government's system there were few disturbances, and any strikes which occurred were subject to strict control by the government. Unions were closely regulated under a law whose regulations were neither consistently nor impartially applied. Labour relations were not facilitated by natural operations within markets, but the state was always dominant. The main purpose of government intervention was to advance its own substantive goals, namely to hold down labour costs and maintain labour peace.[1]

South Korea has long been an anti-communist developmentalist nation where the government has given pre-eminence to two substantive goals—national security and economic growth.[2] These goals have been regarded as given imperatives by both government and the general

public. All public, business and private activities have had to comply with these two goals. Otherwise, legitimacy was not achieved, and rigid government control was applied. Labour relations were no exception. To assure security and economic growth, according to the government, labour peace must be maintained regardless of sacrifice. Labour disturbances were consequently regarded as a threat to national security, as the enemy of sustained growth.

Under the military regimes of Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi] and his sucessor, Chun Doo Hwan, union activities were tightly scrutinized. When Park became president in 1961, he dissolved all existing labour unions and substituted a single national union, the *Han'guk noch'ong* (FKTU: Federation of Korean Trade Unions). This was wholly controlled by the government and staffed, particularly at its highest levels, by bureaucrats. Many so-called "labour nobles" were produced, some of whom rose to become cabinet members.

In 1972 Park created a new constitution which banned future elections and restricted virtually all political activities against him. All strikes were prohibited and the unions, which previously had had some room to manoeuvre, were supervised more strictly. Unions were required to secure government approval prior to engaging in collective negotiations. If any disputes arose, the government automatically intervened to settle them, and the government's decision was final and legally binding.

In April 1980 Chun tightened the control still further. He prohibited all third parties—not only student, religious and other organisations, but also leaders from other labour federations or regions—from interfering in any given labour negotiation. Unions were deprived of all backup and became mere puppet organisations. They offered cosmetic

representation to labourers and ensured that control would remain firmly in the hands of management.[3] Collective bargaining disappeared; the government's objective to control and to minimize the growth of any political opposition base was easily attained.

South Korean management was, in general, pleased with this oppressive scheme. Management enjoyed the privilege of demanding high quality but low paid workers who would work long hours without any serious protest. If there were disputes, management left action to government agents who could arrest or physically intimidate any workers who disrupted the workplace. Labour disputes were not perceived as business matters, but as potentially destabilising activities against the government. Thus, police and security agents pressured workers heavily to facilitate rapid settlements of disputes which invariably involved substantial workers' concessions.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many South Korean government and business leaders believed low wage costs were an important source of international competitiveness. Holding down labour costs implied more than wages, but also limited recruitment, training, administration, benefits and other expenses. Little attention was given to providing a safe, healthy and pleasant workplace. Rather, the aim was to increase productivity and to ensure maximum management flexibility in the deployment of workers. As a result, the rate of industrial injuries and fatalities has been extraordinarily high. The worker fatality rate at the end of 1987 was more than four times that of the United States and about nine times that of Japan.[4]

It is remarkable that Korean workers, under this repression, worked so hard and effectively. They spent an average in excess of the officially reported 50 hours weekly,

even in the 1980s. The work week was far longer than that of any other industrial country.[5] The work ethic was well disciplined. The traditional values have been kept since 1987, so that it remains perceived as desirable to be subservient to, and not to overly complain against, their employers.

Given this authoritative oppression, the few labour disturbances that did break out were largely wildcat strikes. They were often sparked by some incident such as the failure of management to pay wages, the sudden closure of a plant, or the efforts of management to create a rival union. Such events meant strikes erupted spontaneously. Since they occurred without the long period of cooling off and the mandatory arbitration officially and legally required, such strikes were regarded as technically illegal. So, management could without further consideration call in the police to restore order. Many strikers were women who expected to retire from the work force at an earlier age than their male colleagues and who therefore had less reason to worry about possible blacklisting.[6]

Labour movements after the 1987 democratic political reforms

The demonstrations by students, labourers and the general public during the spring and summer of 1987 were so severe that they put heavy pressure on Chun to allow free elections and to begin talks on democratic constitutional reform. Faced with them, the government had no choice but to accept demonstrators' demands. Roh Tae-Woo [No T'ae-u], the presidential candidate designated by Chun, suddenly announced on 29 June 1987 that the government would

permit direct elections and would allow significant liberalisation. This pronouncement brought about profound shifts in every facet of South Korea's political, economic and social relations. It also signalled the end of the old system of Korean industrial relations—representation from above.[7]

Since then, labour relations have begun to fundamentally change. The most striking feature is the increase in violent labour disputes. These affect private industry, but also the public sector, where workers at the Seoul subway system, Korea Broadcasting System and the national railroad have all struck. Such action was unimaginable before 1987. From 1987 to 1990, more than nine times the number of labour disputes occurred than in the previous six years. Once it became clear that the government would adopt a less interventionist policy, long suppressed labour grievances started to explode. South Korean society as a whole was not well prepared to meet this new radical challenge. Management in particular, long protected by the government, was not prepared to foster proper industrial relations and could not easily recognize and adjust to the turbulent changes in the framework of industrial relations.[8]

What are the main features of the developments since 1987? One striking feature is that union organisation activities have greatly expanded. From July 1987 to December 1989 the number of union establishments increased from 2,725 to 7,883. The total size of membership increased from 1.05 million to 1.93 million workers. Union activity has been most prominent in large companies such as the heavy manufacturing sector. (This comprises automobile, shipbuilding, metal and machinery manufacturing). The non-manufacturing sector—for example, hospitals, banking and financial institutions—also positively participated, so the labour movement quickly

spread to clerical and professional workers. School teachers even attempted to organise a union in 1989. This is still forbidden by current laws, and led to a serious confrontration with the government. More than 1,500 teachers who were pro-union were discharged from their jobs. Many were jailed and, in support, a small number of students attempted to commit suicide by jumping from school buildings.

In the midst of the tensions between labour and management new unions tended to become more radical. They regarded the government-sponsored FKTU as too conservative, too corrupt, too self-centred and too much under non-labour control. Naturally, some unions under the FKTU umbrella lost their confidence and, in the eyes of workers, their credibility. A new leadership has emerged. And a new labour council, the *Chŏnnohyŏp* (National Council of Trade Unions), with neither official recognition nor a united policy, has acquired considerable support and vitality.[9]

Labour disputes reached a new high. In the months that followed the 29 June declaration unrest spread quickly. 3,749 strikes occurred during the latter half of 1987, 3,250 of them in the two months of August and September. In 1988, labour disputes declined, and 1,873 strikes were recorded. In 1989, 1,616 strikes occurred. One thing of note is that recent labour disputes suggest gradual stabilisation: for the first eight months of 1990 there were only 291 reported cases.

Wages and reductions in working hours have been the most common issues in disputes. Wages have consequently risen significantly, as Table I shows. Rises have been most substantial in the manufacturing sector where the labour movement has been most violent and explosive.

Manufacturing wages rose 19.6% in 1988 and 25.1% in 1989. Rises were greatest in large companies. In this way, the wage gap between blue and white collar workers has been vastly reduced.[10]

TABLE I

Year	All Industries	Manufacturing	Real Wages (All Industries)
1987	10.1%	11.6%	6.9%
1988	15.5%	19.6%	7.8%
1989	21.1%	25.1%	14.5%
1987-89	54.0%	67.0%	31.9%

Source: Ministry of Labour, *Monthly Labour Statistics*.

What are the major underlying causes of such serious disputes, and what made workers so angry? Vogel and Lindauer list several factors as essential causes: excessive prolongation of an unpopular authoritarian system of labour relations; outrage at disrespectful treatment by superiors; an acute sense of relative deprivation; the perception that the rich acquired their wealth by illegitimate means.[11] In a sense, labour disputes and strikes now are the cost of earlier repression.

Future Tasks and Implications for International Investors

Since 1987, South Korea has undergone a painful period of labour relations. However, if we look at the experience of other nations, we can find similar explosive

uprisings in comparable industrialisation processes—1880s England, the 1900s in America and Germany, the 1910s in France and Italy and the five years following world war II in Japan. These periods mark a particular stage in the level of industrialisation and industrial structure, and the size of the organised workforce. In this sense, Korea's experience is not unique.[12]

South Korea is currently undergoing a transition from a historically repressive system of control to a more liberalised and mature approach to industrial relations. Current labour unrests are the growing pains on the way towards reconciliation.[13] Although Korea has far to go, the important thing is that it has already started to move to assume the mantle of a democratic political, economic, and social system. The most important current task is to get rid of distrust between management, labour and government and and replace it with mutual trust. For this, principles of law, and abiding by the law, should be established. The government must be neutral. An accepted corollary of this is that all people, regardless of wealth, sex, or status, are equal under the law. The role of government is only to uphold the rules by granting recognition to whatever outcome is reached by following the procedures laid down for the contest between labour and management.[14]

In other areas, the government should endeavour to fairly distribute the nation's income and wealth. Various measures including land regulation, housing programmes and tax reform could engineer the redressing of justice in order to reduce the sense of relative deprivation felt by workers. Management need to develop a new conceptual framework of industrial relations. The old repressive style of labour control no longer functions. Learning to live with unions may be difficult, but management should try to

motivate unions and workers to participate more positively in the production process.

Labour unions also have a part to play. They should be democratic in structure and independent of external influence. They must build up trust among their members to restore confidence and union credibility. They must also learn to live with management and accept compromises. They must base their interventions on economic rationality. And, in their efforts in realize a fair distribution of wealth, they need to develop more broad, macro-level perspectives of the South Korean market.[15]

NOTES

[1] Rogers, R. A., "An exclusionary labor regime under pressure: the changes in labor relations in the Republic of Korea since mid-1987," in *UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal*,8/1 (Spring 1990), pp 91-92.

[2] *op cit* p.97.

[3] Vogel, E. F. and D. L. Lindauer, *Toward a Social Contract for South Korean Labor. Development Discussion Paper* 317 (Cambridge, Mass., Institute of International Affairs, Harvard University), 1989, p.13.

[4] Rogers *op cit*, pp.97-98.

[5] Vogel and Lindauer *op cit*, p.8.

[6] *op cit*, pp.13-14.

[7] Rauenhorst, A. M., "Industrial relations in Korea: the backdrop to the current drama," *Comparative Labor Law Journal* 11 (1990), p.317.

[8] Park, Fun-Koo, "Recent development and emerging issues in Korea's industrial relations," paper presented at the Korea

Development Institute/East West Centre Joint conference, Seoul, 8-9 December 1989.

[9] Vogel and Lindauer *op cit*, p.23.

[10] Vogel and Lindauer *op cit*, p.23.

[11] Vogel and Lindauer *op cit*, pp.26-30.

[12] Park *op cit*, pp.2-3.

[13] Vogel and Lindauer *op cit*, p.2.

[14] Rogers *op cit*, p.96 and p.129.

[15] Park *op cit*, p.24.

KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS:

The Past, Present, and Future

JUNG-HOON LEE

Introduction

If the overall history of Korean-Japanese relations could be painted on a canvas, the picture would resemble the works of Picasso rather than Rembrandt or Monet. Marred by the bitter memories of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions between 1592 and 1598, and of course by the colonial experience (1910-45)—both of which left Korea physically and psychologically devastated—an ugly blend of emotions and attitudes inevitably set in which still haunt the two nations' relationship. Many Japanese are still in the habit of treating Koreans in a condescending manner while Koreans, for their part, remain bitterly resentful of the Japanese and constantly struggle to shed themselves of the colonial stigma. One might say that the Koreans have an inferiority complex. Of significance is the Korean obsession with the humiliation suffered at the hands of the colonialists, and their present burning desire to better the Japanese at every opportunity. These are important psychological factors that must be taken into account when dealing with any aspect of Korean-Japanese relations. Four

centuries after Hideyoshi's invasions and nearly half a century since the end of colonial rule, the enduring legacies of these events are still firmly etched in the minds of many, subconsciously affecting grassroots perceptions of and approaches towards the Japanese.

It took South Korea and Japan fourteen long years of strained negotiations before they normalized relations in a 1965 treaty. On the positive side, the treaty cleared the way for extensive trade relations that within a year saw Japan surpassing the United States as South Korea's number one trading partner. South Korea, too, became increasingly important to Japan as its market grew. There was also a down side, however, in that amidst the avarice and commotion created by lucrative economic possibilities emotional reconciliation, surely the key to lasting and genuine relationships, was hardly dealt with. The treaty was a marriage of convenience. Even if it earmarked the beginning of a new era, it stood on shaky ground since the two partners lacked mutual trust and understanding.

Today, 25 years on, economic factors still dominate and dictate the relationship. The volume of bilateral trade grew from $221 million in 1965 to $28 billion in 1988[1] and cultural interactions substantially increased. Yet the way Japanese and Koreans feel about each other has hardly changed. Opinion polls confirm this, and both sides consistently rank the other as the least-liked or least-trusted people in the whole world.[2] Even young Koreans, despite apparent Japanese influences on aspects of their lifestyle from hair styles to clothes, rarely allow material adornment of Japan to faze a sense of duty never to forget the injustices done to their forefathers. To be sure, the emotional dimension of the relationship has so thoroughly permeated the socio-political fabric of Korea that it would take tremendous efforts by both sides to rectify this.

There is a distinctively Korean word that brings together the feelings of remorse, agony, anger, anguish, frustration, and resentment. This is *han*, a word often used to describe, aptly, the feelings of those who experienced Japanese colonialism. Unless *han* is resolved, or at least dealt with in a positive way, issues such as prejudice against Korean residents in Japan, territorial sovereignty over Tokto Island (to the Japanese, Takeshima), trade imbalances, and lesser issues such as Japanese textbook revisions can set off political furores that would potentially turn the clock back on relations beyond the signing of the 1965 treaty.

Historical Background

Although much of today's ill-feeling between Koreans and Japanese can be attributed to the colonial legacy, the history of bad blood predates this by hundreds of years. Hideyoshi's invasions are the most obvious example. Dipping even further into history, there are traces of aggression all the way back to the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D., though all our knowledge needs interpretation. Some assert that the horseriders of Koguryŏ conquered the Wa people of Kyushu during the 4th century and established Yamato, the first Japanese state.[3] Following from this, speculation suggests that the Japanese imperial line may itself have some Korean connection.[4]

Others, however, suggest that the southern part of the Korean peninsula, then known as Mimana in Japan, was conquered and colonized by Empress Jingu in the early 3rd century.[5] Discrepancies of interpretation are clearly enormous, and in spite of later archaeological findings there

is scarcely enough evidence to clarify these issues. The point for us is, regardless of who conquered whom, aggression rather than peace seems to have formed the pattern of Japanese-Korean relations.

This is not to say that amicable relations never existed. In fact, immediately following Japan's unification in 1603, Tokugawa Ieyasu fostered friendly relations with the Korean Chosŏn dynasty, ostensibly to improve Japan's tarnished international image after Hideyoshi's indiscriminate military campaign. Ieyasu was also fascinated by the teachings of neo-Confucianism, which were available through Korean writings. But as the Tokugawa period drew to a close, so did cordial Japanese-Korean relations. Partly engendered by new-found confidence fostered by growing national strength, and partly compelled by contacts with the west, Japan became increasingly nationalistic. This, ultimately, led to the imperialistic path.

Japanese nationalism soon caused problems for their weak neighbours. Chosŏn easily fell prey to the ruthless game of imperialism, a game already being played at a ferocious pace by westerners throughout Asia. After Japan emerged victorious from both the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), both of which were fought largely for supremacy over Korea, she was at last able to annex the peninsula in 1910. Japan had paid her dues and earned the "right" to claim this much-coveted land that formed the gateway to continental Asia.

The Colonial Legacy

1910 saw the beginning of undoubtedly the worst period in the history of Korean-Japanese relations. Unlike British imperialism, Japan's colonial rule was harsh and unremitting. Spearheaded by the military government-general, comprehensive efforts were made to "Japanize" the Koreans through policy measures which disallowed the use of the Korean language, made the adoption of Japanese surnames mandatory, and imposed Shintoism as the national religion. Furthermore, the government-general acquired much of the arable farm land and claimed its produce. Many Korean farmers were displaced and scattered in search of a livelihood.[6]

The intensification of Japan's war efforts, first against China and then against America, further worsened the Korean predicament. Conscripted as soldiers and labourers, tens of thousands of Koreans were called to make sacrifices for the cause of Imperial Japan. For many, this meant death. At the time of Japan's surrender in 1945, over two million Koreans had been mobilized to work in Japan.[7] In all, the number of Koreans involved in Japan's wartime programmes was so great that at least half of all households are estimated to have been affected. It should therefore come as no surprise that two of the most celebrated Korean national holidays, 1 March and 15 August, are dates which mark the colonial period.[8]

Dichotomous interpretation of the colonial era has hindered emotional reconciliation. Throughout the post-colonial period, Japan has tried repeatedly to justify her rule in Korea, maintaining that by providing education, building an infrastructure, industrializing urban areas, enhancing agricultural productivity, improving health and sanitation

services, and so on, her rule was beneficial. In October 1953, Kubota Kanichiro, Japanese Chief Delegate to the third round of Korean-Japanese talks, unleashed deep-seated feelings to give such a view prominence.[9] Considering the uproar he created, Kubota probably realized that he had made a diplomatic mistake, but he was only one of many Japanese—including even pro-Korean figures such as Kishi Nobusuke and Shiina Etsusaburo—who unreservedly considered their goals honourable and their colonial policies commendable.

Koreans, on the contrary, quickly dismiss any suggestion that Japanese rule was positive. Looking at the railroads, hospitals, schools, and factories left behind by the colonialists, they argue that they were not built for Korean consumption at all. Indeed, most statistics for the period show that the majority of the supposed benefits to the Koreans are grossly exaggerated by the Japanese. For example, in spite of Japan's frequent reference to the development of a well-balanced education system for Koreans, the 1944 population census shows that only 0.8% graduated from middle school.[10] Moreover, considering that over 11% of the population were forced abroad, mostly to Manchuria and Japan, and an incredible 20% lost their homes[11] as a result of population redeployment policies, it is difficult to imagine which segment of the population could have had the luxury of enjoying the beneficent rule of the Japanese.

Determining whether Japan's colonial policies had a positive or negative effect on Korea is a daunting, if not pointless, exercise. The emotional undercurrents are much too overbearing to allow for a clear-cut and objective answer. But even if Koreans could be convinced that some aspects of colonialism such as modernization actually benefited them, this would have no effect on their perceptions about the

Japanese. As I will now discuss, the negative impact of the colonial legacy was most vividly illustrated in 1951, when the two sides first got together after Korea's independence to initiate the normalizing of diplomatic relations.

The Process of Diplomatic Normalization, 1951-65

In the aftermath of Korean independence, South Korea severed all contacts with Japan until negotiations for the San Francisco peace treaty set the stage on which the two nations were allowed to negotiate for themselves. Urged by an administration in Washington eager to create a trilateral defence structure to facilitate war efforts on the Korean peninsula, the two nations embarked on a settlement process that was to take 14 years to complete. Seven rounds of official talks were held to settle a wide range of issues, including property claims, Korean residents in Japan, peace line disputes, territorial sovereignty over islands, and Japanese relations with North Korea. In all, five Japanese prime ministers, from Yoshida Shigeru to Sato Eisaku, and four Korean leaders, from Syngman Rhee [Yi Sŭngman] to Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi], were involved.

There were three basic reasons why the two agreed to get together. First, South Korea hoped to obtain a formal apology and reparation payments as part of an overall political settlement. Second, Japan was eager to settle the specific problem of Korean residents in Japan, possibly repatriating a substantial number of them. Third, the United States was prepared to act as a bridge between the two nations in order to consolidate its own anti-communist designs in the region. Aside from the American factor, it is

clear that there was a wide gulf between what Japan and South Korea wanted from the talks. Korean delegates insisted on sincere apologies, while their Japanese counterparts remained indifferent, showing willingness only to talk about Korean residents.

Syngman Rhee's establishment of what became known as the "Rhee Line" on 18 January 1952 complicated matters further.[12] As the meetings continued, so arguments were exacerbated. Historic enmity and contempt began to surface to the point where meetings turned from negotiations into platforms for demands and counter-demands. Despite their enormous influence, the Americans could hardly deal with the emotions. The fervently anti-Japanese Rhee at the helm of South Korean politics meant prospects were bleak. Neither side felt any urgency and both were apparently more concerned with domestic politics. Japan faced local issues of rearmament, conservative and socialist challenges, and pacifism. South Korea was more concerned with the civil war, economic reconstruction, and political corruption.

When Park Chung Hee came to power in South Korea by overthrowing the inept Chang Myŏn government, the atmosphere between South Korea and Japan changed dramatically. Park was a graduate of Japanese military academies, had been an officer in the Japanese army, and was an admirer of the Meiji leaders. He was fluent in Japanese and exhibited no grudge or contempt towards Japan. Furthermore, he was eager to receive economic assistance from Japan to deliver Korea from its sorry state of economic collapse. Having come to power by a military coup, he saw in the economy one way to legitimize his rule. With absolute power at his disposal, and without a legislature or an immediate opposition to thwart him, Park was perceived by the Japanese leadership to be in an ideal position to strike a deal, especially since he was known to

want to solve the Korean economic crisis.[13] Thus, spearheaded by some pro-normalization forces in the Japanese ranks, and in particular by former premier Kishi Nobusuke, the negotiation process moved ahead.

With both sides in apparent accord for the first time since negotiations began, a breakthrough was achieved in late 1962. Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi and Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Jong-pil [Kim Chongp'il] signed the Kim-Ohira memorandum, agreeing to an economic aid package worth $800 million over a 10-year period. This comprised $300 million in grants, $200 million in low-interest government loans, and $300 million in commercial loans.[14] In effect, this concluded much of the property claims issue.

Just as things were beginning to look up, the secretive and collusive manner in which Kim had handled negotiations sparked public fear of a national sell-out. This led to nationwide demonstrations against the talks. Park, having barely won a presidential election in August 1963 against former president Yun P'osŏn, had to contend with the public's growing sense of indignation. During 1964, when the demonstrations peaked, he even considered postponing the talks. In Japan, too, an anti-normalization movement gained momentum. This was led by socialists, communists and other leftist elements, and had the support of the pro-P'yŏngyang *Chosoren*, the federation of Korean residents in Japan.

The situation in Japan was not nearly so bad as that in South Korea, where martial law was declared in June 1964 to control the deteriorating situation. The question was not whether Sato could handle domestic pressure—which he could and did—, but whether Park could handle Korea. We know now that Park decided to "live or die" with the

normalization issue. Convinced that the economic boom was the key to sustaining his rule, he staked his political career on the issue. His conviction allowed Foreign Ministers Shiina Etsusaburo of Japan and Lee Tong Won [Yi Tongwŏn] of Korea to sign the Treaty on Basic Relations and four additional agreements on 22 June 1965, effectively concluding the normalization process.[15] Problems remained in abundance, but both sides survived the ratification of the treaty. Sato was not about to suffer the same fate his brother, Kishi, had faced over the crises following the Japan-United States security treaty in 1960. Park had made a shrewd gamble, and he remained in power largely on the strength of the economic turn-round made possible by Japanese money until he was assassinated in October 1979.

Post-Normalization Relations

In spite of all the furore the normalization treaty had generated, relations between South Korea and Japan were remarkably cordial during Sato's premiership until 1972. Sato went a step further than the treaty, linking the security interests of the two nations. In the Nixon-Sato Joint Communique issued on 21 November 1969, a "Korean clause" was introduced in which South Korea's security was recognized as an essential part of Japan's own security.[16] This was in line with Sato's support for a strong relationship with the United States and his belief in the American Northeast Asian strategy. Close co-operation with South Korea was an important aspect of that strategy.

Winds of change swept across Asia in the early 1970s which inevitably had an impact on Korean-Japanese

relations. Japan's *rapprochement* with China following Nixon's visit led the new Tanaka government to review relations with both Korean states. Furthermore, in the wake of Red Cross meetings at the truce village of Panmunjŏm which tentatively reduced South-North tensions, Tanaka departed from the "one-Korea" policy of his predecessor, and argued for a more pragmatic and flexible approach. This led to approaches to both regimes, and was reminiscent of the Ichiro Hatoyama government's policy in the mid-1950s. The government argued that detente in the peninsula rendered the "Korean clause" no longer pertinent.

In August 1973, the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung [Kim Taejung] in Tokyo fuelled deteriorating Korean-Japanese relations. Park was implicated, because Kim was his opponent, and a rival candidate in the closely contested 1971 presidential election.[17] A year later, a Korean resident from Japan who had assumed a Japanese identity by taking a Japanese name and passport and speaking Japanese, shot and killed Park's wife in an assassination attempt on the president. South Korea held the Japanese government responsible.[18] The Japanese showed no sympathy, and did not apologize. This sparked off widespread demonstrations and a raid on the Japanese embassy in Seoul.[19]

Miki Takeo, when he replaced scandal-plagued Tanaka, gradually calmed the storm. He was concerned that America's loss of the Vietnam war in 1975 might encourage the northern leader Kim Ilsŏng to contemplate a second invasion of the South, so he abandoned Tanaka's equidistance approach to ensure greater stability. Firmly convinced that a communist takeover of the entire peninsula would pose serious problems for Japan, he

sought to strengthen ties with the South and reaffirmed the "Korean clause".

In the years that followed, despite movements in the on-off efforts to enhance trade and cultural ties with the North, particularly during the Fukuda years, the basic tenets of Japan's Korea policy have remained relatively consistent: maintaining the status quo and encouraging peaceful coexistence. Adjustments have had to be made to resolve problems such as Kim Dae-jung's internment and the Japanese textbook controversy in the early 1980s, but the politico-economic rationale has managed to prevail over more emotional issues. In the 1990s it is difficult to imagine Japan changing her basic policy. While South Korea grows stronger and more confident, North Korea remains isolated, belligerent, and relatively poor. So, unless the increasing economic gap between North and South is somehow reversed, there are no legitimate reasons for Japan to revert back to an equidistance policy at the risk of jeopardizing trade relations.

One can argue that as the world changes, Japan must re-assess her policy towards the North to reflect the rapidly changing international order. But P'yŏngyang can arguably be considered the last bastion of communism. Remarkably, P'yŏngyang resists the surging waves of democracy. One cannot underestimate the resilience of a 45-year regime built on a personality cult, and Kim Ilsŏng's power is unlikely to wane in the foreseeable future; this is precisely why Korean-Japanese relations will remain little changed.

The "Third Generation" Conundrum

Out of the calm atmosphere of the late 1980s, the status of third generation Korean residents in Japan has become a problem. Positive Japanese approaches could help to erase one of the most ugly legacies of the colonial past, possibly bringing about an era of genuine bilateral relations based on mutual respect and amity rather than contempt and resentment. Otherwise, the consequences could be dire. In a broad sense, the issue is not just about the status of Korean residents (for in early 1991 there were only three known babies falling under this category, all in the Osaka area), but the overall treatment of 680,000 Koreans who are estimated still to be living in Japan.

Briefly, the problem stems from what South Koreans see as short-sighted stipulations in the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan, concluded in 1965 as part of the overall normalization treaty. In this, permanent residence was to be granted to i) those residing continuously in Japan since or prior to 15 August 1945 up to the time of application, ii) children of such people born on or after 16 August 1945 and before 16 January 1971, and iii) children of those falling in either previous category who were born after 16 January 1971, that is, five years after the treaty was implemented. The people in the first two categories were to be considered "first generation" residents, and those born since 1971 "second generation". The status of "third generation" residents, that is the children of those born since 1971 was to be discussed within 25 years of the date when the treaty came into force. Herein lies the problem, for the 25 years expired on 16 January 1991.[20]

In 1990, the southern government urged the Japanese not only to grant permanent residence to "third generation" Koreans, but also to make genuine efforts to improve the treatment of all Korean residents. Obvious demands included the abolition of compulsory finger printing, the requirement that foreigners carry registration certificates at all times, forceful deportation of foreign subjects, and the requirement of re-entry permits.[21] The Japanese did not respond well to Seoul's demands. They sympathized with the position of "third generation" residents, but shied away from making commitments, arguing that any special treatment of Koreans would be unfair to other foreign residents. Seoul, in response, emphasized the unique circumstances that brought Koreans to Japan in the first place, as forced labourers during colonialization, whereas other foreigners came of their own will.

Imbued with prejudice against Koreans, the Japanese find it difficult to make concessions. Yoshida Shigeru once referred to Korean residents as "insects living in the stomach of a lion with the potential to kill the lion itself if not checked".[22] Extreme as this may be, it is a type of mentality that has been fostered in Japan over the years. Thus, the solution to the Korean residents' issue largely depends on how the Japanese government counters this inbuilt prejudice. The "third generation" issue has given the two governments a rare opportunity to reconcile emotional differences which have been ignored for too long. Both sides, but the Japanese in particular, need to realize that, as two civilized and prosperous neighbours, the time has come to close the chapter on the dark side of relations. It may take time for emotional feelings to catch up with the thriving economic relations, but the opportunity exists to initiate that process.

Some Future Assessments

The future of Korean-Japanese relations still seems promising. Recent and ongoing international events have helped to reduce tension on the peninsula and South Korea has become less sensitive about Japan's contacts with the North. Also, the South's growing economic confidence and the 1988 Seoul Olympics have helped to improve South Korea's image in the eyes of many Japanese. This, although an intangible factor, can enhance overall relations. On the domestic front, the creation in South Korea of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), apparently modelled on the Japanese LDP, and the Japan Socialist Party's (JSP) gradual shift away from a rigid anti-South Korean policy, offer the possibility of an auspicious future. The creation of similar ruling party structures will help to enhance the understanding of the other's political mechanisms, particularly now that the pro-Japanese Kim Jong-pil is again active in mainstream politics.[23]

Another factor that could have an interesting bearing on relations is the LDP leaders' reduced sense of power and confidence in Japan's domestic politics. No longer certain of the firm support they once commanded, LDP leaders may try to avoid controversial issues—such as the Korean issues—which could arouse public resentment. Japan, faced with continuing heated trade disputes with America, may shy away from generous concessions on the Korean residents issue, lest it compound the public perception of a weak government unable to resist foreign pressure. Yet, when Kim Young Sam [Kim Yŏngsam] visited Japan, Kaifu told him that "he would do his best".[24]

Japan is on the verge of becoming a legitimate superpower as economic might replaces ideology and

military strength in the new international order. Considering that economic factors may be the most important criterion determining status, Japan's position is safely ensured. But in the absence of ideology, which traditionally was the medium by which lesser countries identified themselves, other criteria must arise—such as moral integrity—to complement economic power. It is this integrity that Japan must not ignore if she is to be regarded as more than an economic animal.

There has been much trepidation over the resurgence of Japanese nationalism. But from an objective standpoint, if the Japanese have lost the notion of imperialism and are genuine in their pursuit of an independent foreign policy, there is nothing wrong with the expression of nationalist sentiments. On her way to becoming a superpower, moral compassion and magnanimity—particularly towards her neighbours indicating a genuine conversion from a hated imperialistic past—will lead to the international recognition she has long sought. The pursuit of such ends will ensure that Korean-Japanese relations will enter an age of unprecedented amity. If Japan does not follow such a path she will repeat the same mistakes that led her to be so thoroughly hated and isolated not so long ago.

NOTES

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2 For a recent public opinion poll with relevant questionnaires, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 1 January 1990.

3 For an excellent summary of the ancient history of Korean-Japanese relations, see Chong-sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p.153-64.

4 Ibid., p.159.

5 Jon Carter Covell and Alan Carter Covell argue in contrast that Empress Jingu was in fact a princess from Puyo who had led the "horseriders" in conquering Japan in 369 A.D. Jingu's portrayal as a Japanese queen who invaded Mimana in 200 A.D. is, the Covells argue, a *volte-face* cover-up devised by Japanese court historians in the 8th century. Jon Carter Covell and Alan Covell, *The Korean Impact on Japanese Culture: Japan's Hidden History* (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International Corp., 1987), pp.6-24 and 111.

6 Kim Sanghyŏn, *Chae-il kyop'o munje chosa pogosŏ* [Report on the Problems of Korean Residents in Japan] (Seoul: National Congress Press, 1964), p.5.

7 Kim Sanghyŏn, *Chaeil han'gugin* [Korean Residents in Japan] (Seoul: Tan'guk Research Institute, 1969), p.38.

8 1 March (*samiljŏl*) commemorates the same date in 1919, when the largest and bloodiest independence movement staged during the colonial period began. 15 August (*Kwangbokjŏl*) marks the end of the Pacific war, the date Korea effectively gained independence from Japan, in 1945.

9 The major points made by Kubota Kanichiro, Chief Delegate to the 3rd Round of Talks on 15 October were: i) Japan's expenditure of over 20 million *yen* on Korea's development had been instrumental in bringing about Korea's modernization; ii) had Japan not annexed Korea the political circumstances at the turn of the century were such that Korea would have been usurped by another power; iii) The Cairo Declaration's reference to Japan's colonization of Korea as "slavery" is unreasonable, resulting from wartime hysteria; iv) the separation of Korea from Japan at the end of the war was an act that contravened international law. See Koryŏ taehakkyo asea munje yŏn'gusŏ [Asiatic Research Center, Korea University] (eds) *Han il munje charyojip* [Materials on Korean-Japanese Relations] (Seoul: Koryŏ taehakkyo asea munje yŏn'gusŏ, 1976) vol. 1, pp. 108-11.

10 Chong-sik Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

11 Bruce Cumings, "The legacy of Japanese colonialism in Korea," in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), *The Japanese*

Colonial Empire, 1905-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 490.

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14 Chae-jin Lee and Hideo Sato, *U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 29-30.

15 For the contents of the treaty, see *Japanese Annual of International Law* 10 (1966), pp.263-323.

16 *New York Times*, 22 November 1969.

17 *Asahi Nenkan*, 1974, pp. 227-8. Also see John Welfied, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), pp. 340-2.

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19 *Tonga Ilbo*, 7 September 1974.

20 *Japanese Annual of International Law* 10 (1966), pp. 303-7.

21 *Tonga Ilbo*, 27 February 1990.

22 Quoted in *Tonga Ilbo*, 2 March 1990.

23 For a comparison of south Korea's conservative merger in January 1990 with Japan's own in 1955, see *Tonga Ilbo*, 22 January 1990.

24 *Tonga Ilbo*, 20 March 1990.

REVERSE SYNCRETISM AND THE SACRED AREA OF MUAK-TONG:

The Accommodation of Korean Folk Religion to the Religious Forms of Buddhism

JAMES HUNTLEY GRAYSON

In a previous paper,[1] I discussed the question of the process of religious syncretism as an aspect of the transmission and development of Buddhism in the Three Kingdoms (Silla, Paekche, Koguryŏ) of ancient Korea. The syncretism of that period is an example of a missionary world religion accommodating itself to the fundamental religious ethos of the culture to which it has been transmitted. Here I will discuss another form of syncretism, a syncretism which is the reverse of the process normally observed to have occurred during the era of the Three Kingdoms, namely the accommodation of the autochthonous religion to the missionary religion. Although the evidence for the exact means by which this process of syncretism took place is slim, it is an obvious, if often overlooked feature of the contemporary Korean religious scene. After defining what I mean by syncretism, the bulk of my paper here is devoted to an examination of an unusually sacred site in Seoul. This site, Muak-tong, offers abundant illustrations of the reverse of the usual form of syncretism. I conclude with some suggestions for further research.

What is Syncretism ?

Religious syncretism is a process which may be understood as one part of the broader process of cultural diffusion. This has long been recognized to be the case by historians of religion and cultural anthropologists. James Moffatt (1870-1944), Carsten Colpe and others have observed that religious syncretism occurs as the result of the diffusion of culture, or elements of culture, from one ethnic group or cultural sphere to another ethnic group or cultural world.

Moffatt speaks of syncretism as a "blending of ideas and religious practices" which are "often preceded and accelerated by a new philosophical synthesis as well as by a new political re-arrangement."[2] Defined in this way, syncretism is placed squarely in a particular historical, cultural, and political context. Colpe goes further, and describes syncretism as both a state and as a process in which either the missionary religion or the indigenous religion predominates or in which a state of mutual balance between the two is achieved.[3] E. H. Pyle points out that syncretism can occur as a spontaneous and natural result of inter-cultural contact, or can be the result of some plan, which may have religious and/or political dimensions. Not all syncretism, then, is unplanned or random.[4] Pyle adds that it is important to understand this cultural process of syncretism in order to comprehend both the rise of the great, historical world religions and the emergence of various new religious movements which have occurred recently in the third world and elsewhere.[5] Further, J. A. North, in discussing the formation of cults in the Roman empire, says that religious syncretism is "the merging of elements from different traditions, characteristically in

circumstances of political or cultural dominance/ subjection."[6] North's definition, like Moffatt, points beyond the simple concept of inter-cultural contact leading to religious mixture, and stresses the unequal political and cultural relations which may exist between two peoples during the period of inter-cultural contact.

North cites as one example of the process of syncretism modifications made in the beliefs and practices relating to the worship of the indigenous Roman deities after the Romans came into contact with the Etruscans and the Greeks. This type of syncretism would occur when a significant cultural disparity between the two groups entering into contact is the principal non-religious factor. North also cites the example of tribal peoples within the empire, who applied the names of Roman deities to their own autochthonous spirits. Whilst there is an obvious cultural disparity between the two groups in this particular situation, it would seem that the political relations between the Romans and the tribal peoples was the dominant non-religious factor. North also cites a third case, the example of the *pax romana*, the condition of universal peace within the empire, providing a context in which the religions of subject civilisations such as Egypt could spread beyond the boundaries of their original nation and mix with the religions of the tribal peoples of the empire, and indeed the religions of the Romans themselves.[7]

Outside of the Roman empire, the most frequently cited examples of religious syncretism are Manichaean religion and Ryōbu Shinto, both of which are examples of intentional syncretism. In the case of the Manichaean cult Mani (216-77), the founder, was a Parthian who had been brought up in a family which practised one of the gnostic cults. Through a series of revelations, Mani came to believe that he had been given the authority to create a new cult

which would be the fulfilment of the three world religions of his era—Buddhism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. Syncretism was here a conscious attempt to draw together the essential tenets of the principal religions of the Persian Empire.[8]

Ryōbu Shinto, although also a syncretism which was consciously attempted, is different in that it was an attempt to harmonize a world religion—Buddhism—with the indigenous religious practices of Japan. Following the introduction of Buddhism in the 6th century, there existed a state of tension between the foreign religion and the indigenous cults. Conflict was seemingly overcome during the era of Prince Shōtoku Taishi (573-621) when Buddhism finally gained official recognition. Nonetheless, even though Buddhism spread throughout Japan during the next two centuries, a state of uneasy peace must have existed between the practices and beliefs of the two systems. In the 8th century, the Shingon esoteric Buddhist sect developed a concept called Ryōbu Shinto, "Shinto with Two Aspects". In the adherents' view, native Shinto deities of Japan were seen to be the particular manifestations in Japan of the Buddha or bodhisattvas. In this way, Shingon Buddhists provided a universalistic and a particularistic explanation for their own practices. This at the same time aided the indigenization of Buddhism in Japan.[9] The concept of Ryōbu Shinto is similar to the process by which the Romans identified their own gods with the gods of the Etruscans and the Greeks.

On the basis of my own experience, I have come to realize that there are at least two principal forms of syncretism which occur as the result of long periods of contact between a world religion (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and so forth) and a religion indigenous to a particular people. When there has been a high degree of syncretism by the transmitted religion to the indigenous religion, the

result will be that the core values of the indigenous religion will constitute the centre of the new religion with the missionary religion providing many external or superficial features. But, when there has been a low degree of syncretism by the missionary religion with the autochthonous cults, the core values of the missionary religion will form the central aspect of the new religion with the indigenous religion providing certain superficial features or details. I believe that every religion, whether a world religion, higher religion, or a folk religion, has a certain core set of values, concepts or beliefs. If these core values are altered, one can say that syncretic change has been made in a certain direction away from the traditional belief system. Likewise, in the absence of significant change in the core set of values, however many superficial changes may have been made (that is, changes in names of gods, and so forth), one can say that the process of syncretism was only superficial. Figure 1 illustrates the case where significant change in the core set of values of the missionary religion has taken place, whilst figure 2 illustrates superficial, syncretic change in the cultural and religious features of the missionary religion. I call the type of syncretism illustrated in figure 1 High Syncretism, and the type in figure 2 Low Syncretism. Although Korea provides examples of both high and low, here I only examine a case of High Syncretism, the accommodation made by the autochthonous religion of Korea to Buddhism.

What I call Low Syncretism, the more superficial accommodation made by a world religion with an indigenous cult, is what is usually understood to be the process of religious syncretism. In Korea, this particular process of syncretism may be observed in the Buddhist case where the *sansin-gak* (mountain spirit shrine), *samsin-gak* (three spirit shrine), or *ch'ilsŏng-gak* (seven-star [pole star] spirit shrine) have become constituent parts

Figure 1. The Process of Religious Encounter:
High Syncretism



Core Values of Autochthonous Religion Unchanged.
Elements of Foreign Religion Absorbed.

Figure 2. The Process of Religious Encounter:
Low Syncretism



Core Values of Foreign Religion Unchanged.
Only Elements of Autochthonous Religion Absorbed.

of the layout of the temple precinct. These shrines, which are dedicated to autochthonous deities, have become subsidiary shrines within the total temple complex, and the rituals practised in them have become one component of the total ritual system practised at the temples. These subsidiary shrines are a prime illustration in Korea of a conscious attempt by a foreign religion, that is Buddhism, to absorb the external forms of the indigenous religion.[10]

The reverse of the "normal" form of syncretism is what I term High Syncretism. This, not often referred to as syncretism by historians of religions, has been widely observed by anthropologists. It is, in short, the accommodation made by an indigenous religion to the beliefs, practices and imagery of a world religion. To cite one illustration, Gary H. Gossen, in an examination of the Roman Catholic practices of the Mayan people in a remote part of the Yucatan peninsula, demonstrated the fact that their contemporary religious practices were simply the folk practices of a bygone era quite literally dressed up in the guise of Roman Catholicism. Names of saints, forms of rituals, and the dates for the performance of rituals, although ostensibly related to Catholic usage, in reality only expressed the primal concepts of the Mayan people.[11]

We have seen another example of High Syncretism in the religions which emerged following inter-cultural contact between the Romans and the tribal peoples of the Empire. The latter, in a state of political subjugation to the Romans, came to apply the names of various Roman deities to the gods they worshipped. A similar situation of subjugation would have existed between the Spanish *conquistadores* and the Mayan people in the 16th century. A third example of High Syncretism would be the Cargo Cults, especially those which are derived from Christianity, which arose in New Guinea and other parts of Melanesia from the middle of

the 19th century onwards. In this case though, high syncretism was enabled not principally by conditions of political subjugation, but by perceived economic and cultural disparity.[12]

Although not often commented on, there was a similar process of accommodation made by the indigenous religion of Korea to Buddhism. This process of High Syncretism must have begun when Buddhism, as a world missionary religion, first entered Korea. It is also my view that this form of High Syncretism would have occurred more or less contemporaneously with the accommodation made by Buddhism with Korean primal religion. High Syncretism occurred under conditions of perceived cultural disparity rather than in a context of political subjugation. Although there is very little documentary evidence for this process, the results are distinctive and obvious to the observer of the contemporary Korean religious scene. I first began to recognize its existence as I read Laurel Kendall's anthropological study *Shamans, Housewives, and Other Restless Spirits: Women in Korean Ritual Life* (1985). Kendall notes the close relationship between autochthonous shamanism and Buddhism, and states that the *mansin* (shaman) and her clients "called their shrine worship *Pulgyo*, 'Buddhism'".[13] She also remarks that the *mansin* she mainly worked with introduced her to others by saying that Kendall was "'a student of Buddhism'".[14] I came to realize that to this point I had only looked at syncretism from the aspect of the accommodation made by Buddhism to indigenous practices.

A Case Study in Reverse Syncretism

To illustrate the Buddhistic form of syncretic folk religion, I will now examine the major centre in Seoul for the practice of shamanistic ceremonies, the sacred site at Muak-tong. Although I have visited this site regularly since 1971, most of my information here is based on a series of visits in August 1990.

When the Japanese colonial government decided to build the principle *Shinto* shrine for Korea on the slopes of Namsan, a decision was made to remove the shamanistic shrine called the *Kuksa-dang* from the top of the mountain. The *Kuksa-dang* would have overlooked the new shrine. In 1925, the proprietors agreed to allow the Japanese Government-General to move the shrine building to the sacred site around the rock formation known as the *Sŏn pawi*. During the inter-war years, further private constructions were made around the shrine until, by the 1960s, a village of temples and shrines had emerged. The sacredness of the *Sŏn pawi* became a magnet which drew the *Kuksa-dang* and then subsequent shrines, creating a complex, hierarchical sacred space.

Muak-tong: geography and general layout

Figure 3 shows that the site has three principle sections: i) the gate separating the whole sacred area from the profane world outside; ii) an outer sacred area comprising "temples" and shrines built beneath the core; iii) an inner sacred area or core precinct comprising the *Kuksa-dang* and *Sŏn pawi*.

Figure 3. The Sacred Site of Muak-Tong



1. Inwang-sa Tae-ung-jŏn – 인왕사 대웅전
2. Inwang-sa Pogwan-jŏn – 인왕사 복완전
3. Sŏngam chŏngsa – 성암 정사
4. Shop
5., 6. Houses
7. Yŏnpur-am – 연불암
8. Sŏrae-am – 西來庵
9. Naksa-am – 락사암
10. Tae Han Pulgyo Chŏngt'o-jong Yongch'ŏn-sa – 대한 불교 정토종 용천사
11. Former "temple", now undesignated house

i) The *Iljumun* gate

Durkheim,[15] Eliade,[16] and others have made much of the distinction between the sacred and the profane. In the layout of a temple or shrine, it is usual that there is some indication given that the ground around the temple is sacred, that it is "set apart". In the folk religion of Korea, a rope is used to indicate that an area is set apart, whereas in Buddhism the entrance to a temple compound is marked off by a sacred gate called an *iljumun*. The tradition of placing such gates at the entrance to Buddhist sacred precincts dates back at least to the practice of placing four gates at the four cardinal points around the *stupas* of Sanchi in India in the first century B.C.[17]

In the case of Muak-tong, the precinct is marked off by a large *iljumun* at the entrance. This bears the inscription *Inwang-san inwang-sa*. This follows normal Buddhist practice in that the temple name is given along with its location on a particular mountain. What is important to note here is the fact that although the name of the mountain and the temple are homophonous, they are not synonymous. The *inwang* (benevolent king) referred to in the name is the principle figure in the *Inwang-gyŏng* (Ch. *Renwang jing*, Sutra of the Benevolent King). This is one of the key scriptures of the esoteric schools of Buddhism introduced into the southern Silla kingdom from around the 7th century. This *inwang* promises protection to the nation which worships him. The *Paekchwa-hoe* (Assembly of 100 Seats) of Silla times, in particular, was dedicated to the adoration of this figure and to explaining the scripture dedicated to him.[18] The appearance of this esoteric figure on the temple's name board is the visitor's first clue that buildings within the sacred precinct do not belong to traditional, orthodox Buddhism.

ii) The outer sacred precinct

In the outer sacred area there are a number of "temples", ancillary shrines to various "temples", several separate shrines not designated as a part of a particular "temple" complex, and several undesignated houses which are used for the performance of *kut*, Korean shamanistic ceremonies. Until a few years ago, one of the most striking features of this area was the fact that none of the "temples" claimed affiliation with any of the legally recognized Buddhist orders. This is no longer the case, for two of the "temples" now claim affiliation with major Buddhist denominations.

Every building which has a claim to being Buddhist within this area has a signpost on the outer perimeter of its grounds announcing what it is. For example, the signboard for the *Inwang-sa* says, *Taehan pulgyo inwang-san inwang-sa* (Korean Buddhism, Mount Inwang Inwang Temple). What is missing here is the designation which appears on every orthodox temple of affiliation to a particular Buddhist order. There is no such designation because one doesn't exist: the "temples" are private property.

When I visited this area in 1990 I noticed two new temples which claimed denominational affiliation. The signboard in front of *Yongch'ŏn-sa* claimed it was affiliated with the Pure Land Buddhist sect (*Taehan pulgyo chŏngt'o yongch'ŏn-sa*). This legally constituted sect, contrary to its antecedents in China and Korea, is one of the esoteric sects of modern Korean Buddhism. A different case is the signboard on the temple, *Ch'ŏnam-sa*, to the right of the entrance. This claimed it was a member of the *Chogye* sect, the dominant sect of orthodox, monastic Buddhism.

One further curious feature of the "temples" is the fact that the majority of signboards are written in *han'gŭl*

rather than in Chinese characters. Consequently, although one can guess at many of the characters behind the Korean script, it is not possible to know the exact designations of all of them.

There was some confusion, possibly deliberate, about the exact identification of the *Inwang-sa* temple mentioned on the *iljumun* entrance. There is one major shrine complex in the outer sacred precinct which in its centre has a large building designed as the *tae'ung-jŏn* (principle shrine) of a Buddhist temple. In an orthodox temple, this would be the building which contained the figure of the historic Buddha, Sakyamuni. However, north of this complex, just across the alley from the principle shrine, is another building which is claimed to be the *tae'ung-jŏn* of *Inwang-sa*. Both of these shrines appeared to have been doing a flourishing business in 1990.

Aside from the regular and irregular temples, there were eight other houses which had no signboards. These were quite simply houses used for the performance of shamanistic ceremonies. Each house had a long bamboo pole fixed in its courtyard announcing that this was a place where a *kut* could be performed. Amongst these houses was one which, during a previous visit in 1985, had been designated a "Buddhist hermitage." This now had no designation. The change in designation I take as an indication of the impermanence of such "Buddhist" institutions.

A further interesting feature was a hexagonal pavilion and a corner shop selling various household items and foods.

iii) The inner sacred precinct

A visitor to the sacred area at Muak-tong who intended to visit the *Kuksa-dang*[19] would proceed from the outer precinct upwards through a declivity, passing the smaller of the two *Inwang-sa tae'ung-jŏn* on the left and the pavilion on the right. They would pass a large tree, the major limbs of which are severely sawn back. On the stumps of the limbs are hung brilliantly coloured cloths which have been used in shamanistic ceremonies. The use of this tree, close to the raised terrace on which the *Kuksa-dang* has been re-erected, is akin to the placement of strips of cloth on trees or bushes just before the crest of Korean mountain passes. Passage beyond this venerable tree indicates the passage from the outer to the inner sacred precinct.

The *Kuksa-dang* itself is a very old building, though whether it is as old as it is claimed can probably not be verified. It is said to date to T'aejong (r.1400-1418). The shrine is known to have been on Namsan at the end of the 19th century. The interior consists of one large room with two smaller rooms off to the left and right. Around the walls of the main room hang 28 paintings. Twelve of these are said to date from 1623, and the remainder date from the end of the 19th century. Among the figures depicted are *Ch'ŏn-sin* (Spirit [Ruler] of Heaven), *San-sin* (Mountain Spirit), *Su-sin* (Water Spirit), King T'aejo (r.1392-1398) founder of the Chosŏn dynasty, the monk Muhak, and the guardians of the five cardinal points of the oriental compass.

Although these spirits are all powerful figures in the native pantheon, their presence here indicates a certain concern for national affairs. It is said that while the *Kuksa-dang* was on Namsan, the most powerful shamans in the nation would go there to perform rites for national protection, preservation, and prosperity. It is alleged that at

the end of the 19th century, through the influence of Queen Min, rituals on behalf of the state were frequently performed. The name *Kuksa-dang* can be translated as "the shrine of the national preceptor." *Kuksa* was a title accorded certain eminent monks during the Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392). It was held by Muhak, the preceptor to the first Chosŏn king. It is probable, then, that the preceptor referred to in the shrine name is Muhak himself. This supposition is strengthened by the presence of an ancient painting of the great monk amongst the oldest shrine paintings.[20]

Whatever the use of the *Kuksa-dang* was in the past, its present use is somewhat different. It functions in many ways like a contemporary *yesik-chang* wedding hall. That is, it is rented out for ceremonial purposes. Along the back wall of the shrine is a fitted altar. In the central section of this, just in front of a sacred picture, is a telephone and a box of business cards giving the address and telephone number of the *Kuksa-dang*. Time and space can be booked for the performance of a particular rite.

Proceeding north from the *Kuksa-dang*, one climbs up a series of stairs to a concrete terrace with ballustrades in front of the *Sôn pawi*. Directly in front of the massive, pitted rock is a large altar divided into three sections. The principle section is the long central altar. To the right and left are two cabinets in the shape of tiled pavilions. Inside these are sets of electric votive candles which are lit to offer perpetual prayers for the repose of various souls or to ask for particular wishes. In front of the altar is centrally placed a smaller altar, a table for incense burners.

On the right of *Sŏn pawi* is a small iron gate that opens out to a path which ascends the bare rock face of Mount Inwang. Some way up, this path leads to the final shrine of

the entire sacred area, the *ch'ilsŏng-gak*. Although this shrine is supposed to be dedicated to the Spirit of the Pole Star, the picture in the shrine is the tiger, the messenger of the Mountain Spirit. The only other shrine to the Mountain Spirit is found on the grounds of *Ch'ŏnam-sa*.

Just beyond the precinct of the *Kuksa-dang*, and within the precincts of several "temples" are fresh water springs. While these serve the obvious purpose of providing water for thirsty hikers and attendants at ceremonies, it is important to remember that the worship of water spirits is an ancient practice in Korea.

iv) Functions of the shrines

All of the buildings in the inner and outer sacred precincts, whether designated or not as "temples," hermitages or shrines, are known to be locations for the performance of shamanistic ceremonies. In the undesignated buildings, pure shaman ceremonies are performed. In buildings designated as Buddhist, ceremonies are similar in format and intention to these, but incorporate Buddhist or Buddhistic elements. The spirits referred to in ceremonies are Buddhist figures; the clothing worn by the celebrants is Buddhist in appearance; many of the ceremonial paraphernalia and implements are similar to materials one would expect to see in an orthodox Buddhist temple. Prominent amongst the ritual items of "temples" are Buddhist statues and paintings, which lend an authentic air to the shrines. Several orthodox Buddhist festivals, such as Buddha's birthday, are also celebrated. Nonetheless, the format of the ceremonies performed in these "temples", and the reasons for performance, parallel the ceremonies given in undesignated buildings. It is for this reason that one can justifiably say all the shrines and

rituals are collectively an example of syncretic shamanism, a product of the accommodation made by the indigenous religion of Korea to Buddhism.

Observations

1. As in other cases where there has been contact between a world religion and a folk religion, there have been two processes of accommodation—a syncretism by the world religion with the folk religion, and a syncretism by the folk religion with the world religion.

2. The period during which this syncretism took place in Korea must have been the era when Buddhism was transmitted and emplanted in Korean culture. Unlike the examples of syncretism which occurred between the tribal peoples of the Roman empire and Roman religion, where political subjugation was the principle non-religious factor, the syncretism of Korean folk religion with Buddhism would have taken place under conditions of perceived cultural disparity. Syncretism here could be seen to be a part of a process of modernization which all three Korean kingdoms underwent at that time.

3. The process of syncretism by the folk religion of Korea with Buddhism could be called High Syncretism. Whilst many Buddhist elements have been absorbed, the core values of the autochthonous religion have not been significantly altered. A comparison of the practices of the "temples" in Muak-tong with the practices of the *Kuksa-dang* itself would show that, in spite of significant differences in form, there is little difference in substance.

4. There is a clear hierarchy of sacred space in Muaktong. The most sacred area is the core precinct around the wierd *Sŏn pawi* rock, including the *Kuksa-dang*. Beneath this are the various shrines designated as Buddhist temples and several undesignated shaman houses. No "temple", however, is close to the sacred rock. This spatial distinction creates a clear religious and psychological differentiation between the two areas.

5. Further and more detailed research needs to be carried out into the ceremonies conducted at the "Buddhist" temples. This should include both structural studies of the character of the ceremonies and analytical work on the functions and purposes of the rites. Comparative studies should be made between Buddhistic rites and the rites offered at the *Kuksa-dang* and the shamanistic shrines to precisely determine the similarities and differences. One important comparative question would address the educational or economic differences between the people who attend rituals at different venues.

NOTES

1. James Huntley Grayson, "Religious syncretism in the Shilla period: the relationship between esoteric Buddhism and Korean primeval religion", *Asian Folklore Studies*, 43/2, pp.185-198 (Nagoya, 1984).

2. James Moffatt, "Syncretism", in James Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 12, pp.155-157 (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1921).

3. Carsten Colpe, "Syncretism", in Mircea Eliade (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 14, pp.218-227 (New York, Macmillan, 1987).

4. E. H. Pyle, "Syncretism", in John R. Hinnels (ed.), *The Penguin Dictionary of Religions*, p.317 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984).

5. Ibid.

6. J. A. North, "Syncretism (Roman)", in John R. Hinnels (ed.), *The Penguin Dictionary of Religions*, p.317 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984).

7. Ibid, pp.317-318.

8. A good history and discussion of the conscious syncretism of the prophet Mani may be found in Gherardo Gnoli, "Manichaenism", in Mircea Eliade (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion*, 9, pp.161-170 (New York, Macmillan, 1987).

9. Masaharu Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion, with Special Reference to the Social and Moral Life of the Nation*, pp.136-138 (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co, 1930) and Joseph M. Kitigawa, *Religion in Japanese History*, pp.58, 68-69 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1966). The Tendai sect had a similar concept called *sanno ichijitsu*. For a fuller discussion of the process of syncretism in Japanese Buddhism, see J. H. Kamstra, *Encounter or Syncretism: The Initial Growth of Japanese Buddhism* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1967).

10. This process of identifying the cult of the Mountain Spirit with Buddhism must have begun sometime in the 7th century, as it was during that period that the major mountain ranges in Korea were given their present Buddhist-style names. See James Huntley Grayson, *Korea: A Religious History*, p.53 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989). A fuller description of the process of Buddhist syncretism in Korea can be found in my earlier work, *Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea: A Study in the Emplantation of Religion* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1985). See, especially, chapter 2.

11. Gary H. Gossen, "Temporal and spatial equivalents in Chamula ritual symbolism", in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt (eds), *Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach*, pp.135-149 (New York, Harper and Row, 1972 [3rd edition]).

12. Discussions of the history and anthropological interpretation of cargo cults may be found in Freerk C. Kamma, *Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Cultural Area* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1972), Frederich

Steinbauer, *Melanesian Cargo Cults* (Saint Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979), and Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of the Cargo Cults of Melanesia* (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1957).

13. Laurel Kendall, *Shamans, Housewives, and Other Restless Spirits: Women in Korean Ritual Life*, p.84 (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

14. Ibid.

15. The classic statement of the distinction between the sacred and the profane from an anthropological or sociological point of view is to be found in Emile Durkheim's *Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse* (Paris, F. Alcan, 1912).

16. Mircea Eliade, in *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1959), elaborated on the distinction made by Durkheim.

17. For a description and discussion of the great monument complex at Sanchi, see Sherman Lee, *A History of Far Eastern Art*, pp.84-86 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall/New York, Harry N. Abrams, 1964). A discussion of the diffusion of the sacred gate of Buddhism from India to East Asia may be found in Owen C. Kail, *Buddhist Cave Temples of India*, pp.17-18 (Bombay, D. P. Taraporevala, 1975).

18. A description of this trend can be found in Peter H. Lee (trans.), *Lives of Eminent Korean Monks: The 'Haedong Kosŭng Chŏn'*, pp.14-16 (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1969).

19. A discussion of this shrine and its setting may be found in Donald N. Clark and James H. Grayson, *Discovering Seoul*, pp.185-187 (Seoul, Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1986).

20. This claim was first made by the missionary scholar Dr James Scarth Gale in "Hanyang (Seoul)", *Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 2 (1902), p.25.

GLOSSARY

ch'ilsŏng-gak 七星閣
ch'ŏn-sin 天神
Inwangsan inwangsa 仁旺山 仁王寺
paekchwa hoe 百座會
sansin-gak 山神閣
su-sin 水神
Tae Han Pulgyo Chŏngt'o Yongch'ŏnsa 대한 불교 정토 용천사
tae'ung-jŏn 大雄殿
Yongch'ŏn-sa 용천사
Ch'ŏnam-sa 천암사
iljumun 一柱門
Kuksa-dang 國士堂
samsin-gak 三神閣
Sŏn-pawi 禪 바위
yeshik-chang 禮式場

IS THERE REALLY UPWARD MOBILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

Evidence from the South Korean Trade Structure

JAYMIN LEE

Export-led industrialization strategies have become the new orthodoxy for development economics, replacing the old mainstream philosophy of import-substitution industrialization. The experience of rapid economic growth in East Asian NICS (Newly Industrialized Countries), including Korea, is no doubt one important reason for this shift.

It has, however, been questioned whether all developing countries can simultaneously pursue export-led industrialization (Cline 1982). Since all developing countries are not at the same state of industrialization, the "fallacy of composition" applies only to similarly advanced countries (Ranis 1985). Developing countries are likely to grow in a pattern we can metaphorically call "wild geese flying" within a global export-led industrialization.

In other words, export-led industrialization is a probable mechanism of individual more than collective mobility in the international economy. In this respect,

mainstream economist views coincide with that of the so-called world system approach (see Wallerstein 1979; Evans 1979; Cumings 1987). This characterization may provide the world system approach with theoretical underpinning, which is something it seems to need badly.

An important question in this context is whether upward mobility can really be achieved by export-led industrialization, because it is based on the so-called new international division of labour, where developed countries specialize on technology-intensive industries and developing countries concentrate on labour-intensive products. Can this asymmetric relationship be overcome with time? The question is especially important to South Korea, which is now a nationalist-ridden state. Indeed, there has been a persistent tendency amongst South Korean economists to insist that no upward mobility is possible under export-led industrialization, regardless of rapid economic growth and expansion in trade volumes. The fact that South Korean exports have moved to more technology-intensive products over time does not provide an answer to the question; as exports have risen in technological content, so have imports. Production and exports of technology-intensive goods depend heavily on imports for complex components. This feature is most salient in offshore production of export goods. Then, a developed country's importer provides the developing country's producer with sophisticated components, and ships back finished goods after simple local manufacturing. The apparent technical sophistication of a developing country's exports may belie the reality (Lee 1986). So, if South Korea's overall position of comparative advantage is built with offshore production, the trend is not so clear-cut as it might seem.

Notwithstanding the importance of this problem, there have been few formal studies of it. Here I aim to test whether South Korea has actually experienced any upward mobility in the international economy by analysing its trade structure changes over time. I employ a simple econometric model.

Scheme of analysis

I have done a regression analysis, using a cross-section of data from 137 manufacturing industries for the years 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985, to investigate determinants of trade patterns. Information about trade patterns is used as a dependent variable and information about skill and capital intensity for independent variables. Technological intensity would fit my purpose more than skill intensity, but the two are difficult to distinguish empirically. Skill intensity is used because available data is better in this area. Capital intensity is used since it has traditionally been regarded as an important determinant of trade patterns. The determinants are then cross-checked for structural changes. Specifically, I have tested the coefficients of regression in subsequent years. The four years chosen for my analysis reflect simply the greater amount of data available for these years.

The dependent variable is simply net exports divided by the total volume of trade (for the merit of this, see Ballance *et al* 1987). Thus:

$$NRX_i = (\text{exports-imports}) \ / \ (\text{exports+imports});$$
$$i = 1970,\ 1975,\ 1980,\ 1985.$$

The independent variables, measured in Japanese industries, are:

1) SKLi = per capita wages and salaries;

2) KLi = per capita value of tangible fixed assets;
i = 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985.

SKLi and KLi respectively represent skill intensity and capital intensity.

I have chosen Japanese industries rather than Korean-owned companies for the following merits: First, this can control the existence of non-competitive imports, making the two independent variables better able to represent skill and capital intensity; Second, this helps control the effects of factor market distortions, which are prevalent in developing countries such as South Korea. I have run an ordinary least square model, then used the Chow Test to check coefficient consistency. I expect a negative coefficient for SKLi in all years. If South Korea's skill position improves, however, this coefficient will increase (decrease in absolute value) over time.

Statistical results

Results for estimations in each year considered are given in Table I. R^2 results are not high, especially for 1985. Considering, however, that I use cross-section data and only two independent variables, the results are not seriously low. The capital intensity variable is statistically significant only in 1970 in the second equation. So, capital intensity has not generally been a significant determinant in South Korea's trade patterns. On the contrary, the coefficient of skill intensity is consistently negative with strong statistical significance.

TABLE I

DETERMINANTS OF SOUTH KOREA'S TRADE PATTERN

Independent Variables	Dates: 1970	1975	1980	1985
Constant	0.921**	1.439**	1.185**	0.727**
	(4.478)	(7.654)	(6.190)	(3.691)
SKL	-0.550**	-0.567**	-0.462**	-0.268**
	(-6.323)	(-7.130)	(-5.705)	(-3.223)
KL	0.0218*	0.00445	0.00484	-0.00202
	(2.644)	(0.591)	(0.631)	(-0.256)
R^2	0.238	0.346	0.247	0.116
R^{-2}	0.226	0.336	0.236	0.102
F value	20.893**	35.445**	22.005**	8.762**

Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-values; ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively (2-sided tests for t-values).

As for trends over time, the coefficient of skill intensity falls or stays relatively stable initially, then rises from 1975 to 1980. The rise accelerates from 1980 to 1985. Table II presents the results of the Chow test to determine whether we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of skill and capital intensity are relatively constant. The test statistic here is F (1,536). The skill intensity coefficient is only significant between 1970 and 1985 or 1975 and 1985, not in any single five year period.

The negative coefficients achieved for skill intensity confirms my expectation that South Korea has consistently specialized in unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing in

its export-led industrialization. In the 1980s, though, the situation improved.

TABLE II

TESTS ON CHANGES OF COEFFICIENTS: F VALUES

Restrictions:	SKL	KL
1970 = 1975	0.026	2.444
1975 = 1980	0.806	0.0
1980 = 1985	2.730	0.364
1970 = 1980	0.546	2.340
1970 = 1985	5.772*	4.602*
1975 = 1985	6.500*	0.338

Note: * denotes statistical significance at 5%

Concluding remarks

Using regression analysis, I have investigated determinants of the Korean trade patterns in manufacturing industries. The result identifies the fact that South Korea has concentrated on unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing. South Korea was sluggish in its initial attempts to weaken this characteristic of export-led industrialization, but has since succeeded in moving away from it. This shows that there is indeed an upward mobility in the contemporary international system, if it is exploited in the manner of South Korea. The ability of other countries to achieve similar results remains a matter for further enquiry.

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THAT WHICH WAS ONCE DYING IS NOW RESTORED:

Traditional music, musicians and agents

INOK PAEK-HOWARD

The "discontinuation of tradition"[1] or "the conflict of Korean culture" has been a heated subject of discussion among the South Korean intelligentsia since the early 1950s. By 1990, however, the focus seemed to shift to the succession and development of a national culture. What is perceived to be the cause of the discontinuation of tradition? What has been the rationale behind efforts to overcome this discontinuation? As in Polynesia (Merriam 1964: 307), the rapidity with which Koreans took over western music and the extent to which traditional music was abandoned went beyond initial expectations. Thus, in contemporary South Korea, to the majority of urban people *ŭmak* (lit.: music) usually means just western music (more correctly *sŏyang ŭmak*) (for example, see Song Pangsong 1989: 6). *Kugak*, normally glossed as "traditional music",[2] although it should rightly denote Korean music as a whole (*kuk/kug-* = nation) only refers to half of the music culture.

In this paper I consider the transmission of music, especially *kugak*. I focus on how "tradition" incorporates itself into a new social context, and how culture bearers

practice their role in making sense of what is available to them.

The context

In the past, the music of Korea was transmitted in ritual, work and entertainment. Music always had an indispensible role in traditional society. The social context that enabled music to maintain a certain degree of stability had, however, to encounter change from the end of the 19th century. Consequently, it was inevitable that some alterations in the process of transmission should be experienced. As a result, *kugak* (traditional music) now has very little direct relationship with contemporary lifestyles.

The use of court music also declined as the Korean royal court came under Japanese influence. Not only were the number of performances related to rituals and banquets reduced, but also the numbers of court musicians employed rapidly decreased.

Soon after this influence began came the introduction of new styles of music (Yi Yusŏn 1985: 31-39 and 66-79). Contacts with western cultures led to initial exposure to western military band music and Christian hymns. Western music gradually cultivated roots in a new soil. It was actually only with the introduction of Western music categorization became necessary, and all the various kinds of traditional music performed in Korea were thrown together in one category, *kugak*. The relationship between music and the social classes, and between the producer and consumer, had changed track. So, the very same traditional Korean musical heritage was packaged differently.

Rapid modernization and industrialization came with waves of liberalization during the 1950s and 1960s. A wide spectrum of social changes occurred once more. And American music,[3] which since liberation from Japan in 1945 had consisted of a popular as well as classical music culture, began to eat deeply into South Korean sentiments. The more society achieved social and economic progress, the less use it had for traditional music. And so it became increasingly perceived as urgent to re-establish the thread of the age-long tradition.

Steady economic progress and a reasonable degree of social stability in the 1970s provided the populace with a better standard of living. This eventually created the mental room in which Koreans could think about more than just earning a subsistence living. Further, the consciousness of consumers—who were by now well accustomed to western culture and whose interest in music had for decades been focussed on western music—began to look for their own music. Prosperity meant that traditional music could become more readily available to the populace. The social atmosphere provided an opportunity for rethinking the cultural currents at work in South Korea.

Efforts to try to accommodate both tradition and modernity are reflected in the inclusion of traditional music education in university and institutional programmes during the last thirty years. These programmes have produced an ever growing number of able *kugak* performers. Performance activities have become much more frequent, and new compositions written for traditional instrumental ensembles have begun to appear.

Some Korean composers who write in a western music idiom have become aware of the necessity of looking for a national musical idiom. This may reflect increasing

international musical exchanges. Those already involved in creating new music for traditional instruments deeply felt the need to identify the nature of Korean music. Many works have consequently combined tradition with modernity.

The music scene in contemporary South Korea, therefore, has several sound cultures. On the one hand, western music, most usually the classical music tradition, has been and continues to be closely identified with the educated intelligentsia.[4] Western music has been assimilated into every level of Korean life: wherever education takes place, in concert halls, in churches, even in wedding halls. "Quasi-Korean music", referred to by Lee Kang-Sook [Yi Kangsuk] as the music written by Koreans with or without Korean texts but using strictly western melodic types,[5] has been adopted as material for school textbooks and is enjoyed by most reasonably educated people. Popular songs and western-oriented pop music have also settled down as integral parts of the lives of young people (see, for example, Hoare and Pares 1988: 153).

How then was *kugak* perceived by Koreans until recently? According to many scholars, the status of traditional musicians has been low (eg, Song Pangsong 1985: 27). The reason may lie in the fact that the kind of work which required physical labour was never highly regarded. Many of my informants referred to *kugak* as "the thing that *kisaeng* (female entertainers) do".[6]

In the first quarter of this century there was a drastic change in the members of the court's Royal Music Institute (the *Yiwangjik aakpu*). Membership, suddenly based on public recruitment rather than the traditional criteria of heredity, destroyed some public prejudice towards musicians. However, it was not until the 1960s that it

became possible for musicians to receive a higher education in universities (Seoul National University established the first graduate programme in 1959). The position of professional musicians could now be strengthened, because institutionalized training led to the award of qualifications the equal of those gained by other vocational groups. With the new attention focussed on tradition in the 1960s, the economic status of musicians improved one step further.

In spite of the changes, the overall perception and social understanding of traditional music does not seem to have reached that expected by those actually involved in the performance and teaching of *kugak*. One of my informants expressed this well:

> *Kugak* is stuffy and boring. Do you know western music? When I listened to western music it was boring at first, but it came to touch my heart the more I listened. People have preconceived ideas about our traditional music. So they turn the radio off whenever *kugak* comes out of it.

What aspect of traditional music made her bored?

> There is nothing like a fast tempo or any distinction between high and low pitches. That is why it is so boring and monotonous.

This student was studying Korean dance, and their perception tells us how some sort of internal change has been made by Koreans in regard to concepts about music within a culture (see Merriam 1964: 306): the framework in which the aesthetic of musical appreciation operated has been transformed. Such views are widely shared among a large spectrum of Koreans. The view is especially common among the older generation, because they received an education centred only on western music or "quasi-Korean music" (the education programme would have been called *Shinshik kyoyuk*).

Nationalism and traditional cultures

Nationalism remains influential as a history-forming power. It developed in Korea to overcome a socio-political situation whereby a breakdown in tradition had been experienced (Ch'a Kibyŏk 1986: 5). As Smith has pointed out, the conditions of nationalism today are no longer identical with those that fostered it in its initial emergence (Smith 1979: viii). Nationalism, promoted in the pursuit of independence, subjecthood, self-reliance and modernization, has now developed to counter historical colonial perspectives and to review culture in an effort to discover something "traditional" and "national". Nationalism seems still to be a powerful force.

In South Korea, national identity was surely felt to be endangered under what was perceived by the populace in general to be a superior culture, that is, western culture. When the spiritual dominance of the foreign culture is seriously examined, it is notable that a considerable number of the Korean elite are still unable to overcome the after-effects of Japanese colonialism, the so-called *shingmin sagwan*.[7] It was because of this that the Korean *yŏpchŏn ŭishik* inferiority complex was originally born (Ch'a Kibyŏk 1986: 79; Kim Chae-ŭn 1987: 95-128).

As traditional culture was devalued in Korean people's consciousness, voices were raised to find a new way to promote the old. The consensual view of the way forward was a correct search for the national tradition in order to recover national pride and self-confidence, thereby overcoming cultural imperialism and colonialism (Pak T'aesun 1986: 186).

The rediscovery and promotion of a national culture became important, as we can witness by looking back at various government policies. During the last few decades several measures have been devised, namely the *Muhyŏng munhwajae* (Intangible Cultural Asset) system initiated in 1962, the *Munhwa chunghŭng changgi kyehyŏk saŏp* (Long-term Plan for Culture and Arts Revival) of 1974, and the establishment of the *Kungnip kugagwŏn* (now glossed as the Korean Traditional Performing Arts Centre) and the *Kungnip kugak kodŭng hakkyo* (National Classical Music High School) in 1951 and 1972 respectively. Traditional culture came to be seen as a source of Korean identity; the music tradition, although once dying, and protected or fostered by only a small group of concerned and dedicated people, started to be revitalized in the life of modern South Korea.

The government emphasis on traditional culture gives the impression that the efforts were a means rather than an aim. Ch'a Kibyŏk shares this view. He states, "...the re-creation of history through the discovery and re-interpretation of the tradition, without any doubt, is to stimulate modernization and political development" (Ch'a 1986: 131; see also Chŏng Yunhyŏng 1982: 281).

The supports provided by government, in spite of national policies, have rarely been felt by music circles to be satisfying or appropriate. Often they are considered insignificant. The reason may lie in the role of paragons. That is, the attitude that administrators should have for dealing with artistic activities ought to be delicate and sophisticated—administrators should be interested in the art form but not concerned directly with it (UNESCO 1974: 6). This attitude has been lacking in South Korean arts administration. Thus, the government fails to play the role

of administrator through allowing people who lack interest in the arts to be directly involved in administration.

Nonetheless, the notion that *kugak* is a manifestation of a "tradition," whose roots can be found, started to gain popular support. If we suppose that a culture exists only in performance, as Blacking (1986: 3) suggests, the culture, regardless of its form, has to be continuously filtered. For this reason, Alan Merriam once stated that concepts and behaviour have to be learned (Merriam 1964: 145). Every musician, whether professional or amateur, has to go through a learning process, by which they are trained to present musical sounds to match an aesthetic suitable for their audience.

Traditional music is now channelled mostly through performing organizations, educational institutions, music associations and private classes. Transmission, then, is achieved not by a group of people restricted by social class, but by a cultural group in which participation is by individual choice.

Formal teaching methods mean that orally transmitted culture has become restricted in terms of the elements of improvisation and variation. However, we cannot perpetuated the idea that traditional music can be preserved in identical forms. For "culture" is not merely to be received, but to be performed, recreated, and interpreted by every member of society in every generation.

What is perceived to be the tradition?

Some view tradition as something changeable, dependent on the re-interpretation of beliefs and practices passed down from times long gone.[8] Others view it as static and unchangeable. Korean scholars tend to combine the two views. They agree that, although tradition is rooted in the past, it does not exist simply because of the past, but can rather be important now or in the future. Thus, while keeping some relationship with the past, tradition functions both as a vital energy to enrich the present and as a measure from which a new culture for the future can be created.

The Korean word for tradition, *chŏnt'ong*, therefore contains a sense of value—faint though it may be—which argues for the preservation and development of good things transmitted from the past. Tradition is held to change depending on regional, periodic or other conditional factors. Tradition is neither uniform nor singular. And, tradition retains characteristics which make the culture of a specific group consistent and distinct. So, when Koreans this century experienced a conflicting sense of value as the "old" faded and the "new" took shape, they realized their responsibility to re-create the tradition of the past and pass it on to the future (Han'guk chŏngshin munhwa yŏn'guwŏn 1978: 198, 199, 223, and 224).

The concept of nation, in South Korea expressed by prefixing either *minjok-* or *han'guk-*, was used in relation to the process of tradition-building. The use of either term surely gave Koreans a sense of their historic identity, the aim being to revive or recreate a lost or threatened characteristic of nationhood through the study of the customs, language, religion, folklore and other features of

the past. What Smith (1979: 49) regards as one of the most potent ingredients of late 18th and 19th century nationalism, for example—the emphasis on social unity, the patriotic belief in linguistic and cultural identity—was practised in Korea within the concept "education with nationality" (*kukchŏk innŭn kyoyuk*). Nationalism is, in its essence, a mass movement, yet the elite played an important role in shaping the national ideal in Korea as in many other countries.

As for an artistic activity which illustrates this, *madanggŭk*,[9] essentially a traditional outdoor theatrical performance style, is worthy of note. *Madanggŭk* denotes a movement actively developed by university students during the 1970s. The motive behind *madanggŭk* was to step over the cultural boundary of the older generation in order to discover a source of new cultural creation from within the Korean artistic tradition (Pak T'aesun 1986: 188).

Among other performing arts, *t'alch'um* masked dances also featured prominently as a medium in which common people could take part with great enthusiasm (Sŏ Chungsŏk 1982: 335). Perhaps their popularity stemmed from the fact that they allowed students to express their desires for national homogeneity. Without doubt, the essence of tradition was found in folk genres in which a strong sense of mass culture could be identified. This explains why the 1970s cultural movement has been largely based on folk performance arts. While participation in such genres has become more popular among some groups, it is also clear that the university movement runs counter to the activities to foster heritage promoted by academic organizations and the government-sponsored *Muhyŏng munhwajae* system.

The aims of the university movement, generally known as the *minjung munhwa undong*, the mass culture movement, were genuinely positive. But the movement itself has been seen by many as somewhat antagonistic and agitative. Critics have tended to see little in common with established activities. The *minjung munhwa undong* further gives the impression that only the structure of traditional culture has been borrowed to use as a means of political statement, whereas institutional activities have frozen traditional culture (Pak T'aesun 1986: 195). Because of this distinction, some who research the traditional performance arts oppose any staged production. However, the need to recreate traditional folk arts as staged arts seems to be generally realized.

The general impression of traditional Korean music as old-fashioned or vulgar, because it represents the culture of the *kisaeng*, and/or is in some way inferior, still exists, but is declining. Korean nationalism will persist while Koreans feel there is value in taking from the tradition. Since music is a social product, it is not possible to imagine a society where music would not exist. And so, the traditional music of Korea, having passed through a serious crisis caused by external and internal change, has survived only because it has taken on new roles in modern Korea. It now exists as concert products, for tourism, and as cultural artefacts which help to establish national identity. Changes in the social fabric of a community can thus be seen to influence not only music but also the ways in which the music repertory is transmitted (for parallel cases elsewhere, see Bohlman 1988: 15).

In the 1980s, a new emphasis of the government as an activator for cultural promotion appeared. This began to narrow the gap between musicians and the general public. Governmental efforts were called for by UNESCO in the

early 1980s (To Chŏngil 1987: 188), but the South Korean government has remained one step behind the international arts community.

In conclusion, the existing music culture of South Korea is, in effect, a result of history. *Yangak* (western music), *yuhaengga* or *taejung kayo* (popular songs) and *shin kugak*, new compositions written for traditional instrumental ensembles, are all products of Korea in the 20th century. Could not this be living proof of how people make sense of culture?

NOTES

1. Discontinuation seems to be attributed to three main factors: the advent of western culture, the Japanese occupation, and the flood of American popular culture since liberation in 1945. Korean scholars most frequently refer to the Japanese occupation, although reasons are seldom documented or well explained. This is the dominant view amongst the general public, although some might point out that it was the Koreans themselves who abandoned or turned against their traditions in the pursuit of something new (Yi Ŭlho 1978; Kim Ch'ŏljun 1986: 164 and 339-346)

2. The first official use of *kugak* was in 1907, when the music department of the royal court (*Aakpu*) incorporated the term into titles for the head and elder musicians (*kugak sajang* and *kugaksa*). In Japanese, the term had appeared in 1878 to denote "national music." No Tongŭn asserts that a Japanese official resident in Korea referred to *kugak* a year earlier, in 1906 (1989: 13).

3. For details on the influence of American culture, see Yi Kangsu (1987: 130-172) and Koryŏ taehakkyo asia munje yŏn'gusŏ (eds) (1984).

4. There are two possible reasons: i) they had better educational opportunities which, due to social acceptance, meant they could experience western music more readily than traditional Korean music; ii) they belonged to a social strata which actively experienced the cultures of advanced nations.

5. The division between "quasi" and "genuine" is not applicable in any single music culture. Barnett points out that individuals must "work out of a cultural background which provides them with certain potentials for innovation and certain conditions within which they must operate (cited in Merriam 1964: 323). Music culture, then, is the product of members of a given society.

6. This view is still common. The strong association with *kisaeng* may have evolved in the early 1900s, as female court entertainers were absorbed into the *kisaeng chohap*, associations more commonly known as *kwŏnbŏn*. This changed both traditional functions and hierarchies, as Chang Sahun has discussed (1974: 38-40).

7. The Japanese Government-General promoted this as a way to rationalize their rule over the Korean peninsula. *Shingmin sagwan* exaggerated the influence of Chinese culture and underestimated the uniqueness of Korean culture. Such a view still retains considerable influence.

8. "Tradition" is defined here as in the Collins English Dictionary: "the body of thought, practices and so forth... belonging to a particular country, people, family, or institution over a relatively long period. Note two conditions: a sense of belonging to a specific group, and the need for continuous transmission.

9. *Madanggŭk* has been adopted as a new theatrical style by both amateur and professional groups. Texts are often satirical.

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THE ACCEPTANCE OF *DASHENG YAYUE* IN KORYŎ

SONG HYEJIN

Introduction

Dasheng yayue, ritual music of late Northern Song China, was the source of the Korean *aak* ("elegant music") tradition. *Dasheng yayue* was prepared by the Dasheng Institute and was performed in China from 1105 to 1127. The eighth emperor of Song, Huizong, attempted to rectify the accumulated errors in *yayue* ritual music early in his reign. He "supported the founding and development of the Ta-sheng [Dasheng] Institute, a musical bureau masterminded by a Taoist named Wei Han-chin [Wei Hanjin]" (Provine 1980: 19). By 1105, then, *Dasheng yayue* was finally completed, based on the theories of Wei Hanjin.

Dasheng yayue had some particular features. First, its pitch standard:

> The Institute set about constructing a pitch pipe for the fundamental pitch from which all others would be derived. The correct traditional procedure, attested in ancient sources, is to line up grains of a particular kind of millet, ninety grains constituting the length of the pitch pipe. Obviously, the length of the pipe and the pitch obtained are functions of the quality of the grain crop. The Ta-sheng [Dasheng] Institute proposed instead that part of one of the emperor's fingers be used as the unit measure. The emperor

agreed to this, and the measurement was taken and used (Provine 1988: 133).

Second, a system of two basic tone sets–*zhengsheng* and *zhongsheng*, in Korean *chŏngsŏng* and *chungsŏng*. All musical instruments and the vocal melodies in *Dasheng yayue* used this system which, as far as I know, had never been used before. When the music was performed at sacrificial rites relating to the cosmic forces of *ŭm* (Ch: *yin*) and *yang* and the twenty-four solar terms, the *chŏngsŏng* set was considered *yang* and the *chungsŏng ŭm/yin*. The scheme of keys varied according to the season. The two tone sets had identical intervallic relationships, but the *chŏngsŏng* set itself was one half tone higher than the *chungsŏng* set (Song 1985: 8-9). Third, one-, three-, five-, seven-, and nine-string zithers (Kor: *kŭm*/Ch: *qin*) were constructed by the Dasheng Institute. Traditionally, the *qin* zither had been constructed with only seven strings.

In later periods these particular features were to be considered unusual in Chinese musical history, and they cannot therefore be considered either an ancient or mainstream development. But the music and the instruments were adopted by the Jin and Yuan courts, and on the other hand, *Dasheng yayue* became the basis of the Korean *aak* tradition after it was introduced to the Koryŏ court.

According to the *Koryŏsa* (History of the Koryŏ Dynasty; 1452), *Dasheng yayue* was introduced as a musical gift from the emperor Huizong in 1116. The gift included a total of 428 *aak* instruments, together with costumes and ritual dance properties to be used in *aak* (Pratt 1976: 209). The *Dasheng yayue* instruments were divided into two ensembles: the terrace ensemble (*tŭngga*) and the courtyard ensemble (*hŏn'ga*). In comparison with the music as performed in Song, the Korean ensembles were

smaller. For example, more sets of chimes and bells were needed for the emperor than for any feudal lord.

In October 1116, King Yejong of Koryŏ watched the first performance of the music at Kŏndŏkchŏn, the royal audience hall, together with his government officials. He dedicated the music at the Shrine to Royal Ancestors (*T'aemyo*) along with nine new hymn texts that honoured the ancestors' spirits. Following this, *Dasheng yayue* began to be played at various sacrificial rites. Until 1392, during the remainder of the Koryŏ dynasty, *Dasheng yayue* was gradually Koreanised. Eventually, a changed *aak* performing tradition was passed down to the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910).

Research on *Dasheng yayue* in Koryŏ has been published by Lee Hye-Ku [Yi Hyegu] (1967), Keith Pratt (1976, 1977, 1981), Robert Provine (1980, 1988) and myself (1985). In an important study, Pratt investigated the arrival of *Dasheng yayue* in Korea in respect to the diplomatic relations between Song and Koryô. In the remainder of this paper I will survey some aspects of the acceptance of *Dasheng yayue* in Koryŏ, which have already been discussed by others, and suggest a possible further view.

Scholars' views on the acceptance of *Dasheng yayue* in Koryŏ

Pratt, who has researched the political and diplomatic situation in the early 12th century, has posed a number of questions regarding the transfer of this musical tradition. Why would the emperor of Song send such imposing and

expensive gifts to Korea? Why do the voluminous Chinese historical sources make no mention of these gifts? Provine agrees with Pratt's answers, and re-explains the background to the transfer. The two state their conclusions as follows:

> The political situation in China during the Northern Sung [Song] was one of the most complicated that any imperial government had ever had to meet. Not only were politicians bitterly divided on how to deal with profound social and economic problems, but in foreign relations too the crises that beset the administration caused a re-evaluation of the power of Chinese *wen* and *teh* [*de*] to control the barbarians. In 1114 and 1116 it was still thought worthwhile to try and influence the Korean King Yejong with Confucian ritual music, but the more threatening Khitan and Jurchen had already begun to force the eventual, though vain, development of a more realistic attitude towards defence
>
> ...In 1114 and 1116 Emperor Hui-tsung [Huizong] sent [Koryŏ] two substantial gifts of music and instruments, the first of *tang-ak* and the second of *aak*. The purpose of these very expensive presents was partly political, to emphasise the cultural and religious ties which were supposed to bind Korea to China, and to dissuade King Yejong from switching his allegiance to the advancing Aguda, who assumed an imperial title in 1115 (Pratt 1977: 313-315).

> The enormous 1116 gift of music which set the long-lived Korean *aak* tradition on its way was, in short, an unsuccessful political bribe. Such a colossal diplomatic failure was not likely to find its way into official Chinese dynastic histories, and readers of Chinese history, therefore, have been unaware of Emperor Hui-tsung's [Huizong's] ill-contrived scheme to purchase Korea's loyalty.
>
> In sum, the Korean *aak* tradition began as a political bribe, and its musical content derived from a peculiar, albeit colorful, period in Chinese musical history. It would appear that *aak*, at its inception, was simply Chinese music transferred to Korea. In succeeding centuries, Koreans continued to perform and modify the imported Sung [Song] music (Provine 1980: 19-20).

The views of Pratt and Provine are very persuasive from the standpoint of the contemporary Chinese diplomatic and political situation. Their conclusions, however, say little about the cultural situation of Koryŏ and their views seem therefore biased towards China. For example, they regard *Dasheng yayue* as an unsuccessful political bribe. But if we consider the cultural background of the Korean court, and the Korean desire to import ritual music during the early Koryŏ dynasty, we may reach other conclusions. In my opinion, if we are to study cultural exchange, we must consider the viewpoints of both parties.

Relations with Song China from Korea's perspective have been summarized by Lee Ki-baik [Yi Kibaek]. He states:

> From the beginning Koryŏ admired the advanced civilization of Sung [Song] China and so sought to satisfy its material and cultural wants by maintaining a harmonious relationship with Sung. Thus, through the visits of official embassies and the travels of private merchants, Koryŏ exported such raw materials as gold, silver, copper, ginseng, and pine nuts, and handcrafted items favored by the Sung people such as paper, brushes, ink, and fans, in return importing silk, books, porcelain, medicines, spices, and musical instruments. These imports had a significant impact on Koryŏ's culture. For example, Sung woodblock editions contributed to the development of Koryŏ woodblock printing and Sung porcelain to the development of Koryŏ celadon ware. Thus the relationship between the two countries rested on a peaceful foundation of cultural and economic exchange, and this was precisely in conformity with the desires of the Koryŏ aristocracy (Lee 1984: 128).

During the first century of Koryŏ's power, Confucianism had gradually established itself as the guiding political principle of the Korean regime. Also, Confucian schools existed in Kaesŏng and P'yŏngyang by the time of T'aejo, but the foundation of Koryŏ's educational system can be said to have been laid with the establishment of a national university, the *Kukchagam*, under Sŏngjong in 992. King Yejong (r. 1105-1122), "established lectures in

seven specialized fields: *Classic of Changes, Book of History, Classic of Songs, Rituals of Chou, Book of Rites, Spring and Autumn Annals*, and a new field of military studies." He also founded "academic institutes on the palace grounds, the *Ch'ŏngyŏn* Pavilion and the *Pomun* Pavilion, recruiting scholars and collecting books for study of the classics and history" (Lee 1984: 130). So, from the early Koryŏ dynasty onwards, national political philosophy could be closely articulated with the growth of the intellectual class.

In short, Koryŏ was already significantly oriented toward Confucian culture, and she wished to attempt to import advanced aspects of the Confucian system. During King Sŏngjong's reign, supporting this statement, the observation of Confucian rites began. According to *Koryŏsa* (59.1a/b), the new ceremonies, all based on Confucian style rites, included sacrificial rites to heaven (*Wŏn'gu*), agriculture (*Chŏkchŏn*), land and grain (*Sajik*) and that given at the Royal Ancestral Shrine (*Chongmyo*). Koryŏ keenly felt the need for suitable ritual music, for the rites were considered incomplete without it.

There are more convincing historical references which reflect the necessity felt for ritual music by Koryŏ. According to *Koryŏsa*, and as reported by Pratt (1976), Song sent some musical gifts in 1114. On the fourth day of the seventh month, the Korean ambassador An Chiksung arrived back in Koryŏ in charge of Huizong's gift of *Dasheng xinyue*, music for banquets (*Koryŏsa* 13.33b). This gift comprised 167 instruments, scores, illustrated instructions on performing the music, and a message from the emperor himself (*Koryŏsa* 70.28a-29b). Immediately after this, King Yejong sent ambassadors Wang Chaji and Mun Kongŏn to China to express thanks to Huizong (*Koryŏsa* 13.33b).

The text of Yejong's message was not recorded by the *Koryôsa* compiler and is apparently unknown to both Pratt and Provine. Fortunately, the message was recorded by a minister, Pak Kyŏngjak (1055-1121) and is preserved in the *Tongmunsŏn* (Collection of Eastern Literature) first compiled in 1478. The message is very informative:

> On the second day of the sixth month, the Koryŏ ambassador An Chiksung brought the official instructions of the Song Emperor and delivered ten additional records that described the Emperor's gift of *Dasheng xinyue*, scores, and illustrations of how to play the music in Koryŏ.
>
> The Emperor made music through a marvellous scheme, and He has sent His new music to the nation on His Empire's border in order to share it with His people. Your gracious proclamation impressed and astonished us greatly.
>
> We respectfully think that the Emperor could have been a sage because of such wisdom and, due to revelations about His sincerity, He could refute the wrong pitch theory based on millet by accepting the proposal of a hermit scholar. By reporting the principles of pitch structure handed down from His ancestors, He was able to gain the correct pitch for the Emperor's tone, *hwangjong*.
>
> As a result He can control all five tones, played by instruments made from all eight kinds of material.[1] So, when the music is presented in the shrine for sacrifice to heaven, the spirits descend. And when the music is performed in the courtyard, all the government officials are in accord. Therefore, the Emperor could make manifest the success of His era by reconstructing the model musical system which had been lost in the remoteness of antiquity.
>
> Some time ago, Koryŏ sent a message with a special envoy to request the new music. The Emperor has listened to Koryŏ's desires and has been sympathetic to Koryŏ's sincerity. And, unexpectedly, he has bestowed the new music, not only musical instruments but also illustrations. Thus, even if our musicians do not know the details of how to play the music, they can learn by referring to the accompanying illustrations (*Kugyŏk tongmunsŏn* 1969: vol.4, 34-35).

Points of particular interest in the message are the brief background offered to *Dasheng xinyue*, the desire of the Koryŏ court to have access to the music, and Song China's compliance with Koryŏ's wishes.

According to a second letter, written by Minister Im Chon (fl. 1120-1130), after 1114 Koryŏ sent envoys and musicians to Song in order to learn *Dasheng xinyue* and, if possible, also the ritual music *Dasheng yayue*. This is supported by Xu Jing's comments in the *Gaoli tujing* (chapter 40) and the *Song shi* (80.19b2-3). So, the Korean court could not have been completely satisfied by the 1114 gift; they wanted most to learn real ritual music, not simply the new banquet music. The Koryŏ court accordingly applied to the emperor once more for *Dasheng yayue*. Huizong not only acceded to their wish for representatives to study in China, but sent a second huge musical gift, which this time would support the entire *Dasheng yayue*. Im Chon writes:

> While staying at my lodgings after I had paid a formal visit to the Song court's Audience Hall, I met an official who brought me the emperor's instructions. Minister Cai Jing delivered a message that gave permission for Koryŏ's musicians to learn *Dasheng yayue*. Usually, if the people of the higher social classes love something, those of the lower class will follow their taste. Everybody, then, will want to listen to the orthodox sound of *Dasheng yayue*. Now, given your warm official compliance, I am deeply grateful to you.
>
> King Yejong is edified by the advanced culture of Song. He respects etiquette (*li*), music (*yue*), the odes (*shi*) and the histories (*shi*). He recognizes the Song government as both a great civilisation and as the cultural model for other nations. Indeed, he has wanted to listen to *Dasheng yayue* ever since he heard of its completion. When I departed from Koryŏ, King Yejong made a special pronouncement. He told me: "If you have the opportunity of an audience with the Song Emperor, you must deliver my earnest request. Even though we have gratefully received the new banquet music from Song, I have not yet seen or heard *Dasheng yayue*. I wish to appreciate its elegant sounds. I know there are hierarchical differences of degree, but I think there is no reason to prohibit both the nobility and the peasantry learning the real meaning of something so distinctive. The beautiful accomplishment which is *Dasheng yayue* is symbolised by the successes of Song. The contents of *Dasheng yayue* have been handed down from the Emperor's ancestors. The development of the new music brings heaven and earth together. As heaven covers everything, earth cannot act in private. How can there be any limitations on listening to the orthodox and elegant sounds? Even though my desire is very sincere, I cannot voice them well. But, if you are granted a suitable opportunity, please deliver my earnest request to the Emperor."
>
> Now the Emperor has clearly seen our loyalty, and has allowed by His imperial order Koryŏ musicians to learn and practice *Dasheng yayue*. His order brings great glory and fortune to our nation, and it will be impossible for us to compensate Him for His kindness (*Kugyŏk tongmunsŏn* 1969: vol.4, 87-90; Song 1985: 17-20).

Huizong replied to Yejong in 1116 with the following message (the translation is by Pratt):

> Since the Three Dynasties [of Xia, Shang and Zhou], ritual has been scattered and music destroyed. If we search out ancient [sources], explain and elucidate them, [we see that rites and music] reach their greatest splendour after developing for a hundred years. A thousand years later we, reflecting upon the pitches and tunes of the Former Kings, have arrived at notes with such style and refinement as to fill the whole country, making visitors feel settled and giving pleasure to strangers. From far away in your country, expressing compassion from the Eastern Sea, you have asked permission to send officials, and these are now at court. In olden days when the teachings of feudal lords were honourable and their virtue outstanding they were rewarded with music, having instruments bestowed on them for the performance of sacrificial music. For "changing the evil customs of a place" (*shih*) there is nothing like this. Now we answer your request, and are sending [this gift] to your country. Though our borders are different and our lands separated, fundamentally there is great harmony [between us]. Is this not good? We are now presenting you with *Ta-sheng ya-yueh* [*Dasheng yayue*] (*Koryŏsa* 70.5a/b, cited in Pratt 1976: 209).

The messages reflect the motivations of the two nations. Koryŏ's letters were recorded only in private, not official publications such as *Koryŏsa*, *Song shi*, and so on. Until now, scholars have not been aware of King Yejong's message and Im Chon's letter. This is why they have erroneously interpreted the gifts of Huizong solely in terms of Song's political and diplomatic aims.

Conclusion

In summary, the above references and the general cultural background of the time indicate Koryŏ's desire to receive *Dasheng yayue*. If we regard the geo-political background from the viewpoint of Song, and agree upon its implications, we should not ignore Koryŏ's position. It is not difficult to perceive a very different perspective, that of the Koryŏ court. The acceptance of *Dasheng yayue* was not accomplished only because of the diplomatic policy of Song China, but it resulted also from the positive policy of Koryŏ towards the advanced Confucian culture of its mentor.

NOTE

1. The eight materials in Chinese thought are gourd, earth, skin, wood, stone, metal, silk and bamboo. The five tones comprise the fundamental pentatonic scale, named in respect to a central tone on *hwangjong*.

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GLOSSARY

An Chiksung	安稷崇	Chŏkchŏn	籍田
Chongmyo	宗廟	Ch'ŏngyŏn	清燕
Chosŏn	朝鮮	Dasheng	大晟
Dasheng xinyue	大晟新樂	Dasheng yayue	大晟雅樂
de	德	hŏn'ga	軒架
hwangjong	黃鐘	Huizong	徽宗
Im Chon	林存	Jin	金
Kaesŏng	開城	Kŏndŏkchŏn	乾德殿
Koryŏ	高麗	kukchagam	國子監
kŭm/qin	琴	Mun Kongŏn	文公彦
Pak Kyŏngjak	朴景綽	Pomun	寶文
P'yŏngyang	平壤	Sajik	社稷
Song	宋	Sŏngjong	成宗
T'aejo	太祖	T'aemyo	太廟
tangak	唐樂	tŭngga	登歌
ŭm/yin	陰	Wang Chaji	王字之
wen	文	Wŏn'gu	圓丘
yang	陽	Yejong	睿宗
Yuan	元	zhengsheng/chŏngsŏng	正聲
zhongsheng/chungsŏng	中聲		

MUMUNT'OGI AND MEGALITHIC MONUMENTS: A Reconsideration of the Dating

SARAH M. NELSON

Preamble

The category of *mumunt'ogi*, plain pottery, in Korean archaeology needs to be deconstructed. It is traditionally associated with the Bronze Age, but C_{14} dates show that some types predate bronze by a considerable period, while other types are found in the later *Wŏnsamguk* period. More important than bronze is the construction of megaliths; therefore I prefer to consider the time period of *mumun* to be the Megalithic. In this paper I look at the C_{14} dates along with the timing and distribution of various types of *mumun*, megalithic monuments, rice agriculture, and bronze. I conclude with some hypotheses about interpreting the Megalithic period.

Introduction

The category of *mumunt'ogi* has a long history in Korean archaeology. Early discussions of village settlements involved some sites on river banks where

incised potsherds and chipped stone tools had been recovered. Other similar artefacts were found on hillsides, featuring polished tools and sherds lacking surface decoration. Although conceptualized as representing different people, these types of site were at first believed to be contemporaneous with the first type. Excavations in the southeast of the Korean peninsula, especially at Tongsamdong, produced *mumun* in the lowest levels, leading to a hypothesis that *mumun* preceded *chulmun*, a plain style before "comb-marked" pottery. However, as *mumun* began to be found together with bronze objects, and as they were accordingly identified with the Bronze Age, *chulmun* came to be considered the earliest pottery in Korea, a purely "neolithic" pottery. Misari, a stratified site on the Han river, with *chulmun* below *mumun*, confirmed this revised sequence.

And so matters rested, with a suspicion of inverted stratigraphy cast upon the plain pottery at Tongsamdong. At least this was the case until carbonized wood associated with relatively plain vessels found at Osanni yielded the earliest C_{14} dates then known from any pottery site in Korea. It began to become evident that the designations of *mumun* and *chulmun* were too imprecise to be useful. Nevertheless, the category of *mumun* continues to appear in Korean archaeological reports, and is often described as Bronze Age pottery (e.g. Kim 1981, Yi 1988, Riotto 1989).

Variants of *Mumun*

Leaving aside the pre-*chulmun* pottery, much of which is also plain, I will look at varieties of *mumun* said to belong to the Bronze Age to tease out both regional variants and chronological sequences. Then I will consider the co-occurence of various kinds of stone tools and the appearance of megaliths, stone cists, rice agriculture, and bronze.

The earliest C_{14} dates associated with post-*chulmun* plain-surfaced pottery occur in sites along the southern coast. Dated layers at Sugari, Tongsamdong, Sangnodae Island, Kumgoktong and Shinamni serve as examples. The plain pottery vessels in these layers have rounded bases and doubled-over rims, with a row of slashes or incised lines across the bottom of the collar or just below it (Chŏng 1982). This is sometimes called double-mouth-rim pottery, or *ichungko*. Recalibrated dates fall in the 2000-1500 B.C. range (Nelson 1991). Several authors designate this stage Late Neolithic rather than Bronze Age (eg. Im 1984, Choe 1982, Choi 1984).

The associated stone tools found along the south coast are variable. Amorphorous flaked tools, hoes, grinding stones, a semi-lunar stone knife and shell bracelets were found with *ichungko* at Tongsamdong (Sample 1974), while Sugari's layers I and II with *ichungko* included flaked stone tools and biconical spindle whorls (Chŏng, Shin and Im 1981). Kumgoktong contained a projectile point with a diamond-shaped cross-section and a central tang, a small chisel and the usual utilized flakes (Kim and Chŏng 1980). Its recalibrated date is between 2120 and 1865 B.C. The uppermost layer at Osanni, which included *mumun* pottery and semi-lunar knives, was dated a bit later, from 1785 to 1355 B.C. (Im and Kwŏn 1984), within the range of *mumunt'ogi* in central Korea.

Central western Korean *mumun* have later dates and are associated with dolmens, stone cists, polished stone daggers, rice, and bronze, none of which have been found

with the *ichungko mumun* on the southern coast. Nevertheless, the doubled rim is prevalent in sites along the Han and Taedong rivers, featuring the same slanted incising that is present further south. Many vessels found along the Han have flat bases and outflaring sides in a flower-pot shape. This is known as the *karak* type, after a site in metropolitan Seoul (Im 1968). *Karak* co-exists with another type called *kongyul*, with a row of punctates around the rim, sometimes a scalloped lip, and a globular necked jar that is entirely undecorated.

The large village at Songgungni in South Ch'ungch'ŏng province also produced rice grains and *mumun* pottery, with two dated periods of 870 to 785 B.C. and 820 to 585 B.C. A nearby stone cist contained a Liaoning bronze dagger, a bronze chisel, a polished stone dagger, 11 polished stone projectile points, 2 curved beads called *kogok*, and 17 tubular beads (Yi 1976). In the dwellings, artifacts include stone daggers, diamond-shaped projectile points, semi-lunar knives, saddle querns, whetstones, spindle whorls, and groundstone axes. A wooden spade and a handle for a stone dagger have recently been unearthed, along with pedestal vessels. Dates for these habitations are 2665 ± 60 and 2565 ± 90 B.P. (715 and 615 B.C.) (Kang *et al* 1979; Chi, An and Song 1986; An, Cho and Yun 1987).

The site of Hunamni on the South Han river contains all three of these pottery types, as well as burnished red jars, a common feature of stone-cist graves. The wide-ranging C_{14} dates average about 800 to 500 B.C., and this is the time period to which the site is usually ascribed. Both chipped and polished stone tools have been found, as well as semi-lunar stone knives. Two kinds of projectile points were identified, frequently together. One type is like the arrowhead described at Kumgoktong, while the other is hexagonal in cross-section with an incurved base. Polished

stone daggers, commonly found in stone cists under dolmens, were found under Hunamni house floors. Spindle whorls, clay and stone net sinkers, and beads were also present. Four kinds of grains were identified, including wheat, barley, millet, and rice. The rice was of the *japonica* variety, which is adapted to climates with short growing seasons, that is, further north than the natural habitat of wild rice (Kim *et al* 1973, 1974, 1976, 1978).

Another type of (mostly) plain pottery, with two or three rows of short slanted lines forming a band around the rim but lacking the double rim is found at Naep'yŏngni on the North Han river. A C_{14} date of 1265 to 1045 B.C. was obtained with this, while houses with completely plain vessels had later dates of 815 to 765 and 415 to 300 B.C.

P'aengi, or "top-shaped" *mumun*, is found in the vicinity of the Taedong river. Characterized by a very narrow base and a globular body, it is thought to resemble a child's spinning toy. Associated stone tools include semi-lunar knives, spoked mace heads, perforated stone disks, grinding stones, spindle whorls, stepped adzes, and projectile points and stone daggers. Both the latter have a diamond-shaped cross-section. Carbonized rice has been reported from a site near P'yŏngyang. *P'aengi* is often regarded as the earliest *mumun* by South Korean archaeologists (eg Kim 1978), but this claim is not supported with radiocarbon dating.

Another type of pottery with incised all-over patterns is, I believe mistakenly, usually lumped with *chulmun*. This so-called *ponggae* (lightning pattern) pottery comes in identical shapes to some forms of plain pottery vessels found northwards, and it is accompanied by a similar artifactual assemblage (Kim 1968, Kang 1975). The decorative patterns are geometric, but much more complex

and better executed than those on the usual *chulmun* ware. This type of pottery is found in sites across the northern border of North Korea along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, and is possibly related to Upper Xiajiadian in China. Unfortunately, no C_{14} dates have been reported.

Other plain pottery found in the northeast includes jars with long funnel-shaped necks, gourd-shaped bodies and small lug handles, along with pedestal vessels called *dou*. These are similar to sites in the Yanbian Autonomous Region of Jilin Province, China, where they are lumped into the Tuanjie Culture (Lin 1985). This is probably the earliest appearance of *dou* in Korea.

Finally, plain pottery with large, oval, shallow impressions around the base or (more commonly) around the rim is found from central to southern Korea. It is sometimes referred to as the *chŏngdo* type. Radiocarbon dates associated with this pottery are late, up to 115 AD, placing it in the Late Bronze Age or Early Iron Age (National Museum of Korea 1981, Ch'oe 1983).

Thus we see that *mumun* pottery varies both spatially and temporally. What can we make of this? The most obvious conclusion is that *mumun* is found throughout the Korean peninsula, but with regional variants. Again, so-called *mumun* has dates that cover a more than 2000-year span. Using *mumun* as a time marker consequently obscures the fact that megaliths, stone cists, rice and bronze seem to have appeared in Korea at different times across this 2000 year period, with possibly different ports of entry and different trajectories.

Stone cists and Mumun

The major type of pottery found in stone cists is not *mumun*, but burnished red jars. These are usually small and globular, with short necks and out-flaring rims. Their walls are thinner than *mumun*, and the vessels appear to be fired at a higher temperature. Associated stone tools, however, are also found at dwelling sites where *mumun* is abundant, and sherds of red burnished jars rarely turn up at habitation sites. The association seems confirmed, but indirect.

The distribution of stone cists and red jars includes the Tumen river and the northeast coast, sites uncovered along the east coast near Yangyang and the basin of the North and South Han river branches, southwest Korea, and the lower Naktong river (An 1977).

Megaliths and Mumun

Megaliths are found in several forms: table dolmens, *paduk*-table dolmens, dolmens without propping stones, and menhirs (Hwang 1981). Except for menhirs, these stone formations usually mark burial sites. Table dolmens, also called "northern style" dolmens, probably continued the grave within the above-ground structure. Easy to rob, these constructions nowadays provide little information and virtually no associated artifacts. Southern style dolmens, in contrast, mark subterranean graves, are difficult to move, and cannot be easily distinguished from natural boulders. It is not surprising that the recovery of

objects and even skeletal material from beneath the cap stone is more common than from northern style dolmens.

The structure of the burial beneath the dolmen structure may be a stone cist, a jar, or a simple pit (in roughly chronological order). Stone cists, as noted above, tend to contain red burnished pottery, but the jars may be *mumun* jars. Round-based early jars were never used in this manner, but later forms of *mumun*, especially those with basal oval depressions, may be used for burials.

Rice and Mumun

Sites at which rice has been discovered contain *mumun* or later styles of pottery. The Songgungni and Hunamni sites are in particular firmly associated with rice at least as early as 850 B.C. The types of *mumun* found include both *karak* and *kongyul*, as well as jars with narrow necks. Rice was also found with *mumun* at Namgyŏng near P'yŏngyang, along with millets and soybeans (Kim and Sŏk 1984). These latter sites also establish a connection between rice, *mumun*, and polished stone daggers and arrowheads.

Bronze and Mumun

Songgungni, with its nearby stone cist burial including a bronze dagger of the Puyo style, demonstrates a firm relationship between bronze and the *mumun* of the central west coast styles. It is unknown whether this particular

dagger was made locally or imported. But to designate *any* appearance of *mumun* as Bronze Age appears inappropriate, and is unlikely to lead to any better understanding of this period of Korean prehistory. Tight assemblages of bronze, stone cists, dolmens, rice, and diamond cross-sectioned projectile points are associated only with *karak* and *kongyul* pottery in South Korea, and possibly with *p'aengi* pottery in the northern Hwanghae and South *P'yôngan* provinces. The *ichungko* of the south coast have few of the same attributes, and the dates are much earlier.

Conclusion

In order to begin to get a better grasp of the Megalithic period, it seems wise to abandon the general categorization of *mumun*, and to use terms that are more specific in both time and place. In particular, *karak* ware appears to be a valid time marker for perhaps 1000 through 500 B.C. throughout the southern part of the peninsula. With a more fine-grained grid to build on, it may become possible to examine the process of culture change, and the effects of rice and bronze on the local economy.

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